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ABSTRACT 
Syria's Policy Towardy the Lebanese Cohflict: 1975-1990 
In the 1970s, variou$;^ mtemal tensions inlfep^t to the Lebanese 
••>i 
Vs^i'-- .<-^ .r 
system and multiple regional developments eontrilj^ted to the breakdown 
of governmental authority and the outbreak of civil strife in 1975. The 
cause of the Lebanese civil war was neither exclusively internal nor 
exclusively external, nor was its settlement. Syria as an external major 
power had intervented in the Lebanese conflict. 
The Syrian role in the Lebanese civil war has to be analysed from 
the point of view of the developments that had been taking place at the 
regional level during the two years foUov/ing the October war. The 
Egyptian - Israeli disengagement agreement on Sinai in September 1975 
left Syria isolated. After the Sinai accord Egypt withdrew from the 
confrontation against Israeli occupation. The Sinai agreement meant that 
Egypt could not effectively come to Syria's rescue if war broke out again 
with Israel. Thus Syria felt particularly vulnerable to an Israeli military 
attack from across the Golan Heights. However, there was another more 
serious dangers - the danger of an Arab - Israeli war sparked off by an 
Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. 
Israeli occupation of South Lebanon would increase Syria's 
strategic vulnerabilit\ considerably b} providing Israel with new front in 
any future war. The Israelis could engage the Syrians on the Golan 
Heights while simultaneously launching an offensive aimed at Damascus 
through the highly exposed Bekka Valley in Lebanon and the Syrian are 
incapable of fighting the Israelis on two fronts. The operation of 
Palestinian guerillas had alread\ provoked a series of Israeli raids into 
Lebanon and the Syrians feared that if the guerilla operations continued. 
Israel would use them as a pretext for occupying South Lebanon. 
Consequently, the Syrian regime pursued a convoluted course 
regarding Lebanon. On the one hand, Sxria supported the PLO and other 
Muslim radical elements in Lebanon, which were considered useful as 
troublemakers against Israel and were also perceived as increasing Syrian 
influence over events in Lebanon. On the other hand, it seems that Syria 
would have preferred the political system to remain intact and 
controllable. Thus, Syria sought to end the Civil War in order to preserve 
the status quo, albeit in a modified form. 
Another consideration which shaped Syrian policy towards the 
Lebanese conflict was the Syrian desire for a peaceful settlement of the 
Arab - Israeli dispute on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal from more or 
less all the Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the setting up of an 
independent Palestinian state on the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza 
Strip. Then, from the Syrian viewpoint, in such a case the need for Syrian 
intervention in Lebanon became all the more necessary. 
And the final consideration that determined Syria's policy towards 
the civil war was the Syrian belief that Lebanon and Syria are really 
integral parts of a greater Syria and that the divisions between the two 
countries was a result of conspiracy hatched by the French to serve their 
own colonial interests. To Assad the Syrian and Lebanese are one people 
and it is difficult to draw a line between Lebanon's security in its 
broadest sense and Syrian security. 
All these considerations which underlay Syria's policy towards the 
Lebanese civil war. The civil war which started with the Ayn al-
Rummana massacre passed through five distinct phases. The first phase 
was characterized by fighting between the Palestinians and the Kataib 
party, which resulted in a cabinet crisis. The cabinet crisis in turn was 
transformed into a conflict among Lebanese themselves. It ended with the 
formation of the six-member 'Salvation Cabinet' of Karami. 
The second phase was characterized by a temporary halt in the 
fighting which lasted until early September 1975 when large-scale 
fighting broke out and resulted in the destruction of the dov/ntown 
commercial area of Beirut. This phase ended with the formation of a 
twenty-member National Dialogue Committee. The third phase was 
characterized by the continued efforts to reach an agreement on political 
reforms. 
In the fourth phase the conflict took on a Lebanese - Palestinian 
character when the Christian started the siege of the Palestinian camps of 
Tell al-Zatar and Jisr al - Basha. This phase also witnessed an increase in 
the role of Syrians in trving to bring about a ceasefire. Syrian mediation 
efforts led to the declaration of the Constitutional Document. 
The final phase of the civil-war \\ as characterized by a continued 
offensive of the National Movement and Palestinians against the 
Christians who were now on the losing side. In the face of the continued 
National Movement offensive Christian strong - holds every where began 
to shrink and for the first time S\ria began to give indications that it no 
longer supported the Muslims and was quite prepared to move against 
them. The final phase came to an end with the Syrian military 
intervention on 9 April 1976 against the National Movement and 
Palestinians. 
During the first two years of the war, the balance of forces favored 
the LNM and their Palestinian allies. They tried to advance their plan but 
were unable to impose it, especially after the Syrian military intervention 
in 1976. By 1977 the LNM forces were in retreat and their ability to 
influence political events declined, especially after the assassination of 
Kamal Junblatt in 1977. Gradually, the LNM abandoned its program of 
political reform and in 1980 began building bridges with the traditional 
Islamic leadership. The new program that it developed was based on a 
preservation of the traditional confessional system but with a 
redistribution of confessional power to reflect demographic and political 
changes. During the period of 1976 to 1982, the Lebanese state under 
President Elias Sarkis undertook various initiatives to fmd a negotiated 
settlement to the Lebanese conflict, but none succeeded. Meanwhile, the 
Lebanese Front was gradually strengthening its position and awaiting 
favorable regional developments to impose its own will. 
The Israeli invasion of 1982 dealt a staggering blow to the 
Palestinians and the LNM and dramatically strengthened the Lebanese 
Front, bringing its militant leader, Bashir Gemayel, to the presidency. 
Bashir Gemayel was assassinated within days of his election, and his 
brother, Amin, was hastily elected in his stead. In the wake of the 
invasion American involvement in Lebanon grew, aimed mainly at 
brokering a withdrawal agreement between Lebanon and Israel that, it 
was hoped, would be a precursor to a ftiller peace treaty between the two 
countries. However. b\ 1984. less than two years after the Kata'ib and 
President Amin GemayeFs coming to power, the Israeli "new order" in 
Lebanon had all but collapsed. The Lebanese-Israeli agreement initialed 
on May 17. 1984, ran into strong opposition from Syria, was not ratified 
and was soon abrogated by the Lebanese government; Israel began 
withdrawing from most Lebanese territories except a border strip in south 
Lebanon under the control of Israel's surrogate South Lebanon Army; the 
Lebanese government turned awa\ from Israel and the U.S. and opened a 
dialogue with Syria to tlnd a wa\ out of the impasse. Indeed, by 1985, 
Syria had regained most of the power o\ er Lebanese affairs that it had 
lost to the Israelis and Americans in 1982. 
On another level, internal battles of that period, in the Mountain 
and Shouf area (1983), in Beirut (1984), and in East Sidon (1985) 
increased the sectarian character of the Lebanese conflict. Confessional 
segregation reached its peak and the confessionally-based militias ruled 
the various regions in closed and semi-closed enclaves. In the Christian 
areas the militias spread slogans of a "Christian republic," "Christian 
security," federalism and partition. In the Muslim areas, the emerging 
radical Islamic movements raised the slogans of an Islamic republic. 
In 1983, a meeting in Geneva of representatives from the major 
Lebanese factions for a national dialosiue conference achieved little 
progress. They were able to agree on only one issue, the Arab identity of 
Lebanon. When these representatives met again in Lausanne in 1984, 
they were not able to make any further progress. In December of 1985, 
and with the encouragement and support of the Syrians, representatives of 
the dominant confessional militias, the Christian Lebanese Forces, the 
Shiite Amal Movement, and the predominantly Druze Progressive 
Socialist Party, met in Damascus and reached an agreement, known as the 
Tripartite Agreement, on political reforms and special relations with 
Syria. However, in early 1986, President Amin Gemayel and Samir 
Geagea (intelligence chief of the Lebanese Forces) organized a coup 
against the Lebanese Forces leader Elie Hubayka. Hubayka was ousted 
from his position as the leader of the Lebanese Forces and the Tripartite 
agreement as rendered null and void. 
A state of political paralysis prevailed in Lebanon between 1986 
and the end of President Gemayel's term on September 23, 1988. In fact, 
Prime Minister Rashid Karami and the cabinet boycotted the President 
Karami tendered his resignation as Prime Minster but soon thereafter, on 
June 1, 1987, was assassinated. Yet, the cabinet continued to function 
with Salim al-Hoss as acting Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the Lebanese 
and Syrian governments pursued talks to find an alternative to the 
Tripartite Agreement. The talks became deadlocked after the 
assassination of Karami, but not before agreement on the broad outlines 
of political reform, relations between Lebanon and Syria, and the position 
vis-a-vis the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. Most of the points 
agreed upon in these talks found their way into the Taif Agreement of 
1989. 
At the end of Gemayel's term, in September 1988, the failure to 
elect a new president led to a political vacuum which threatened to lead to 
partition. Gemayel appointed an interim cabinet headed by Army 
commander Michel Aoun, but this cabinet's authority was only accepted 
in the predominantly Christian areas; in West Beirut and other regions of 
the countr)', the original cabinet headed by Salim al-Hoss was regarded as 
the legitimate one. Executive authority was thus split between the 
military government of Aoun and the civilian government of Hoss. The 
two governments stood against each other and each claimed exclusive 
legitimacy. The legislative authority also experienced a vacuum because 
the parliament failed to renew the one year term of the speaker or to elect 
a new one. 
The Lebanese conflict had always been linked in significant ways 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The various Lebanese factions had, 
repeatedly, attempted to exploit their associations with one or another of 
the conflicting regional parties to promote their own internal interests. 
Such associations complicated and prolonged the civil war. Indeed, the 
polarization among the Lebanese and their efforts to defend or promote 
their interests invited and facilitated external intervention. However, if it 
was necessary to settle the internal dispute in order to decrease the role of 
external forces, it was also necessary to have their tacit acceptance or to 
minimize their capabilities to oppose a settlement in order for such a 
settlement to succeed. In 1989 such conditions were available. 
Israel had already lost interest in Lebanon after 1984-85 and was 
preopcupied with the rising Palestinian intifada which had erupted in 
December, 1987, in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza 
strip. As for the Palestinians in Lebanon, the exodus of Palestinians 
troops from Beirut in August of 1982 dramatically weakened their 
influence. Later development between 1983 and 1988, battles between 
Syrian and Palestinian troops in the north, battles between Amal and the 
Palestinians in Beirut, and various intra-Palestinian fights, contributed 
fiirther to the weakening of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The remaining 
Palestinian armed forces were isolated in a few refugee camps of South 
Lebanon. 
In contrast to the Israelis and the Palestinians, Syrian influence in 
Lebanon increased steadily. Syrian influence in Lebanon had always been 
considerable, but the military intervention of 1976 gave it a solid material 
footing. In the Civil War, Syria initially supported the LNM and their 
Palestinian allies until the Spring of 1976 when it became evident that the 
balance offerees was tipping dramatically in the latter's favor. On June 1, 
1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon, upon an invitation by the President 
and the Lebanese front and supported the Lebanese front in holding back 
LNM and Palestinian armed forces. In October 1976, two Arab summits 
held in Cairo and Riyadh endorsed the Syrian intervention. They 
established an Arab Deterrent Force, the majority of which was 
composed of Syrians. In 1982, Syrian troops were also forced by the 
Israelis to evacuate West Beirut along with the Palestinian troops. 
However, within a few years, Syria was able to regain its influence in 
Lebanon. In 1987, Syrian troops reentered West Beirut as well as various 
regions of the Mountain, the Shouf and the southern suburbs of Beirut. In 
1990, Syrian troops reentered East Beirut and other predominantly 
Christian areas that the) had been forced out of in 1978. 
Part of this re-expansion of Syrian power was with Arab and 
Western acquiescence. This acquiescence was partly to avoid inter-Arab 
conflicts and partly to curry Syrian favor in the Persian Gulf and the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. In 1989, Iraq, free from the pressure of the 
war with Iran, intervened in support of General Aoun and the Lebanese 
Forces and against Syria. This could have led to an escalating regional 
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conflict between Iraq and Syria: therefore, the Arab states, led by Saudi 
Arabia, held a summit meeting in Casablanca and formed a Tripartite 
Committee composed of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of 
Morocco, and President Shadli Ben Jedid of Algeria to deal with the 
Lebanese crisis. 
The Arab initiative in the Lebanese conflict was not only a way to 
minimize the threat of regional escalation, but was also interpreted by 
some as an attempt by the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, to 
counterbalance Syrian influence in Lebanon with a little bit of its own 
influence. 
The U.S. was interested in curtailing the crisis in Lebanon so as not 
to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process. After the development of the 
Gulf crisis in 1990, the U.S. had the added concern of containing Iraq and 
gaining Syrian support for the Gulf war coalition. The end of then Cold 
War and the break up of the soviet Union strengthened American 
influence in the region and allowed it to pursue its policy objectives with 
fewer global obstacles. The U.S. supported the Ta'if negotiations and lent 
its support both in Arab circles and vis-a-vis Syria toward the successful 
completion of those talks. 
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The Ta'if Agreement (officially, the Document of National 
Accord) was the document that provided the basis for the ending of the 
civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. The signing of 
the Arab League sponsored TaTf Accord in October 1989 brought a new 
dawn of peace into Lebanon. It set in motion the process of national 
reconciliation in Lebanon after more than sixteen years of fierce fighting 
and bloodshed. The end of war underlined the need to build a state of 
peace - one that can consolidate the foundations of stability and set the 
countn on a steady course of orderly evolution and progress. 
The Ta'if Accord has muzzled the fighting warlords in Lebanon, 
but it alone cannot ensure a long-term peace. For, the political stability 
and the rebuilding of its economic base depend on the actors and more so 
on their actions than a document or constitution. However, the accord's 
provisions lays stress on external and domestic prerequisites to durable 
peace. Externally, Lebanon's stability is inextricably linked to the degree 
of legitimacy and sovereignty respected by external actors. Domestically, 
socio-political stabilit}' is conditioned by a measure of legitimacy the 
state derives from its people, i.e., the reestablishment of state authority 
subsuming the sectoral or communal loyalties. 
Following the implementation of the Ta'if Accord there has been a 
tremendous improvement in the Lebanese political situation. Lebanon 
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embarked on the series of reforms according to the provision of the 
agreement and signs of long lasting peace had begun to emerge except in 
the southern Lebanon. But the intermittent fights between Israeli forces 
and Hizbullah in the South still cast darks shadows of civil war. The 
"South Lebanon issue" is a part of the age- old Arab Israeli Conflict and 
can not be resolved without settling the Palestinian question. Under Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri. Lebanon started improving economically; currency 
stabilized, and physical and social reconstruction was kept at the top of 
the priority. 
The Ta'if Accord, undoubtedly, contains many provisions to tackle 
long standing sources of domestic instabilitv', namely, socio-economic 
disparities and socio-political discontents. In the socio-economic arena 
provisions for equitable regional development and administrative 
decentralization are notable. In the political side, Ta'if accord emphasizes 
the abolition of political confessional ism as a basic national goal. 
Deconfessionalisation is considered as an important step toward 
relegitimizing Lebanon's political system. The Ta'if accord calls for the 
eventual elimination of the confessional system and it refers to the 
establishment of a national committee that will devise measures to guide 
the political transition. 
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However, the process of deconfessinalization is not as simple as it 
appears from outside, it is encumbered by severe limitations. 
Deconfessionalization means dis-enfranchisement of the existing 
establishment, which derives its power from the same confessional 
constituency. It is doubtful whether the confessional establishment would 
ever take such a drastic step to disempower those benefiting from it. 
Moreover, considering Lebanon's current political and social reality, 
whether an institutional change will produce a fimctionally 
deconsfessionalised system or not is a question. 
With regard to this, socio-political characteristics of Lebanon 
require a special mention. As primordial ties and politics are very much 
inter-related in Lebanon, deconfessionalization of the institutions alone 
do not bring complete democracy to the country. More than five years 
after signing the TaMf Agreement, many improvements have been 
realized. The war has ended, and most Lebanese, except for one part of 
the southern population, have enjoyed a long forgotten peace since late 
1990. State institutions have reestablished their authority, the army is 
united and gaining strength, and the deterioration in economic conditions 
has stopped, although a lot has to be done to face a serious financial 
deficit and economic stagnation. However, the Ta'if Agreement was and 
is still being implemented within a different balance of internal forces as 
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well as a different balance of regional, Arab forces, than originally 
intended. This is reflected through the increase of Syrian influence and a 
lack of balanced internal representation in Parliament because of the 
"Christian" decision to boycott the elections held in the summer of 1992. 
This imbalance has led some of those who participated in and supported 
the agreement to join the opposition and declare that what is being 
implemented is not the Ta'if Agreement. 
Syria's unquestionable influence in the Lebanese political affairs 
imposes constants on it autonomy, with regard to Syria's influence, it is 
considered as a mixed blessing. Although it protects Lebanon from the 
external penetrations there is a significant section in Lebanon, which 
perceives the Syrian domination with a "conquered" feeling. However, 
despite the negative domestic fallout that Syria's presence provokes; its 
insulating effect has a positive domestic consequence; it allows the 
Lebanese to focus better on their internal problems. 
In the event, Lebanon's future shaped by external pressures and 
influences will be largely dependent on the regional peaces process. 
Peace exercise between the major players, Syria, Israel and the 
Palestinians will have a tremendous effect on the Lebanese political 
scene. 
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IPreface 
There have already been several studies of the Lebanese 
Civil War and of Syrian involvement in Lebanon, but no analytical 
account of the gradual development of this involvement, or of the direct 
interactions between the external powers, has been fully presented. Thus 
the focus of this thesis is a historical - analytical discussion of Syrian 
policies in Lebanon from 1975 to 1990. 
Events in Lebanon cannot, of course, be explained solely in 
terms of the involvement of external powers. On the contrary, the actions 
of the external powers were generally in response to internal 
development. It is the basic assumption of this thesis that the nature of the 
Lebanese political system and its inherent instabilities had a profound 
impact on the successes and failures of the policies of the external actors. 
Thus, while Syria and Israel serve as the focus of attention, it has been 
necessary to relate to Lebanese internal political events throughout the 
narrative. 
Indeed, the question of Lebanese internal politics is the 
starting - point for this thesis. Consequently, Chapter one deals with the 
historical background and overview of Syrian - Lebanese relation since 
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the medieval times upto the collapse of the Ottoman empire. It then goes 
on to discuss Syria-Lebanon relations during the mandate years focusing 
on the emergence of distinct Syrian and Lebanese identities unrelating in 
the independence of both countries from French rule designation of Al-
Sham covered the subsequent post - colonial states of Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Israel during the Ottoman rule before the First World War 
upto the French mandate after World War and finally the region had 
reached to an independence after the Second World War. 
Chapter two, discusses the basis of Lebanese political 
instability and goes on briefly to narrate the development of the Civil 
War, as well as the background to Syrian policies in Lebanon. Syria's 
interests, its perceptions of Lebanese domestic developments and its role 
within the context of the Lebanese Civil War has been analysed in this 
chapter. 
Chapter three focuses on the complex interrelationship 
between developments within Lebanon and Israeli - Syrian strategic 
relations during 1977-1981, and also deals with the gradual evolution of 
the Israeli - Syrian deterrence dialogue concerning the limits of Syrian 
military intervention. This intervention is discussed both within the 
context of the Israeli - Syrian strategic relationship and as a factor 
affecting and being affected by internal developments in Lebanon. 
viii 
Chapter four includes a discussions of the Israeli war 
objectives, some explicit, others ambiguous, and outlines the main 
military moves. The discussion of these moves serves to underline the 
politico-strategic objectives of Israel and Syria. The siege of Beirut and 
the intricate Israeli - Syrian - Lebanese - American interactions leading 
to the withdrawal of the PLO and Syrian forces from Beirut are dealt with 
in this chapter. 
Chapter Five, examines the efforts to bring out an explicit 
and elaborate analysis of the political reforms in Lebanon. 
It also analyses the Ta'if Accord highlighting its political 
salience in the reconstruction process. Finally, the problems and 
prospects for sustaining peace and stability in the country are discussed. 
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CHA'PTEH- f 
CHAPTER-I 
Historical Background: An Overview of Syrian-Lebanese 
Relation 
Introduction 
Lebanon's relation with Syria has been one of the many 
persistent riddles of West Asian region. Historically connected and, 
culturally and politically conjoined, relationship betv^een the two 
countries have been very significant for contemporary history for both the 
states. Their mutual relationship has kept the world busy with great deal 
of conflicts and temporaiy agreements. But Lebanon for Syria and vice 
versa is a relationship that will have to be evaluated in a completely 
different way that is not available under the rubric of international 
relations, because most of this bilateral relation has flourished under the 
non-nationalist factors like ethnicity, sectarian ties and pan-national 
sentiments. 
Lebanon and Syria are two sections of a single historic 
geopolitical and cultural regional entity with diverse religious and ethnic 
constitution. Both ancient and mythical the lands of Lebanon and Syria 
are the founts of fables and fine crafts. By the late medieval age, the 
future of Lebanon and S) ria had started to move in differing directions. 
While Lebanon came under the Maronite Christian influence, and 
because of the sect's closeness to French Catholic School, ultimately 
became an amicable ground for resolving the East and the Western 
influences in the West Asian region, Syria continued to be under the strict 
domain of the Ottomans. But not for long., by the early twentieth century, 
Syria and Lebanon came under the influence of the European powers who 
took away large geographical tracts as "mandates". French interest was 
solidified, so was the difference between Lebanon and Syria. Two 
countries ^^  ere set upon a long and difficult path that would finally take 
them both on a ride that would push Lebanon to a civil war situation and 
inaugurate a truly complex chapter of international politics in West Asia 
in general and the Levant in particular. 
Al - Sham (or Vilayat al-Sham) under the Ottoman Rule 
Since the medieval times the geographical designation of Al-
Sham covered the subsequent post-colonial states of Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordon, and Israel. Syria gradual!}' acquired a predominantly Arab-
Muslim character after the seventh century Arab conquest, and Damascus 
served as the capital of the Islamic Umayyad Empire until A.D. 750. 
Syria then preserved its distinctive cultural tone through two centuries of 
occupation by European crusaders and four centuries of rule by the 
Ottoman Turks. This region did ne\er sit quiet. For centuries, war and 
conflicts existed side by side with a rich intermixture of all the dominant 
ideas that shaped the world during those years. They came from both the 
east and the western parts of the globe. The movement of the cultured and 
the learned men was chronicled extensively. Even in the Holy Bible, 
mention is made of the "three wise men" who came earning gifts to the 
baby Jesus after his birth from distant lands. Ideas mingled freely in the 
region and set off ripples that reverberated across the region and the 
world. This tendency was to continue for many centuries to come. 
The Ottomans of Turkey ruled Syria through the system of 
Pashas, who governed with unlimited authority over the land under their 
control. The Pashas remained responsible only to the sublime Porte. The 
institution of Pashas was a unique Ottoman innovation. The Pashas were 
both administrative and military leaders. Furthermore, the Pashas ruled 
through smaller administrative districts headed either by a subordinate 
Turk or a loyal Arab. Throughout Ottoman rule, governors and the 
governed remained strangers except among those wealthier Syrians who 
entered government service or studied in Turkish universities'. 
Syria had known economic prosperity in the past but did not 
know it again under the Ottoman rule. At time attempts were made to 
rebuild the country, but on the whole the region that was to constitute 
Syria remained poor. The population decreased by nearly 30 percent, and 
hundreds of villages virtually disappeared into the desert. Only the area 
known as Mount Lebanon achieved economic progress, resulting largely 
from the relatively independent rule of the Druze emirs. 
In the early sixteenth century the Ottomans captured Mount 
of Lebanon and Syria from the Mamluks and set about reorganizing the 
administrative structure of the conquered territories. In 1590 they set up 
an emirate over Mount Lebanon as a part of this process of administrative 
reorganization. During the entire period of its existence (1590-1842) the 
emirate, instead of being ruled by loosely spread families, was governed 
by two main dynasties, the Maans and the Shihabs . Mount Lebanon had 
throughout history provided refuge to threatened minorities, fleeing from 
conquering invaders or religious persecution. At the time of creation of 
the emirate, Mount Lebanon was b\' and large dominated by two sects-the 
Maronites, in the North and the Druze Muslims in the South. Initially the 
emirate was under Druze political hegemony. However, as a result of 
certain socio-economic and demographic change in the mountains there 
was a gradual decline in IDruze power and by the mid-eighteenth century 
the Maronites had replaced the Druze as the dominant political force in 
the emirate^. 
This Maronite political ascendancy in Mount Lebanon 
generated considerable bitterness among the Druze. Resentful of the 
Maronite domination and angered by Christian intrusion into the South 
the Druze revolted in 1841. 
The revolt began in the north as a Maronite Christian peasant 
uprising against Christian landlords. As the revolt moved southwards to 
the territories where the landlords were Druze, the conflagration acquired 
an inter-sectarian character, and the Druze massacred some 10,000 
Maronites. 
Vilayat al-Sham or Syria which came to be known as Syria, 
used to be a part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 until the end of World 
War I (see Map-1). Most of Syria was part of the three provinces 
(Vilayat) of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut. The Ottoman administration 
was concentrated mainly in the cities, thus allowing local leaders to rule 
remote towns and villages, provided they pay their taxes and refrain from 
rebellion. With the continuing decline of the Ottoman Empire during the 
nineteenth century. Western influence grew-first through economic and 
cultural penetration, later through political and militar}' intervention. 
France was the power with the most ramified interests in Syria, a result of 
steady commercial activit)' as well as ties with the Catholic, and 
especially the Maronite communit)-^ . 
Later, by the nineteenth century the European powers had 
started to take advantage of Ottoman weakness through both military and 
political penetration, including Napolean's invasion of Egypt, subsequent 
British intervention, and French occupation of Lebanon. By the time, 
Lebanon was for the first time officially detached from Syria, and its 
administration came mcreasmgly under the control of France . 
During the Ottoman rule, the Druze revolt led the Ottoman 
authority to abolish the emirate the following year. Western penetration 
became decidedly political after the Druze uprising in the Syrian province 
of Lebanon. A conference of the Five European powers met with the 
representatives of the Ottoman Empire and the Porte had agreed in 
principle to a scheme ol partition, providing for Druze and a Christian 
Qu'im-Maqam (administrative deputy), each to rule over his 
coreligionists under the general supervision of the local Ottoman 
governor. This scheme \MIS a compromise between the continued French, 
preference for the return of the Shihabs and Turkey's desire for her own 
direct control. Then the} divided Mount Lebanon into two districts on 
qaim-mamiyah, one Druze and the other Maronite governed by a district 
ruler (qaim-magam) who was appointed and could be removed by the 
Pasha of Sidon, the Sultan"s direct representative in the coastal Levant^ . 
The new solution, however, further aggravated the situation. 
The Druze and Christian population were already too intermingled to 
permit such a simple solution. Many Druze live in the Northern Maronite 
district and the Christian of Southern Druze district outnumbered the 
Druze. Besides, Maronite Christian Maronite backed by the French 
wanted authority overall Christians including those in the Southern 
district. The contradictions inherent in the new system led to renewed 
clashes in 1845 .^ Continuing tensions between the two sects finally 
resulted in 1860 in a civil war in the mountains. The fighting in that civil 
war assumed a savage character. Within a brief period of three months 
nearly 12,000 Christians were massacred, crops were destroyed and 
churches and monasteries burned down. In neighbouring Syria, for no 
apparent grievances, about 10,000 Christians were slaughtered in 
Damascus . 
Tellingly, the large-scale killing of Christians immediately 
led to French intervention. French protection of the Christians in Syria 
and Lebanon had a long history of its own. Official French contact with 
Syria and Lebanon can be traced back to the Crusades of the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries. It was during the Crusades that most of Maronites came 
to communion with Rome. The earliest indication of what in later years 
was to become the French protectorate of Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire is to be found in a letter dated 21 May, 1250 from Saint Louis to 
the Maronite Patriarch which reads: 
We are convinced that this nation (the Lebanon) is 
a part of the French Nation, for its friendship for 
the French resembles the friendship, which the 
French have among themselves. We promise to 
give you and your people protection and to do 
whatever will be necessary for you well being,'' 
The friendship that evolved between the Maronites and the 
Crusaders lasted for nearly two centuries. The Lebanese took a great 
interest in the French language and culture and intermarriage between 
French and the Levantines furthered the bonds between the two people. 
With the end of the crusades, however, as the soldiers and missionaries 
began to depart from the Levant the once strong French influence was 
also gradually weakened. 
The expansion of European trade and Commerce in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth century led to a renew of the close ties that had 
existed between French and the Levant in the past. The French King 
Francois I and Suleiman the Magnificent signed the first Capitulation, 
which accorded France certain commercial privileges and initiated the 
development of the French Catholic protectorate in the Levant. 
Subsequent renewals of the Capitulation enlarged its scope to include 
religious freedom to French subjects in the Ottoman Empire. In time the 
indigenous Catholics of Syria and Lebanon were also brought under the 
cover the Capitulation and France came to be acknowledge as the 
protector of catholic Christians in the Levant'^. King Louis XIV in a 
response to an appeal by the Maronite Patriarch formally "adopted" the 
Maronite community in Lebanon''*. 
This royal protection was renewed then and by the 
eighteenth century it had become a well established tradition. As a result 
of the special status of France in the Levant, French Catholic missionaries 
flocked in large numbers to this area. The French Jesuits who came to 
Mount Lebanon in 1634 established numerous schools. The Lazarists set 
up the Antoura school in 1780, the first institution to impact secondary 
education. The Christian Brothers and Marist Fathers built schools in 
Beirut, Tripoli, Joumieh and Damascus for the education of boys. 
Similarly, religious orders for women like the Ladies of Nazareth, Sisters 
of Charity of Besancon the Sisters of Saint Joseph and the Saint Vincent 
de Paul were actively engaged in girls education. The French Cultural 
Mission eventually set up a cultural center and a Lycee, secondary 
school, in Beirut'^. 
In view of the deep and extensive relationship that existed 
between France and the Christian community of Syria and Lebanon, the 
events of 1860 caused considerable alarm in France. In August I860 as 
the massacre of Christians continued a French expeditionary force of 
7,000 men landed in Beirut to defend the Maronites and other 
Christians'^. The following year France along with other major European 
Powers (England, Russia. Prussia and Austria) forced the Ottoman to 
change the system of go\ emance in Mount Lebanon into a new political 
arrangement known as "Mutasarrifiyah System". 
On 9 June, 1861, the representatives of the Five European 
Powers met with the representatives of the Ottoman Empu^ e and signed 
the Reglement Organique (Constitutional Document) which called for the 
unification of Mount Lebanon and the creation of Semi-autonomous 
governorship. The governor or Mutasarrif was to be a non-Lebanese 
Christian designated by the Ottoman Sultan with the consent of the 
European Powers. The area's special status was to be guaranteed by the 
European Powers'^ 
It should be noted that Maronite's power and influence 
during the Mutasarrifi} ah period grew steadily. The fundamental 
assumption underlying this new political arrangement was that while all 
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the religious sects coexisted, the Maronites were dominant . At the same 
time the formal guaranteed of the Five European Powers bolstered the 
tendency of the Maronites to reh on the West, particularly French with 
whom they now developed strong political, linguistic and cultural ties. 
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French became the cultural and literary language of the middle and upper 
classes and soon replaced Arabic in the house of many Lebanese 
Christians. 
In the course of time, the Mutasarrifiyah came to be regarded 
as a Maronite national homeland by a majority of the Maronite 
Christians. However, an enterprising minority among them visualized the 
Mustasarrifiyah not as an end in itself but as a stepping-stone towards foil 
Lebanese statehood. The borders of the Mustasarriifiyah were confined to 
Mount Lebanon. But in order to make the state economically viable it 
was imperative that it should have access to ports and suitable 
agricultural lands. Hence this minority argued that the Mutasarrifiyah's 
borders should be enlarged to include the Bikaa valley, Akkar plain, the 
coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and Southern Lebanon'^ . 
However, the Ottoman still directly administered these regions as 
separate districts. In order to realize the vision of an expanded Lebanon 
the Maronite Leadership, therefore, had to turn to their-long time ally 
frame for help"°. 
The outbreak of the First World War temporarily disrupted 
the Maronite plans for a separate state with extended boimdaries. The 
Mutasarrifiyah system, which had given Mount Lebanon an autonomy 
and internationally recognized status within the Ottoman Empire came to 
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an end in 1915. Owing to military compulsions, the Ottoman authorities 
unilaterally abrogated the autonomous status of Mount Lebanon and 
placed it under the direct rule of an Ottoman military governor^'. 
World War I and the Defeat of the Ottoman Empire 
With the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottoman 
Empire threw in her lost with Germany. The defeat of the Axis Powers in 
1918 found the Ottoman Empire like the Austro-Hungarian Empire in a 
state of dissolution. The vast Arab dominion of the Turkish Empire was 
virtually at the mercy of the British and French conquerors. The new 
Turkish movement under the Kemalists led by the Kemal Ataturk had 
renounced all claims to these lands. The office of the Ottoman Caliph was 
abolished in 1924 bringing to an end the rule of the house of the 
Ottomans. The Arab territories were given away to the Mandatories on 
behalf of the League of Nations. The territories in question were mostly 
ceded by Germany and Turkey. Lebanon and Syria were ceded by the 
Ottoman Caliph. The mandates were divided into three classes, 
commonly known as "A"", "B" and "C" mandates. The mandates were 
graded according to the stage of development they had achieved. The 
destination of the Arab territories had been settled during the war by a 
secret agreement between France and Great Britain. The mandate for 
Syria was assigned to France and the mandates for Iraq and for Palestine 
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and Transjordan were given to Great Britain. The French mandated 
territory was divided by the mandate itself into two: Syria and the 
Lebanon. In the Lebanon, a coastal strip on the confines of Syria and 
Palestine, a group of Arab Christians formed the majorit)' of the 
population: and this territory enjoyed a republican form of government, 
which supported by periodical interventions of the mandator}' power, 
continued to function. The Lebanese Christians, estranged, seemed 
content in spite of minor grievances, with the security assured to them by 
French protection. 
In Syria, on the other hand, Arab nationalism proved as 
potent a force as in Iraq and Palestine. In Iraq, Great Britain created a 
unified state at the expense of the minorities. In Syria, France pursued the 
opposite policy, and excluded from Syria proper three areas inhabited 
mainly by non-Arabs. Two of these - Latakia on the coast, and the Jebel 
Druze territor>' in the south - were placed under direct French 
administration. The third - the Turkish district of Alexandretta in the 
north - became an autonomous province under the nominal suzerainty of 
the Syrian government. 
With the end of the War the Maronite Christians once again 
revived their efforts for a separated state and extended frontiers. Their 
efforts acquired an added urgency because with the collapse of the 
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Ottoman Empire after its defeat in the War, the Maronites feared that in 
the political restructuring that would take place, Lebanon would be 
incorporated into a Pan-Arab Islamic State in which they would lose their 
autonomy which they had enjoyed under the Ottomans . Durmg 1919, 
therefore, various Maronite delegations, including one led by the 
Maronite Patriarch Elias Bots al-Howeik himself traveled to Paris and 
Versailles to plead for the creation of a separate state for themselves 
under French supervision. 
The Muslim Arabs of Syria at whose expense Mount 
Lebanon was sought to be enlarged, however, were resolutely opposed to 
the Christian demand. Nationalist sentiments among them were running 
high. Immediately after the allied victory, Amir Faisal, son of Sharif 
Husain of Mecca who was Britain's wartime ally, had set up an Arab 
government in Damascus. Arab administration in Beirut, Sidon and 
Tripoli owning allegiance to Damascus had been established. Syrian 
nationalists wanted complete independence of geographical Syria, on the 
basis of British wartime pledges to Sharif Hussain contained in the 
Husain MeMohan correspondence. But the British had concurrently 
concluded secret Sykes- Picot Agreement with France, in May 1916, for 
dividing geographical Syria among themselves after the war. Very soon, 
in the wake of the conclusion of the agreement, General Henry H. Allen 
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by replaced the Arab administration in Beirut with a French Military 
Governor, whichever the Arabs of the coastal region had taken control in 
the name of the Damascus government, they were dislodged. In Sidon the 
Arabs put up a violent resistance and had to be quelled by force. He, then, 
divided geographical Syria into three parts. In the South, Palestine was 
placed under a British officer; in the North Beirut, Mount Lebanon and 
the northern coast lands were placed under a French officer and in the 
east, internal Syria and Transjordan, were place under an Arab Military 
Governor Syrian nationalist's vigorously protested the division of Syria 
and the imposition of British and French control. In March 1920 the 
Syrian National Congress met in Damascus and proclaimed the complete 
unity and independence of geographical Syria within which Mount 
Lebanon was to have an autonomous status. The British and French, 
however, refused to recognize this Greater Syria. The following months 
the Allied Supreme Council meeting at San Remo awarded France the 
mandate over Syria and Lebanon and Britain a mandate over Palestine 
and Transjordan. In July, French General Henri Joseph Eugene Gouraud 
sent an ultimatum to Faisal demanding immediate acceptance of the 
Mandate. When Faisal refused to comply with the ultimatum, he then 
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captured Damascus and deposed Faisal . 
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Lebanon During the French Mandate 
On 1 September, 1920, General Gouraud, now the French 
High Commissioner in Lebanon, officially declared the establishment of 
the Le Grand Liban (State of Greater Lebanon) (see Map-2) by adding to 
Mount Lebanon the coastal cities from Tripoli to Tyre, the regions around 
them and the Bikaa Valley '^'. The long-standing Maronite vision of an 
enlarged Lebanon was now fulfilled. 
The Creation of Greater Lebanon by France was not 
motivated by any kind of altruism nor was it solely the result of their 
concern for the Maronite community. France had its own imperial 
interests in the region and this could be best served by creating Le Grand 
Liban. Perhaps and the most important reason behind the French move 
was the desire to establish a permanent and loyal base in the Levant to act 
as a bastion against the rising Arab nationalism in its colonies, 
particularly in North Africa . 
Where the expansion of Mount Lebanon marked the 
successful culmination of a long standing. Maronite £ispiration it also 
brought with it dramatic demographic changes. The Maronites who were 
in absolute majority (58.4%) in Mount Lebanon were reduced to the 
status of largest single sect in Greater Lebanon. According to the census 
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of 1932 the Maronites constituted approximately 29 percent of the 
population and all the Christians sects together constituted only 51.7 
percent of the population even this thin majority was largely attained by 
including the Armenians who had settled in Lebanon after the First World 
War. In contrast, the Sunnis who had constituted only 3.5 percent of the 
population of Mount Lebanon now became the second largest sect in 
Greater Lebanon comprising 22 percent while the Shiites increased from 
5.6 to 19.4 percent. 
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Comparison of the Population Distribution Between Mount Lebanon 
and Greater Lebanon 
Table I 
Ethnic and sectarian Factors in Mount Lebanon and Greater Lebanon 
Ethnic and 
Religious Groups 
Maronites 
Greek Orthodox 
Greek CathoHc 
Armenians 
Others (Including 
Jews) 
Total Christians 
Sunnis 
Shiites 
Druzes 
Total Muslims 
Grand Total 
Mount Lebanon Total 
population and 
percentage 
242308 
53356 
31936 
67 
2901 
329568 
14529 
23413 
47290 
85232 
414800 
58.4% 
12.6 
7.7 
-
0.7 
79.3 
3.5 
5.7 
n.4 
20.5 
99.99 
Greater Lebanon Total 
Population and percentage 
226378 
76522 
45999 
31156 
30191 
410246 
175925 
154208 
53047 
383180 
793426 
28.6% 
9.6 
5.8 
3.9 
3.8 
51.7 
22.2 
19.4 
6.7 
48.3 
100.00 
Source: 
(1) Micheal W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Labenon: The Challenge 
of a Fragmented Political Culture (New York, 1965), p. 18. 
(2) Amon Soffer, Lebanon- Where Demography is the Core of Politics 
and life, Middle Eastern Studies (London), Vol.22, No. 2, April 
1986, p. 199. 
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More important than this loss of overwhelming Christian 
majority was the fact that the inhabitants of the incorporated territories, 
who were predominantly Muslims, strongly resented their inclusion in 
Greater Lebanon. The Sunni Muslims in Particular had pronounced pan-
Arab sympathies. They felt themselves as an integral part of the Arab 
world and many among them wished to see Lebanon become part of a 
large, powerful united Arab nation. Still others saw Lebanon as an 
integral part of Greater Syria. The Sunnis, therefore, came to regard 
Lebanon a an "artificial state" created by an imperialist power, in order to 
dominate the Arab World. In addition, their incorporation in Lebanon 
involved for the Sunnis a grave religious crisis and a powerful emotional 
blow. For the first time in history they were a minority in Christian State. 
They feared that their religion and culture would suffer in such a state. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that in the Ottoman Empire the 
Sunnis had constituted the ruling class. In Lebanon they would have had 
to live under the political hegemon\ of Christians whom they had always 
regarded as their inferiors. This question of secondary political status was 
the main grievance of the Sunnis through out the Mandate period and 
continues even till this day. The Shiite, and Druze also shared much of 
the Sunni sentiments. However, their opposition to Greater Lebanon was 
neither as strong nor as uniform as that of the Sunnis. Among the 
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Christians, only the Greek Orthodox, were anti Greater Lebanon. This 
was because of their fear of a CathoHc Christian domination in Lebanon. 
Moreover, the Greek Orthodox had been influenced by Arab nationalism 
much more than other Christian sects^^. 
The events of 1920 had left the Sunni Muslims in a state of 
shock. For some months to come, there was hardly any organized protest 
against the creation of Greater Lebanon. The first significant protest took 
place only in the summer of 1921 when the French were preparing to 
conduct a census. Sunni Muslims refused to participate on the grounds 
that they didn't recognize Greater Lebanon and denounced the census for 
differentiating between \arious Muslim sects as an imperialist device 
designed to divide the Muslims. Muslim protest intensified the following 
year. In April 1922, Khurshid Pasha, a high-ranking Muslim official in 
the Lebanese government, was assassinated by a secret Sunni 
organization in Beirut. The Assassination was aimed at deterring Muslims 
from collaborating with the French, who in order to enlist Sunni 
cooperation sometimes offered them lucrative government posts^'. 
In 1925, in the midst of this Muslim agitation, the Druze of 
Jabal Druze in Syria rose up in revolt against the French. The Druze 
uprising quickly assumed a nationalist character as Syrian-Arab 
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nationalists rallied to its support. On 23 August, 1925 Sultan al-Atrash, 
the leader of the Druze uprising, issued a proclamation in his capacity as 
President of the Provisional National Government demanding complete 
unity of Syria and Lebanon and independence from French rule. The 
revolt soon spread to Lebanon and violent clashes between the Druze and 
Christians took place in many areas. A wave of intensive pro-Syrian 
agitation, unprecedented since 1920, engulfed Lebanon, with Muslims 
coming out in support of the Druze. Petitions were submitted to the 
French Government and the League of Nations, strikes were organized. 
And numerous public meetings were held against the French rule. As 
rebel activities intensified the French started distributing arms among the 
Christians and a campaign was conducted in the Christian press calling 
upon the Christians to assists the French in putting down the revolt. A 
force of Christian volunteers was quickly put together under the 
leadership of Botrus Karam , a Maronite from North Lebanon, and 
dispatched to the South to fight alongside the hard-pressed regular French 
army. By March the following year, the French troops with the help of 
Christian auxiliaries had been largely successful in putting down the 
revolt. The role played by the Maromtes in suppressing the revolt had 
grave implications for Christian-Muslim relations in Lebanon. Christian 
collaboration with the French was constructed by the Muslims as an act 
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of treason of the highest degree and for a long time to come, the Maronite 
Christians were regarded as traitors who opposed the national aspirations 
of the Arabs. Even today their role in suppressing the anti-French 
rebellion is sometimes recalled as an example of their deep-seated hatred 
for Arab and Arabism. 
In May 1926, shortly after the suppression of the nationalist 
Druze uprising in Lebanon, a French-inspired constitution came into 
force. The purpose of this constitution (still in force today with some 
important modifications) was not so much to introduce responsible 
government in Lebanon as to secure for the Maronites a position of 
predominance I the political system. The constitution as per Maronite 
wishes declared that the boundaries of Greater Lebanon were immutable. 
Sunni Muslims all over Lebanon refused to take part in the drafting of the 
constitution in order to make it clear to the French authorities that they 
didn't support a Lebanese Republic separated and independent from 
Syria. Of the 210 questionnaires sent out by the Drafting Committee to 
representatives of the different communities in order to as certain their 
views only 132 replied. Most of those who refused to reply were Surmi 
Muslims. Resolutely opposed not only to the present frontiers of Greater 
Lebanon but also to its independent existence, the Muslims could not 
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have been expected to take part in the making of a constitution which was 
a very symbol of all that they had rejected 30 
Of particular importance in the constitution that came into 
force in 1926 was Article 95, which reads: 
As a provisional measure and for the sake of 
justice and concord the communities shall be 
equitably represented in public employment and in 
the composition of the cabinet such measures, 
however, not to cause prejudice to the general 
welfare of the state.^' 
According to the new constitution the Lebanese had to elect 
their own Head of State. The Maronites were determined that someone 
from their community should be made President. However, the French 
proposed the name of Charles Dabbas who they thought would be more 
acceptable to the Muslims than a Maronite candidate. Dabbas 
consequently became the first President under the new constitution. 
However, in 1932. when a Sunni Muslim, Muhammad al Jisr, announced 
his intention to run for the Presidency, the French announced his intention 
to run for the Presidency, the French immediately inten^ened to prevent 
him from contesting. Instead, Habib Pasha, a Maronite, was elected as 
President. Since then, the powerful Presidency had remained the 
exclusive preserve of the Maronites. As a concession to the Muslims, the 
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French started the convention of reserving the much weaker post of Prime 
Minister for the Sunni from 1937 onwards. 
MusHm agitation for union with Syria didn't cease even after 
the promulgation of the constitution in 1926. It continued intermittently 
during the next few years reaching its peak in the mid-1930s in response 
to the resurgence of militant nationalism in Syria. In April 1935 the 
largely Sunni taxi drivers of Beirut went on a strike. After some violent 
incident Riad al-Solh, a leading nationalist figure was exited to the Jazira 
region^^ in Syria. In March 1936, Salim Ali Salam convened the famous 
Conference of the coast in Beirut, which demanded the return of the 
annexed territories to Syria, and in .luly the Mufti of Lebanon, along with 
leading Muslim leaders, set up Muslim Consultative Council with strong 
pro-Syrian sympathies. Muslim-Christian relations rapidly deteriorated 
from mid 1936 onwards culminating at the year's end in large-scale 
countr}'widc riots. 
While the Muslims v\ere demanding Lebanon's unity with 
Syria, Maronite and other Catholics Christians busied themselves with the 
de\ eloping historical, cultural and even geographical arguments aimed at 
demonstrating the special nature of Lebanon and justifying its existence 
as an entity separate form the rest of the Arab World. Phonecianism was 
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the attempt to trace the ancestry of Lebanon to the Phoenician 
civiHzation. which existed some five thousand years ago. Its chief 
proponent was a Maronite intellectual Charles Corm whose main aim was 
to show that the Lebanese have very little in common with the Arabs. 
Mideterreanism whose prophet was Greek Catholic, Michel China didn't 
stress the historical origins of Lebanon but sought to link Lebanon's 
physical and cultural origins to the Mediterranean basin. Its intent, 
therefore, was vei7 similar to Phonecianism.'''' 
Independence of Lebanon, the Lebanese National Pact 
The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 had far 
reaching consequences for Lebanon, France, the traditional protector of 
Maronites came under Nazi occupation in June 1940. When France 
surrendered, the Vichy regime sent its officials to administer the Levant 
and Axis influence became widespread. Numerous German and Italian 
officers came to the region in an attempt to turn it into a base for anti-
Allied activities.' The danger of a German domination of the Levant 
moved the British to join forces with the Free French under General 
Charles De Gaulle and launch and invasion of Syria and Lebanon. On 8 
June, 1941, British and Free French forces invaded Syria and Lebanon 
from Palestine. Leaflets dropped from Allied aircraft proclaimed the 
25 
independence of Syria and Lebanon.^ ^ Once Lebanon and Syria were 
occupied by the joint forces of British and Free French, General de 
Gaulle was no more eager than previous French government to surrender 
France's position in the Levant. However, the British who had occupied 
the Levant during the First World War and then handed it to France, were 
determined to repeat this again. Britain was then busy promoting the 
concept of Arab unit}- in the form of the Arab League through which it 
hoped to secure its own interests in the region after the war. French 
presence in Syria and Lebanon was, therefore, incompatible with such a 
policy.-^ ^ 
The significance of the new developments was not lost upon 
the Maronite community. A section of them correctly assessed that it was 
just not possible to establish a Christian state in Lebanon without the 
backing of French power. A moderate group advocating pragmatism 
gradually came to the forefront of Maronite leadership. This group, which 
was led by Bishara al-Khoury. felt the urgent necessity of cooperating 
nationalist Muslim leaders into the political power structure and winning 
their confidence in order to preserve the viability and dependence of 
Greater Lebanon.""^  Khoury, therefore, offered to cooperate with Muslim 
leaders in their struggle to throw out the French. The response of the 
Muslim leaders was positive. After years of fruitless agitation many had 
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resigned themselves to the existence of Greater Lebanon and in Khouiy's 
offer they saw at least an opportunity to end the much hatred of French 
rule. Secondly, many among them feared that failure to cooperate with 
Khoury would only strengthen his archrival, the rapidly anti-Arab Emile 
Edde who was secretly negotiating with the French for the establishment 
of a purely Christian state in Mount Lebanon. Finally, many Sunni 
Muslim politicians and officials thought it preferable to hold on to the 
influential positions they had already achieved within Greater Lebanon 
that to play a minor role in a large Syrian state whose power center would 
inevitably lie in Damascus rather than Beirut. 
Under pressure from Britain, the GauUists were forced to 
hold free election during the summer of 1943, which resulted in a victory 
for Khouri's Constitutional Block Party over Emile Edde's National 
Block Part). Khourj' was elected President of the Republic on 21 
September 1943. After the victor) one of his first acts as President was to 
conclude a verbal agreement with the popular Sunni Prime Minister, 
Riad-al-Solh which came to be known as the National Pact. The Pact laid 
down that Lebanon was to be a completeh independent sovereign state in 
which the Christians would not seek foreign protection or try to bring 
Lebanon under foreign control.'^ Likewise the Muslims would not try to 
bring Lebanon into any political union with Syria or into any form of 
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Arab union. In relation to the Arab World Lebanon was to regard itself as 
an Arab state with a "special character" and cooperate fully with it, 
provided it recognized its sovereignty. Despite its Arabism, however, 
Lebanon would retain its cultural ties with the West. The Pact further laid 
down that public offices in Lebanon were to be distributed equitably 
among the recognized sects and that the President of the Republic should 
belong to the Maronite community and Prime Minister to the Sunni 
Muslim community.'*" This verbal agreement was followed by a unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 
which met on 8 November 1943 and amended the constitution so as to 
eliminate all mandatory restrictions. The more militant elements in the 
Maronite community like the Church and the Lebanese Phalanges'*' 
(Katib al Lubnamiyah), however, were at best only lukewarm towards the 
national Pact. They still entertained the narrow and parochial notion of 
Lebanon as a Christian homeland and continued to seek allies outside the 
Arab World. It was no wonder, therefore, that these parochial groups 
resolutely opposed Lebanon's membership of the Arab league in 1944. 
Regarding the Arab League as indeed leading to Arab unity, these groups 
began to consider very strongly the matter of making Lebanon a 
"National Home" for the Christians.'*^ 
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Furthermore, the National Pact 1943 provided for sectarian 
balance and sectarian fraternity. It bridged the gap between the two wings 
of Lebanon, and provided a compromise formula for the distribution of 
political power among the various sects, in a multi-confessional society, 
within the framework of a liberal parliamentary democracy. The Pact 
balanced divergences among the Lebanese. Whereas the Muslims had 
looked predominantly towards the Arabs for linkage and identity, the 
Christians had looked towards the West. The compromise reaped was to 
give up both indications, and to belong to an independent, sovereign 
Lebanon with an Arab face, that is, no merger with the Arab national 
environment, and no dependence on Western protection. 
Syria during the French mandate up to its Independence 
The French interrupted the first steps of Syria towards 
independence and unity by putting an end to Faisal's reign. They reduced 
the areas of historic Syrian vilayets by incorporating into Lebanon the 
Tripoli, Bikka and Sidon districts in 1920 and by surrendering the Sanjag 
of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1938. The mandatory government also 
weakened the political centrality of Damascus and the territorial unity of 
the country by reviving, and even enlarging, regional divisions and 
strengthening marginal centrifugal focus. Thus at the beginning of the 
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1920s, the French divided Syria into four states: Damascus, Aleppo and 
the Alawi and Druze states. The Jazira region was also administered 
separately, and Alexandretta failed any tendencies towards Syrian 
National Unity and increased international contrasts by encouraging for 
example, polarization in - the education system. 
The abolition by the French in 1920 of Faisal's Syrian Arab 
Kingdom caused a crucial setback in the process of the creations of a 
political community in Syria. Nevertheless, feelings of Syria's identity 
didn't slacken among members of the Syrian-Arab national movement. 
Under the French mandate these feeUngs were in fact fostered with the 
formation by the French of separate Syrian political units and local 
government institutions, cabinet, parliament, etc. These feelings were also 
enhanced by the Arab national movement's struggle for Syria's 
independence. ^ 
In Damascus Arab nationalism was led by educated, wealthy 
Muslims who had earlier supported Faisal. Their grievances against the 
French were many, but chief among them was French suppression of 
newspapers, political activity, and civil rights and the division of Syria 
into several political units. They also objected to French reluctance to 
frame a constitution for Syria that would provide for the eventual 
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sovereignty that the League of Nations mandate had ordered. When the 
Iraqis gained an elected assembly from the British in March 1924, Syrian 
Arabs became even more distressed. Then, the French on February 9, 
1925, permitted the nationalist to form the people party. Led by Paris al 
Khuri, the nationalists demanded French recognition of eventual Syrian 
independence, unity of the country, more stress on education, and the 
granting of civil liberties. 
The French were painfully aware that the unfolding Syrian 
Arab political ferment was unfavorable to their presence. This ferment 
had already led to the creation, in December 1912, of a Reform 
Committee for the vilayel of Beirut with a membership of 42 Muslims, 40 
Christians and 2 Jews. In turn they appointed a sub-committee of 12 
Muslims, 12 Christians and 1 Jew to draw up a program of changes which 
if was hoped the Ottoman government would implement.'*'' 
In 1928 the French allowed the formation of the National 
Bloc (Al-Katahal Wataniyah), composed of the several of nationalist 
groups centered in Damascus. The nationalist alliance was headed by 
Hananu and Hashim al Atasi and included leading members of large 
landowning families. One of the most extreme groups in the national Bloc 
was the Istiqlal (Independence) part}', a descendant of the old AL-Fatah 
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secret society of which Shukri al Kuwatly was a member. Elections of 
that year for a constituent assembly put the National Bloc in power, and 
Hananu set out to write a constitution. When completed, in provided for 
the reunification of Syria and ignored the authority of the French. In 1930 
the French imposed the constitution minus the articles, which would have 
given Syria unified self-government. 
Syrian nationalists continued to assert that they should at 
least have a treaty with France setting forth-French aims. Britain and Iraq 
had signed such a treaty in 1922. Unrest after the death of the nationalist 
leader Hananu at the end of 1935, followed by a general strike in 1936, 
brought new negotiations for such a treat}', under Leon Blum's liberal-
socialist government in France, the two countries worked out the Syrian-
French treaty of Alliance in 1936. The French parliament never ratified 
treaty, yet a feeling of optimism prevailed in Syria as the first nationalist 
government came to power, with Atasi as President. 
During 1937, France allowed the return of the Jabal Druze 
and Latakia to the Syrian state and turned over many local government 
functions to the Syrian Government French administration during the 
previous years had given some advantage to the Syrians. It had built 
modem cities in Damascus and Aleppo, roads and schools throughout 
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much of the country, and it had partially trained some Syrians as minor 
bureaucrats. French cultural influence spread in the schools in the press, 
and even in the style of dress; social and economic conditions slowly 
improve. 
During the course of the Syrian - French treaty discussion in 
1937, Turkey had asked for reconsideration of the situation in Hatay - at 
that time the Syrian province of Alexanderetta - which had a large 
Turkish minority and already had been given a special administrative 
system under the France -Turkish Agreement of Ankara (Sometimes 
called the Franklin - Bouillon Agreement) in 1921. The case was 
submitted to the League of Nation, which decided in 1937 that 
Alexandretta should be a separate, self -governing political state direct 
negotiation between Turkey and France ended on July 13, 1939, France 
agreeing to absorption of Alexandretta by Turkey. Disturbances broke out 
in Syria against France and the Syrian government, which Syrian leaders 
felt had not adequately defended their interests. Syrian President Atasi 
resigned, parliamentary institutions were abolished, and France ruled an 
unruly Syria through the Council of Directors. Latakia and the Jabal 
Druze were again set up as separate units. The French government 
officially declared it would not submit the Syrian - French treaty to the 
French Chamber of Deputies for ratification. 
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Although the countty seemed on the way to peace and 
prosperity, Syrians continued to demand freedom for the foreign rule and 
a rejuvenation of Arab society. The French leader, General Charles de 
Gaul, declared that so far as he was concerned the mandate would remain 
in existence until a new French government legally brought it to an end. 
Syrians elected a new parliament in 1943 with the National Bloc in 
control; the parliament elected Kuwatly as President of Syria. During 
1944 the Syrian government took over the functions of fourteen 
administrative departments, which since 1920 had been under direct 
French control. These included those dealing with customs, social affairs, 
excise taxes, control of concessionary companies and supervision of 
tribes. France kept control of social cultural and educational services as 
well as the special Troops of the Levant. Despite French opposition, the 
Soviet Union in July and the United States in September 1944 granted 
Syrian and Lebanon Unconditional recognition as sovereign states; 
British recognition followed a year later. These Allied nations brought 
pressure on France to evacuate Syria. 
In January 1945 the Syrian government announced the 
formation of a national army and in February declared war on the Axis. In 
March the country become a charter member of the United Nations; an 
indication of its status as a sovereign nation and in April affirmed its 
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allegiance to the idea of Arab unity by signing the pact of the League of 
Arab States. 
The way in which the French left Syria increased their 
already embittered feelings the Syrians had for France. Demanding that 
cultural, economic and strategic interests be protected by treaty before 
agreeing to withdrawal of the Special Troops of the Levant, France 
refused to budget. In May 1945 demonstrations occurred in Damascus 
and Aleppo and for the third time in twenty years the French bombed and 
machine-gunned the ancient capital. Serious fighting broke out in Homs 
and Hamah as well. Only after Great Britain's Prime Minister, Winston 
Churchill, threatened to send troops to Damascus did General de Gaulle 
order a cease-fire. The following year France started withdrawing its 
troops and by mid-April all French troops were off Syrian soil. On April 
17, Syria celebrated Evacuation Day; the date continues to be a national 
holiday. 
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CHAPTER-II 
Syria's Policy During The Lebanese Civil War 1975-1976 
Syria had become an independent country, free of the hated 
French domination and free also to shape its own destiny. As a member 
of the Arab world the newly created Syrian state joined the other Arab 
states in their war to exterminate the newly created state of Israel. 
Internally one of Syria's basic problems was its need to define its own 
nationhood. 
It has been pointed out that "Syrian" is a modem entity and 
a modem concept. The idea of Syria as a nation - as a separate entity -
was first formulated in the second half of the nineteenth century by 
Syrian and Lebanese Christians. As members of non-Muslim 
communities in a Muslim world they had a privileged but inferior status. 
The idea of nationalism therefore meant, to them, that they could claim 
equal citizenship and status with Muslims in a modem nation-state. They 
were the first to propound the doctrine of secular nationalism; of a state 
in which the basis of identity was language and culture and not religion 
and community. The Lebanese Christians in particular played a very 
important role in the founding and development of Arabic literature and 
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many Christians in Syria and Lebanon became the first leaders and 
intellectuals of the nationalist movements in the Arab world as a whole. 
There was place for separate ethnic and cultural groups in this state, but, 
as in the days of the old caliphate, the state itself had to be Islamic and 
had to extend over the whole of the Arab world. 
During their struggle against the French, certain groups had 
come to have vested interests in the French-created political unit called 
Syria. These vested interests were a strong force in prodding Syria's 
Muslim nationalists to call for Syria's unification and independence, but 
even these interests were not free of the dominant ideology of pan-Arab 
nationalism or of allegiance to their own particular community in the 
many internal divisions within the Syrian population. To the individual 
Syrian, loyalty to this family, religious community, tribe and locality was 
far more important than loyalty to a state. In the 1940s and even to the 
mid-1960s the country's political and economic life was still dominated 
by a small, mostly Sunni elite whose members lived in Aleppo and 
Damascus. The Sunni landlords had large estates, which were worked by 
a heterodox peasantry. In general, the Sunni majorit} tended to regard the 
Christian and heterodox Muslim groups as "imperfect Arabs.'" an attitude 
that still affects the countr>'*s minority groups today. 
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Inside Syria, Hafez's al-Assad's Ba'th government 
proclaimed a new constitution and began to implement a policy of 
nationalizing banks and factories and distributing land to the peasants. 
Merchant and landowner riots and protest demonstrations were brutally 
put down. 
In 1965, the party's moderate, civilian wing ousted the 
members of the rival military wing from their positions and began to 
carry out purges. The military wing staged a coup in Februar>' 1966 and 
arrested the old leadership. Among those put in prison were 'Aflaq, Bitar 
and General Amin al-Hafez. 
The new leaders of Syria were two Alawite Ba'thist 
Generals: Salah Jadid. who was supported by the regional Syrian Ba'th 
and Hafez Assad, Commander of the Air Force and Minister of Defence 
- and the two soon became rivals. 
In October 1968, the group led by general Hafez al-Assad 
gained the upper hand. The group's aim was to reduce Syria dependence 
upon the Soviet Union, to improve relations with the other Arab states 
and to renew the war against Israel. 
Assad and his nationalists began arresting the communists 
and making changes in the government. Assad had virtualh taken control 
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of the government in Febmary 1969 in a kind of semi-coup, but Syria's 
continued dependence on Soviet military and economic aid - and also 
Egyptian pressure - had forced him to accept a compromise and the 
continued participation of the leftist faction in the government. The 
regime also tried to meddle in the relations between the Palestinian 
organizations and the governments of Lebanon and Jordan. 
General Assad completed his takeover of the Syrian 
government in November. 1970. His first step was to arrest all his 
opponents. A 173-member "People's Council" was convened in 
February. 1971. The Council nominated Assad as President of the 
Republic. He was endorsed that same month in a plebiscite (in which he 
was the only candidate). Assad's first move was to mend Syria's relations 
with the other Arab states, and especially with Egypt. 
President Assad has given Syria its most stable government 
in decades. He is also the first S>rian statesman in the modem era who 
appeared to be succeeding in drawing the whole population together by 
striving to transcend communal and party differences. 
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Assad's Regime: 
Hafiz al-Assad who was born in Qardaha near Hadhiqiya in 
the Latakia was of a poor peasant Alawi family in 1928. Assad became a 
professional officer in the Syrian Air Force. In the 1950s, he joined the 
clandestine officers cells linked to the Baath Party. He took a leading part 
in the coup of March 1963 that brought the Baath officers to power and 
became commander of the Air Force in 1968. Assad was a member of the 
Baath High Command, both the "National", i.e.. al-Arab, and the 
"regional" Syrian one.' As a member of a minority he had to face 
decisions which did not affect members of majorities. He could either 
mingle with his fellows in an attempt to avoid discrimination or 
persecution, or he could break out in an attempt to make himself 
successful and even indispensable in the world of the majority. He chose 
the latter course and entered the one institution, which promised 
promotion on merit - the army^. 
Growing up under the French, Assad like many politically 
minded students didn't avoid being drawn into anti-French activities. In 
the 1940s his political awakening coincided with the birth of the Baath 
Part}'. Its ideas of nationalism and secularism attracted members of 
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minorities. Its founder was after all a Christian. Assad joined the Homes 
Militar\' Academy in 1951 as an avenue of advancement. 
Assad was beginning his tenure of power after departure of 
the greatest Arab leader. Jama! Abd al-Nasser, on 28 September, 1970. 
Assad's primary task on taking over in 1970 was to establish some 
stability in the regime^ 
On November 13. 1970, General Hafez al-Assad and the 
militar) leadership faction of the Baath Party seized power from the 
ruling civilian radical trend, in contrast to the hard-line posture of the 
predecessor regime - itself the product of an earlier division in the Baath 
Party. Internally, Assad's coming to power marked a relaxation in the 
political atmosphere. He was elected President for a seven-year term in 
Februan.' 1971. A new Regional Command of the Baath was formed of 
Assad supporters and the old leaders were removed from their posts. In 
mid-1971 Assad's government was continuing in its announced 
determination to reduce Syrian isolation, especially in the Arab world; to 
govern through a so-called progressive national front and to build a base 
of support among the people at large; to strengthen what it called the 
front against Israel and continue assistance to the Palestinian guerrilla 
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movements; and to stimulate the economy and reduce public 
restrictions'*. 
During the balance of 1970 and the first three months of 
1971, Assad and his cabinet moved rapidly to continue improvement of 
the country's internal and external posture and. in the process, to 
implement the promises made at the time of their assumption of power. 
Security restrictions were relaxed; more than 200 political prisoners were 
released, including amnesty for a group of former supporters of Hafez; 
and measures such as an increase in family welfare allowances and a 
reduction in the price of sugar, rice and tea were adopted^ 
The establishment of the People's Council was announced 
in Damascus on February 13, 1971, as promised exactly three months 
after the overthrow of the Jadid regime by Assad's faction on November 
13, 1970. Announcements released between February 13 and 17, 1971, 
described the People's Council as consisting of 173 members, with this 
allocation: Baath Part}'. 85 seats; the Socialist Unionist Movement, 12 
Arab Socialist Union, 12 Arab socialists, 8 Communists, 8 and the 
balance of 48 to "Popular Organizations", including trade and labour 
unions, professional federation, representatives of industrial enterprises, 
and the senior Islamic clergy. The three categories of membership under 
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which the Regional Command organized the council were thus 
proportioned with 49 percent of the seats to Assad's Baath Party, 23 
percent to the "Progressive Forces", and 28 percent to the "Popular 
Organizations"*^. 
The two main responsibilities of the People's Council, 
Assad said, were legislation and the formulation of a permanent 
constitution. First, however, it was constitutionally required that the 
council nominates the President of the republic and submit this 
nomination to approval of the electorate by referendum. Assad was 
nominated March 2 and, in the referendum held March 12, received 
approval by 99.2 percent of the vote^ 
On April 3, 1971. President Assad issued a decree forming a 
new cabinet with Major General Abdul Rahman Khulayfawi as Prime 
Minister and twenty-seven ministers, of whom two were designated as 
deputy Prime Ministers in addition to holding specific portfolios. This 
cabinet was broadly based, with Assad Baathists predominating, and was 
essentially an extension of the preceding interim cabinet. Baath Party 
regional elections were scheduled to be held in May 1971 in order to 
reestablish the Regional Command structure and thus complete the 
legitimization of the Assad faction's control of government and party. 
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Assad's policies, in theory, aim to achieve national unity 
through the creation of a popular democracy, granting civil liberties and 
building on the original socialist reforms of the Baath revolution. The 
organs used to implement these goals would be the National Progressive 
Front led by the Baath Party, and the People's Assembly, as well as 
various other popular organizations. They would foster civil liberties and 
socialist measures while mobilizing the people to unity and to dedicate 
their energies to the Syrian homeland. A unified Syrian people would in 
turn constitute a solid basis for pan-Arab unity and for the struggle 
against Zionism, imperialism and reactionary Arab regimes^. However, 
beyond these theoretical and rhetorical statements aimed at 
demonstrating his commitment to Baath doctrines, Assad's first priority 
was to establish a basis of popular legitimacy for his regime. 
Assad's regime at first emphasized a new "openness" in its 
internal policies - a slightly more liberal economic policy and an effort to 
associate certain non-Baath but "Socialist- Unionist" factions with the 
regime. A new, permanent Constitution was passed by the People's 
Council in January 19 and endorsed by a plebiscite in March. It defined 
"Syrian Arab Republic" as a "popular-democratic and socialist" state, 
"Part of the Arab homeland", and its people as "part of the Arab nafion, 
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struggling for the realization of its total unity". Islamic Law (the Shariah) 
was to be the "Principal base of legislation"^. 
Elections for the People's Council were duly held in May 
1973 - the first general elections since 1961, and again in 1977, 1981, 
1986, 1990 and 1994. Towards the 1973 elections, the Baath Party set 
up, in March 1972, a "National Progressive Front" with the Communists 
and several "Socialist Unionist" factions prepared to accept Baath 
guidance and primacy. Candidates usually appeared on behalf of that 
"Front", most of them Baath men, but independent candidates were not 
ruled out. 
Background of the Lebanese Conflict 
Background of the Lebanese conflict was apparently rooted 
from the Lebanese socio-economic and political structure. The 
determinate of its conflict had been known that came from the internal 
factors responsible to the Civil War in the Lebanon during 1975 and 
1976. These factors were basically responsible in dividing the Lebanese 
people into different groups; many polarizing camps, and leading up to 
situation of civil war in Lebanon. 
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These internal factors can be divided as follows. 
(1) The Fragmentation of Social Structure in Lebanon 
(2) The Sectoral Division of Lebanese Population 
(3) The Rigidity of the Political System in Lebanon 
These three factors were complex and multidimensional. 
The interactions of these three factors had effected into the polarizing 
camps and leading the country into civil war in mind-seventies 
The Fragmentation of Social Structure in Lebanon 
Dominant characteristic features of the fragmented social 
structure in Lebanese society are as follows: A multiplicity of religious 
sects in Lebanon accommodating their own conflicts and interest within 
the limitation of system that tends to promote sectarian identities and acts 
as a barrier to social integration'°. 
(1) Legitimating of Sectarians Differences 
Republic of Lebanon has given official recognition to 
seventeen different sects. These are the Maronites, Greek Catholic, 
Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac 
Catholic. Eastern Nestorians, Chaldeans. Evangelicals. Latins, Sunnis, 
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Shiites, Druze, Alawis, Ismailis and Jews" (see Map-3). Separation of 
religious sects in Lebanon from the state would naturally secure its social 
structure. But over the years, religious identity has always been a major 
focus of debate in contemporar>' Lebanon. According to Albert Houroni 
has written: "The primary divisions sides the Near East are, as they have 
been for over thousands year, religious: whether a man is Muslim, 
Christian, or Jewish community he belong to " The fact about this 
statement is more apparently in Lebanon than else where 
The officially recognized sect is legally permitted to have its 
own legislative courts and councils. For instance, the Maronites and the 
Greek Catholic, being recognized by the Pope in Rome as an ultimate 
authority. Likewise the Greek Orthodox Church has its head quarters in 
Damascus and not in Lebanon.'"' As a result of these self definition and 
self identification that the Lebanese sense of citizenship was determined 
by religious affiliation and that Lebanese religious sentiments and 
commitments superseded loyalty to the country.'"^ 
Wadi D. Haddad reinforces this view by saying that: 
"Today' Arab nationalist may be tomorrow's 
Maronite. Today's Secularist, Socialist may be 
tomorrow's Shia cleric; today's Arab nationalist 
may be today's Maronite".'^ 
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The main spiritual of each sect acqu^^i^ poHtical role antiT ' 
efficacy for their community. When, the rehgious leadefs become 
spokesman of their communities they tend to promote their sectarian 
interest. Commenting on this, observers conduced that some Lebanese 
are "Christians first, Lebanese second". "Pragmatic merchant first, 
ideological pursuits second," "Arab first, Lebanese second," and so 
forth.'^ 
The international connection of some of the religious 
bodies, and religious- sectoral affiliation both are important factors of the 
fragmented social structure in the country where political and social life 
are so deeply in influenced by events and persons outside Lebanon.'^ 
The officially recognized sects, legislation of personal 
statutes also have become as diversified and fragmented Social Structure 
because of increasing the number of sects. It has tended to strengthen the 
sectarian identities as well as in both belief and life- style among the 
sects. 
A reason of lacking intermarriage between each sect also, 
due to the legal barriers which have been prescribed that a person must 
marry within the religious community only that leading the country into 
the sectarian conflict as well as civil war among them. 
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(2) Geographical Concentration of Different Religious Sects 
The various sects tend to be concentrated in specific regions 
as well as they tend to live in separate neighborhoods. The distribution of 
various some important sects living in different district are as follows: 
Zghorta, Batrun and Asruwan are Maronite districts, whereas Jezzin, 
Meth and Baadba are Maronite majority districts. The Sunni community, 
which was concentrated in Beirut and in the region of Tripoli in North 
Lebanon.'^ The Shiites are in the districts of Tyre, Baalbeck, Hermel, 
Saida and Marjayum; the Greek Orthodox in Koura and Greek Catholic 
majority living in the districts Zahleh and Baalbek. The Druze constitute 
about half of the districts of Aleh, one third of Rashaya, and a quarter of 
ShufandMeth.^^ 
In many towns and many cities where more than one 
religious group is present, each group tens to live in its own 
neighbourhood. The large-scale migration from North to South, from 
rural to urban areas that had taken place later on. Many moved from 
North and settled in many tows around Beirut. In addition to their old 
frustration, this migration involved the new experience of living in a 
large and difficult metropolitan area. Likewise, the large- scale migration 
had created the problems and tensions for various sects, particularly 
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between Christians and Muslims. Many central districts of Beirut has 
shown that urbanization has not been associated with a large measure of 
decline or weakening of traditional ties and communal attachment.' This 
geographical concentration of different sects has been "a formidable 
obstacle to developing a positive national consensus particularly since 
the outlying regions are predominantly Muslim." 
Then, the geographical representation of different sects also 
reflects and reinforces the fragmented nature of the social structure in 
Lebanon. 
3. Absence of Unified Educational System. 
The absence of unified educational system in Lebanon 
reflects and reinforces the fragmented social structure of Lebanon as 
well. Primarily of Lebanese educational system depending on 
philosophies and doctrines of different religious communities, each sects 
has its own autonomous private schools without any controlled by the 
government. This plurality of educational system has become more 
complicated as a result of the development of Catholic and Protestant 
missionary educational."' 
The curricular also classified that Arabic instruction for 
Muslim but Christian curricular using the western languages: French and 
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English. On the other hand they tend to perpetuate the existing sectarian 
24 
cleavages. 
Lacking of the unity of national educational system 
"political socialization'" flinction of the education i.e. to work toward a 
national consensus has been a failure in the main. And also the 
multiplicity of educational systems has prevented the emergence of a 
united intelligentsia. 
The traditional religious loyalties being the most important 
role in the way of life of an individual as a feature consequence of the 
fragmentation of Lebanese society. Lebanese people participate in public 
affairs through their respective communities only. As an effectiveness of 
interaction between Lebanese citizen through their religious communities 
that it has influenced to their social and political consciousness. They 
tend to look at the world from the point of view of their community. 
Thus, the fragmented character of Lebanese citizen leading to many 
fundamental problems such as constitution, a popular national pact, 
political order, and the most important is the national solidarity of 
Lebanon. Obviously, the social fragmentation itself would not be able to 
bring a civil war in Lebanon. But there are many factors which have 
contribute and reinforced to the violent encounter of various sects in 
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Lebanon. And one of it many factors is the Emergence of Sharp Class 
Division. 
THE EMERGENCE OF SHARP CLASS DIVISION: 
Instead of integrating various sects more firmly, the 
economic development in Lebanon after 1944 had different impact on the 
Christians and Muslim. The economic development resulted class 
divisions which emerged broadly coincided with the religious divisions. 
Before independence, the Christian were dominating in emerging areas 
of service sector like banking, transport, managerial services, 
communication, tourism, hotels etc. 
Prior to the French mandate, the Christian were already 
established in export and import. After French mandate. Lebanon rapidly 
became an enterepot and western goods and raw material exported to 
Europe. Slowly and gradually the Christian emerged capitalist and along 
with French mandatoiA authorities who protected French capitalist 
interests, because the ruling class of Lebanon.^ ^ 
Thus at the time of independence Christian were the most 
powerful economic group in Lebanon and members of ruling class by 
and large were from Christian group. The French had arisen with the 
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growth of western investment in Lebanon. Due to the knowledge of the 
language of the foreigners they were favoured. 
After independence, the economic position of Christian has 
further enhanced because of the two reasons. Firstly, the Lebanese 
economic system was based on extreme freedom to private enterprise and 
secondly the creation of Israel in 1948 as one of the most important 
amongst external factors. As a result of the creation of Israel, Lebanon 
inherited all of Palestine regional economic functions due to the Arab 
boycott of Israel. The Arab boycott gave a boost of Beirut port and the 
Beirut International Airport as well as an added appeal to the Lebanese 
schools and hospitals for Palestinian and Transjordanian students and 
patients. 
The Iraq Petroleum Company had used Haifa in Palestine as 
an outlet for petroleum export until May 1948. Later on Tripoli in 
Lebanon chose its new outlet, upon the stoppage of the flow of oil 
through Israel. Similarly ARAMCO used south Lebanon as an outlet for 
part of it, Saudi oil export by building a pipeline in 1957 from Saudi 
Arabia to Lebanon via Jordan and Syria.^ ° Around 150000 Palestinian 
refugees were forced to take refuge in Lebanon which offered cheap 
labour and as a result of this many banking and other service were shifted 
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from Jeruslem to Beirut. This labour force was not covered by state 
labour legislation and social security/' 
The post war oil boom gave a boost to the service sector in 
Arabian peninsula and the gulf The large flow of foreign currency had 
given spurt to the development of financial enterprising, financial help 
the Lebanese firms and resulted vast sum in Beirut money market. But 
the majority of the banks and financial enterprises were in the hands of 
Christians and investments were made to the industrial, agricultural, 
commercial and construction enterprises of the same community only. 
In 1968, the contribution of service sector was 67% where 
as only 32% labour force was employed in this sector. The contribution 
of industry and agriculture was 22% and I \% respectively. At the same 
time 50% of the population derived their income from agriculture. With 
this it is clear that agriculture was neglected where mostly Lebanese 
Muslim were engaged. The regional inequality was going northward, 
which can be proved with the fact that the rural per capita income was $ 
166 per year while that of the urban elite was $ 2680 in the 1960. The 
most prosperous sector the Lebanese economy remained by a large 
Christian preserve. In case of industn,- the position of Muslims was 
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slightly better but here too it was the Christian community which 
dominated. 
As a result of uneven development of the economy there has 
been a steady flow of Muslim migrants from rural to the urban areas in 
search of jobs. The population of Beirut, rose from 2,50,000 in the early 
1950's to 14 million in 1975 when the Lebanese Civil War started. The 
migration of Muslim from rural to urban continued untill the reveal 
population was pared down from 65% of the total population at the times 
the Civil War started. The migration was partly the result of the 
development in agriculture of export oriented fruits and vegetable 
farming. It also required intensive cultivation and greater investment of 
capital. As a result urban capitalist cause to reveal areas by means of 
ownership of fruit and vegetable inchards or by control of marketing of 
the produce of such farms. This development led to majority of Shia and 
Sunni farmers migrated to cities in search of their livelihood. From 1970 
onwards, these migrants were joined by another kind of migrants still 
Muslim fleeing their hours to escape the death and destruction caused by 
devastating Israeli raids into south Lebanon. 
With the passage of time two poverty belts inhabited 
predominantly by Muslim sprang up in Lebanon. One surrounding 
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country itself and one surrounding by the Christian. The economic 
growth in Lebanon cause from the private sector, the public sector 
remained relatively small and inefficient. As a result social institutions 
and services of Lebanon fell below par. Due to the dominant role of 
private sector in the field of education, health and housing. These sources 
were expensive for poor people and mostly Christians were availing 
these highly paid services. This imbalance in educational opportunities 
between Christians and Muslims has led to further economic disparities. 
This analysis of the de\elopment in Lebanese economy and its impact on 
the religious sects clearly highlight the economically deteriorating 
positions of the Muslim section of the population and strengthening of 
the economic position of the Christian community. 
The famih income of the Christians averaged about 50% to 
higher than those of Muslim and same two-third higher than those of 
Shia Muslims. This does not mean that there were no prosperous Muslim 
or poor Christians in Lebanon. The rich Muslim tended to mix up with 
their counterparts in the Christian community due to their common 
economic interests. The class polarization that took place between rich 
Christian and poor Muslim has simply a conflict of the interest among 
social classes and came to take on a sectarian and communal colour.^^ 
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This class conflict was highlighted by the brief civil war of 1958. The 
feeling among Muslim was that their socio-economic condition 
deteriorated that of the Christians stuce independence and further 
government was not doing anything to bridge the gap between the rich 
and the poor. After the civil war of 1958, the new President Fuad Shihab 
tried to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth among the 
Christians and Muslim but did not give justified result. The litani river 
project launched for ameliorating poor Muslim peasentry of south 
Lebanon.^ " By 1974 the dam and the power station had been completed 
and Beirut was getting its electricity but there was hardly any sign of the 
irrigation programme. 
To change the structure of the Lebanese economy would 
have led to clash with the powerful business community' that controlled 
and benefited from the service sector. To shifting of the concentration 
from business and service sector to agriculture could have infringed on 
the established rights of Christian business community in Lebanon. So all 
the efforts from the times of Shihab to regulate the economy have been 
resisted by powerful Christian oligarchy on the ground that country 
would lead to socialism. The same line of development was taking place 
in Arab countries which had adopted socialist principles of development. 
64 
RIGIDITY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The Lebanese political system was proved flexible in 
allowing for free enterprise in the economic sphere, but it provide rigid in 
its resistance to political system. The Lebanese Muslim had principal 
demands of allocating parliamentary, cabinet and administrative posts on 
the basis of sects, which was based on the French sponsored census of 
1932 did not reflect the true demographic situation, hence it had to be 
changed. This change was demanded as the size of different sects had 
under gone tremendous change as a result of Christians migration to 
West and higher fertilit> rate of the Muslims especially Shiite. 
In 1958, change was effected in the appointment to civil 
services due to the pressure from the Muslims. The ratio of the Muslim 
was not ever 5 to 6 in the civil services. Maronite Christians who had 
around 29% of the population in 1958, had held approximately 50% of 
government posts. After 1958, it was laid down by the government that 
our Muslim had to be appointed for every Christian but this policy was 
not extended to the field of political representation. Since the religious 
ratio has changed in favour of the Muslims, the Christian elites have 
refiased to allow a new census. The new census was supposed to unseat 
Maronites Christian from the near monopoly power. 
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In Lebanon the political movement which could have cut 
across sectarian. The political system in Lebanon proved rigid in not 
allowing Muslim a greater share is in state power which they claimed on 
the basis of demographic setup. This led to further political alienation of 
the Muslim since the Muslim had resented for their minorit) status 
within Lebanon since the time of independence, e\en though all 
evidences pointed to the contrary. Second, the system proved rigid is not 
accommodating political forces that arose after independence. The 
inevitable outcome of this was the emergence of extra constitutional 
sources of authority. All these factors only served to weaken the state and 
its institution at a time when the Lebanese societ} was in need of a strong 
central authority to control the social flux triggered by rapid development 
and modernisation. 
CIVIL WAR AND SYRIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION 
First phase of the civil war: 
On the morning of Sunday, 13 April 1975. while Pierre Gemayel 
was attending the consecration of a new Maronite church in the Christian 
suburb of Ayn al-Rummana, a car broke through the security line and 
shots were fired in the direction of the church entrance, three were shot 
them, two of them members of the Katiab militia and one bodyauard of 
66 
Gemayel. The car managed to escape in the confusion. On the same 
morning, one group of Palestinian from various refugee camps were 
returning by bus after attending a commando parade. Twenty passengers 
were killed and twenty other injured in an ambushed by gunmen of the 
Kataib militia as they passed through Ayn Al - Rummana."'' These two 
incidence led heavy fighting between Katiab militiamen and Palestinian. 
The armed Shiite militiamen joined the side of Palestinian. Leaders of the 
PLO and Path organization however, refrained from allying themselves 
openly with the Palestinians and Shiite who were fighting the Katiab 
forces. On the second day of fighting Mahmud Riyad, the Secretary 
General of the Arab League, mediated and a ceasefire agreement was 
concluded. But the sporadic fighting continued in the normal life of the 
city. In the last week of April, Kamal Junblat, head of the national 
movement declared to separate Kataib party and Arab world for its role 
in Ayn al-Rummana massacre and to with hold the support to any 
government in which Katiab was represented. As a result of this 
declaration Katiab members from the cabinet were resigned. After the 
resignation of Katiab members, their allies belonging to the different 
Christian political parties too resigned. The Prime Minister Rashid al-
Sulh lost more than half of the Cabinet Members and severely criticized 
the Katiab party and charged the Katiab of exploiting sectarianism to 
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impose their will on the country and of using political and military 
provocations to create a series of crises in an attempt to expand the 
conflict.^ ^ Instead of Rashid Karami as next Prime Minister, Franjeh in a 
surprise move appointed a military cabinet on 23 May 1975 under a 
retired Muslim Commander of the Internal Security Forces Brigadier 
Nuri al-din al-Rifai with Iskander Ghanem himself the Army Commander 
as the Minister of Defence.''^  The formation of militar) cabinet received 
criticism from the Christians commenting that it was necessary to re-
establish law and order. 
The formation of military cabinet of fighting and clashes 
between the Kataib militiamen and their allies, on the one hand, and the 
National Movement and their allies on the other. This prompted Syria to 
mediate by sending its Foreign Minister Abd -al-Halim Khaddam and 
Vice Minister of Defence Naji Jamil. Their mediation was successful in 
convening Franjih to give up the militan.' cabinet and accept Karami as 
Prime Minister, later on he refrained from cooperating with Karami and 
did little to help infomiing a strong government. Fighting continued 
uninterruptedly throughout June. It was only on 30 June that he was 
finally able to form a six man cabinet in which he himself was the 
Minister of Defence and Shamun leader of National Lebanese Party 
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(NLP) the close ally of the Kataib party held the important post of 
Minister of Interior. 
SECOND PHASE OF CIVIL WAR: 
After the formation of Karami government, Franjieh gave no 
cooperation to Karami. Unhappy and unsatisfied Franjieh with the way of 
the working of the government, retired shortly after the formation of the 
Karami cabinet to his summer home in Ihdin. Karami, however, reftise to 
go to Ihdin for the formal cabinet meeting to be held under the President 
and he began to hold informal Ministerial meetings. The result was that 
the country came to have a dual administration one in Beirut and the 
other in Ihdin. It was creating lot of conftjsion in controlling the internal 
security. Meanwhile in Ihdin, the President's son, Tony Franjieh took the 
charge and every this possible was going to be done to prevent Karami 
from getting away with his political victory. 
On 24 August, 1975 clashes broke out between Shiites in 
the subsurbs of Zahleh. backed by the Palestinian commandos and the 
Christians of the town. Soon the fighting spread to Tripoli where Sunni 
Muslim and Christians clashed. On 7 September, Christian gunmen 
abducted all passenger going by bus from Tripoli to Beirut and 12 
Muslim were shot dead in cold blood."'^  With this news, ferocity broke 
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out between the Muslims of the city and the Maronites of Zghorta. Only 
after dismissal of General Ghanem and appointment of Brigadier Hanna 
Said in his place, a partial ceasefire was succeeded. While the fighting 
subsided in the North between Kataib militiamen and Muslim gunmen in 
which the predominantly Christian shopping district of Suq - al - Tawila 
was bombed and set on fire. Once again Syria mediated by forming a 
National Dialogue Committee (NDC), which had membership of twenty 
equally divided between the Christians and Muslim.''^ 
Third phase of the civil war 
In NDC, Muslim side insisted on political reform plan but 
Christians representatives refused. Since much of the fighting was done 
by the Christian militiamen, this was obviously a tactics on the part of 
Christians for indefinite postponement of any discussion and heavy 
fighting broke out once again in Beirut and Tripoli. By this time the 
conflict between the Premier and the President came out into open. 
The President forced Premier to resign and the Muslims insists that no 
Sunni other than Karami would be allowed to assume the Premiership. 
To control the civil war Karami met with the President and outcome was 
the formation of the Higher Coordination Committee (HCC) on 3 
November, 1975 with the representation of Muslims, Christians, 
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Palestinians and Security forces were represented.^ ^ But it had lesser 
impact on civil war. On 6 November a fighter carrying light and heavy 
weapons for the Maronite militia arrived at Jounieh. The Premier sent a 
Lebanese - Palestinian Force to make inspection but it was prevented by 
Kataib militiamen. Consequently, the Muslims also felt completely 
justified in proceeding with their own rearmament. But now a 
considerable emigration of Christians from Muslims areas and of Muslim 
from Christian areas, had already taken place, where the two 
communities still existed side by side feelings were uneasy. A new 
Christian strategy was formulated a plan to partition of Lebanon as a 
solution to the confrontation. The fighting still continued in Beirut. The 
Christian were not interested in a negotiated settlement of NDC and 
HCC. Meanwhile Franjieh's Zghorta Liberation Army recorded 
successes in its fight against the National Movement and Palestinians in 
Tripoli and surrounding areas with the coordination with Shamun and 
Gemayel. A worst incident took place, this was the discovery of the dead 
bodies of five members of the Kataib party near the Maronite village of 
al-Fanar. In reaction to this, all the roads in Christians dominated areas 
was blocked and in Beirut and around 100 Muslim were killed on the 
spot in the revenge of five Maronites. By the end of this year causalities 
on both sides had reportedly reached 6,650 killed and 1,400 wounded.'''^  
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FORTH PHASE OF CIVIL WAR: 
The Christian front refrained from attacking the Palestinian 
camps, which from the background trained and supplied with arms to the 
members of various organization of the National Movement. It was the 
main cause of the war. On 4 January 1976, a Maronite siege of the 
Palestinian refugee camps, of Tell al-Zatar and Jisr al-Basha, in Beirut 
marked the start of the fourth phase of the Civil War.'" Maronites stated 
it was a strategic necessity as it stood in between the Christian line of 
communication between last Beirut and Metn, but the PLO and Muslim 
forces denounced the siege as a deliberate act of unjustified provocation. 
Yassir Arafat announced not to tolerate and prepared to break it by force 
if necessary. 
On 14 January, 1976 Kataib militiamen and their allies 
attacked and later occupied the Dubay Palestinian camp. Following the 
capitulation of the Dubay camp, the Christian militiamen began to 
prepare for a full-scale attack on the Muslim slums of al-Karantina, al 
Maslakh and at Maba. The Palestinian also launched an attack against 
Jiyya, al-Naima and Damur. In view of escalation of the conflict the 
Lebanese Army and Air Force were ordered to intervene by President 
Franjieh and Shamun by passing Premier Karami, who as Minister of 
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Defence was responsible for the armed forces. Premier Karami called 
upon the Maronites and the Palestinians to raise their sieges. On 18 
January, 1976 the Maronite militias finally over ran at Karantina and al-
Maslakh and on the same day Karami having failed to impose a ceasefire 
in time to save the tax slaves announced his resignation from the 
Premiership. On Palestinian request Syria supported the demonstration 
and he gradually began to turn in favour of the Muslims. Syria put firm 
pressure on the Lebanese leaders to reach a compromise. On 20 January, 
1976 Syrian delegation composed of Foreign Minister Abdul Halim al-
Khaddam, Chief Staff Hikmat Sihabi and Air Force Commander Naji 
Jamil arrived in Lebanon to help impose an effective ceasefire. With 
sound objection but later on the whole country fell under Palestinian 
military occupation and indirectly under Syrian control by forming a 
tripartite High Militan, Committee (HMC) to supervise and enforce a 
ceasefire, as a result of formation of HMC Karami took back his 
resignation on 24 January. On 14 February a declaration was made by 
Franjieh on 14 February in the form of Constitution Documents with 
certain changes in the political system. The National Assembly would be 
enlarged by including equal number of Muslim and Christian 
representatives from each religious group and sect according to size. The 
President would remain a Maronite and the Prime Minister was no longer 
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to be appointed by the President but would be elected by the National 
Legislature. The religious quota system for appointment in the 
government bureaucrac) was to be retained. The Premier would be Sunni 
and the President of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite. The PLA troops 
made responsible to enforce ceasefire and Syria would authority over 
how and where guerilla forces would be deployed.''^  
Indirect Syrian Intervention 
Syria's concern over the outbreak of civil strife in Lebanon 
in the spring of 1975 grew into an absorbing preoccupation as the strife 
graduated into the Civil War that would last for more than a decade. 
Meanwhile, Syria's stakes increased as it tried to shape the outcome of 
the war by exercising leverage over domestic Lebanese parties and the 
Palestinian Resistance. 
The modalities used by Syria to influence events in Lebanon 
followed a clear escalatory pattern. Syria's intervention evolved as a 
process with definable thresholds, corresponding to three principal 
phases. In the initial, mediatory phase in December 1975, Syria relied 
primarily on non-coercive, diplomatic means. In the second phase in May 
1976, coercive means were used only indirectly, when Palestinian forces 
74 
intervened in Lebanon on Syrian orders. Finally, direct intervention 
occurred in the third phase in October 1976.'''' 
The dynamics of the Syrian escalation reveal that 
intervention in Lebanon was an incremental process, rather than a 
discrete act whose intent was clearly formulated from the start. One 
indication of tentativeness in Syrian probes is that whereas certain 
modalities of intervention, i.e., diplomatic or militar}', direct or indirect, 
predominated in each phase, none of the phases was exclusively 
characterized by a single modality. In fact, each stage harbored signals of 
escalatory intent towards its successor. Conversely, mediatory attempts 
were never abandoned even once direct military inter\ention was under 
way. 
The decision-making process for S>ria's intervention 
remains opaque to outside observers because of the secretiveness and 
censorship of the regime. There is evidence, as President Assad's 
Advisor of Foreign Affairs, Adib al-Dawood, declared, that "...As the 
crisis worsened and the possibility of war increased, the evaluation 
process was widened and was made more rigorous^ .^ However, while 
information on the size of the decisional unit and the identity of the 
participants in key Syrian decisions is revealing, the veneer of official 
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consensus is never punctured by Syrian spokesman. Wider consultations 
by President Hafez al-Assad may have been needed because the 
intervention was increasingly controversial within the elite and among 
the public at large, but allusions to such dissent are cryptic and rare. 
Therefore, in asking key questions about the Syrian intervention, it is 
best to counterpart official explanations with the actual record of Syrian 
behavior. President Assad asserted in an interview on 9 August 1978: 
We entered Lebanon in response to requests and pleas 
for assistance, which came to us from hundreds of 
families, from thousands of Lebanese citizens, and 
from many different sides; and with the approval of 
the legitimate authorities in Lebanon"*^ . 
Despite the consistent Syrian emphasis on Lebanese appeals, 
closer examination exhibits a complex and variable interplay between 
invitation and penetration. In the initial phase of war, mediatory missions 
were sent essentially on the Syrian initiative, although they were 
generally welcomed by parties to the Lebanese strife. In January 1976 a 
series of overt appeals were addressed to Syria both by the Lebanese 
President and by members of the anti-establishment coalition. By 
contrast, when Syria's massive military thrust into Lebanon occurred in 
June 1976, it was clearly a penetrational intervention. 
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lese iriMS,2aha sir Syrian objectives since the beginning of the Leban Jjdl iS^a nce 
Syria sustained its initiatives and sacrifices to half the slaughter between 
our Lebanese brothers as the Information Minister, Ahmad Iskander 
Ahmad observed. The following were the objectives: 
Preventing partition - the partition of Lebanon, whatever 
this may necessitate by way of effort and sacrifices. Establishing security 
and peace in Lebanon. Protection of the Palestinian Resistance; helping 
the Lebanese "brothers" to reconstruct and develop their countr\'^ .^ 
The above list of objectives reflect two dominant foci of 
Syrian involvement in the war. In the domestic Lebanese arena, Syria 
was committed to averting the negative outcome of partition and to 
realizing the positive goals of stability and national reconciliation. With 
respect to the Palestinian Resistance, Syria was eager to preserve its 
image of champion and defence. 
The record shows two distinct strands in Syrian policy and 
raises questions about the degree of synchronization between the two. On 
the diplomatic level S> ria tried to cultivate the image of an impartial 
arbiter throughout the Lebanese Civil War, pursuing contacts with pro-
and anti-establishment Lebanese as well as the Palestinian Resistance. 
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Syrian diplomacy consistently supported perpetuation of the Lebanese 
political system, with only minor institutional reforms, and preservation 
of the Cairo Agreement. 
On the military level, however, Syria engaged in an abrupt 
and dramatic shift of alignments in the midst of the war. Its abandonment 
of traditional Palestinian and Lebanese anti-establishment allies in favour 
of the pro-establishment forces was a tactical maneuver. Refusing to 
countenance the complete victory of either coalition in the Lebanese 
strife, Syria broke ranks with its long-standing allies when they refused 
to heed its counsel. 
With respect to the Palestinian Resistance, a dichotomy 
emerged between those factions Syria could control and those which it 
could not. The forces of Saiqah and the Palestinian Liberation Army 
(PLA) forces based in Syria willingly carried out Syrian commands. On 
orders of President Assad, they first intervened in Lebanon to support the 
anti-establishment coalition, and subsequently fought against the same 
coalition, even combating PLA units based in Lebanon. By contrast, both 
the PLO factions loyal to Arafat and the rejectionist groups adhered to 
their alliance with the Lebanese insurgents against Syrian wishes. This 
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stand infuriated the Syrian elite, prompting its military assault on the 
Resistance in Lebanon. 
In the domestic Lebanese context, Syria's efforts during the 
initial, mediatory phases were directed at reviving immobilized Lebanese 
political institutions. When this proved difficult, Syria made several 
attempts at institutional innovation, sponsoring interim political bodies to 
resolve the crisis and restore order. Clearly, the escalation of Syria's 
involvement was reactive to increase polarization in the target states. As 
more extreme positions prevailed within the contesting Lebanese 
coalitions, the possibility of political compromise became more elusive. 
Maronites within the pro-establishment group openly sponsored partition 
of Lebanon and creation of a Christian mini-state; while Kamal Junblat 
led the Lebanese National Movement in the call for revolutionary 
overthrow of the Lebanese system, rather than merely reform. 
The most potent symbol and accelerator of Lebanese 
political polarization was the collapse of the Lebanese Army. From the 
earliest stage of the Civil War, these were signs of internal dissent in the 
Army, as well as challenges to its role by both individual militias and 
Palestinian guerrillas. Repeated disputes arose over the desirability of 
deplying the Army to check civil strife. The ultimate collapse of the 
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Army in March 1976 painfully demonstrated the inability of the 
Lebanese State to solve its own problems. This development opened the 
door to deeper Syrian involvement a deeper, indeed, than the Syrians 
themselves initially expected. 
The complexity of tracing and analyzing the dynamics of the 
Syrian intervention stems from the various axes of ongoing conflict. 
Although different axes of conflict were often activated simultaneously, 
the salience of issues and actors varied during different phases of the 
war. A chronological approach seems most useful in analyzing the 
interplay between Syrian initiatives and developments in the target state. 
Each of the three major phases will be further divided into brief time 
frames, within which developments will be treated thematically issues 
and actors involved. 
The first instance of the Lebanese Civil War was marked by 
the appearance of a typical corporation-government alliance. President 
Kamil Shamun, leader of the predominantly Maronite National Liberal 
Party also occupied the post of Chairman of the board of the Protein 
Company. This company in no time gained the fishing rights of the 
coastline along the predominantly Muslim city of Sidon. Poor Muslim 
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fishermen of Sidon were angered by the high technology fishing 
techniques of the company. 
On 26 February 1975, the Lebanese Communist Party and 
other leftist parties organized demonstration in Sidon, agitating for the 
revocation of the Protein Company's license. After the Army was sent in 
to break up the demonstration, a general strike was called by left-wing 
groups in Sidon and. later, in Beirut and Tripoli. Meanwhile, port 
workers disrupted operations along the entire Lebanese coastline, and the 
wave of strikes threatened to spread. Troops were sent to break up 
barricades around Sidon, and heavy fighting continued for several days. 
On 2 March, demonstrators accepted a ceasefire on the condition that the 
Army withdraws from the city. The Lebanese Cabinet, meeting in 
emergency session, arrived at a compromised proposal whereby the 
Protein Company would only be permitted to operate eighteen miles 
offshore, so as not to interfere with the small fishing boats closer to the 
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coast . 
The "fisheries dispute" has been designed as the opening 
round of the Lebanese Civil War, marking "the point at which a 
significantly higher and sustained level of violence was manifested'* .^ 
Most portentous or later developments as a controversy over the use of 
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the Army to control civil strife. Issues raised included the appropriate 
channels of authority for ordering Army action; the propriety of the 
Army's role; and challenges posed to the Army integrity by foreboding 
of internal dissent. 
An intra-elite quarrel arose over authorization of the Army 
use in the 26 February demonstration in Sidon. This decision ignored the 
instructions of the Sunni Prime Minister, Rashid al-Sulf Instead, the 
Maronite Army Commander, Gen. Iskandar Ghanim, assumed personal 
charge of the Army's conduct, maintaining contact with President 
Faranjiyih throughout the crisis. The Sunni establishment considered the 
use of the Army as an instrument of the Maronite Presidency and the lack 
of Deference to the Sunni Premiership an intolerable affront. Prime 
Minister Sulh was faulted for having disgraced the Sunni community by 
accepting a slight to his authority by the Army Commander. Sunni 
leaders demanded that he be replaced immediately by a more forceful 
leader. 
On the substance of the Army's role, Sunni leaders 
complained that democratic liberties were violated when the Army fired 
on demonstrations in Sidon. Instead of firing on civilians, they argued, 
the Army should be defending Lebanon's border from Israeli raids. To 
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assure that in the future the Army would perform its appropriate 
functions, they demanded a reorganization of the Army command into a 
Military Command Council whose membership would be equally divided 
between Christians and Muslims, although the Commander-in-Chief 
would still be Maronite. The new council would then be answerable to 
the government as a whole rather than to the Maronite President. 
The Lebanese National Movement (LNM) joined in 
criticizing the use of the Army in Sidon, and Kamal Junblat called for the 
immediate resignation of Chief-of-Staff, Ghanim. However, a lack of 
coordination between the LNM and the Sunni establishment was evident 
in Junblat's refusal to endorse their call for the Prime Minister's 
resignation. Instead, Junblat presumably because he did not wish to give 
his Sunni adversaries an easy political victory''^ . In the absence of 
coordinated call for Prime Minister Sulh's resignation he was able to 
weather the storm, at least temporarily. 
Meanwhile, members of the Christian establishment 
forcefully vindicated the Army's role in the Sidon incidents. Thousands 
of students joined demonstrations in support of the Army, held in 
predominantly Christian East Beirut. Responding to demonstrators' 
vilification of Muslim and leftist groups for demanding changes in the 
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Army command, the Maronite leaders of the Kata'ib and the National 
Liberal Parties rejected the Muslim proposal for a new Military 
Command Council^ * .^ 
Hoping to defuse tensions over the Army's role. President 
Faranjiyeh referred the issue of Army reform to a special committee for 
study. The government was particularly concerned by manifestations of 
tension within the Army in wake of the Sidon events. When Ma'ruf Sa'd, 
populist Sunni leader, died on 6 March of wounds inflicted during the 
Sidon demonstration, intense fighting occurred between Maronite and 
Muslim recruits in the Lebanese Army. These clashes were an early 
indication of the Army's potential for internal disintegration^'. 
Controversy over the Army's rule was further accentuated 
because of alleged participation by Palestinians in clashes with the Army. 
When troops sent to remove barricades on the road to Sidon on 28 
February, 1975 armed civilians who opened fire on the troops included 
Palestinians from the nearby camp of Ayn al-Hulwa. Christian political 
spokesmen seized on this participation as evidence of Palestinian 
interference in internal Lebanese affairs. They cited a coordinated 
Palestinian and radical plot to undermine not only the Army but also the 
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Lebanese political system as a whole. PLO leaders, however, vigorously 
denied any connection between the Resistance and the Sidon events . 
Shortly after calm was restored, Syria proposed a joint 
military and political command with the PLO. This suggestion, in March 
1975, was presented as a sign of support for the Palestinian movement, 
but might alternately be viewed as an attempt to increase Syrian 
influence over resistance decisions in view of recent tensions in 
Lebanon. Palestinian suspicions of Syrian intent surfaced when talks 
convened on 25 May about implementing the joining command came to 
naught. However, mere announcement of the proposal in March 
exacerbated Maronite apprehension about Syrian support for Palestinian 
participation in Lebanese affairs "'. 
The debate over responsibilit}- for the Ayn al-Rammana 
incident raised the broader issue of the Palestinians' status in Lebanon. In 
a meeting between President Faranjiyeh and Yasir Arafat on 14 May, the 
President complained that Resistance leaders had been specifically 
warned by the Lebanese Army to avoid driving vehicles through Ayn al-
Rammana, so as not to offend the residents' sensitivities.^ '* He 
complained of repeated "excesses" by Palestinian guerrillas attributing 
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the most flagrant offences to members of Rejectionist groups who 
refused to be bound by the Cairo Agreement". 
In reply, Arafat emphasized that the Resistance was not "a 
political party in the Lebanese arena" and was determined to avoid 
interference in Lebanese internal affairs. He explained, however, that 
"we must be understood, for we are not an army in the disciplined sense, 
which can impose uniform behavior on all its elements". He then 
promised to do his oblige all elements of the Resistance to adhere to the 
Cairo Agreement. Arafat had tried earlier to impose discipline, sending 
sorties of the PLO's military police to refugee camps on 15 April to 
restrain the Rejectionists from provocative acts. After accepting the 16 
April ceasefire, he dispatched members of the Palestinian Armed 
Struggle Command to assist the Lebanese Security Force in 
apprehending offenders^ .^ 
Leaders of the Resistance believed that the Kata'ib 
precipitated the Ayn al-Rammana episode to provoke the guerrillas and 
challenge their status in Lebanon. In a meeting with the Arab 
Ambassadors to Lebanon on 14 April, Abu lyad, second in command to 
Arafat in the PLO, asserted that the Resistance that exercised maximum 
self-restraint in recent year, despite the invective and vituperation of the 
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Kata'ib. Palestinians even pursued a political dialogue with Kataib 
leaders, who then reneged on a pledge to publicise a document which 
said that "Resistance is not the cause of Israeli avarice and aggression". 
The recent events, Abu lyad declared, were intended to spark a clash 
between the guerrillas and the Lebanese authorities. He expressed the 
hope that the Kata'ib perpetrators would be punished and order restored 
but warned that if not, ""we will not be responsible for the determination 
of the existing situation". Abu lyad subsequently remarked that the 
Resistance had an interest in Lebanon's asserting its sovereign authority, 
because "with a strong state, one can reach an agreement"". 
A weak Lebanese state meant, that both the Kata'ib and its 
opponents were interested in asserting themselves for or against the state. 
The Maronite extremists wanted to prove to their opponents that, it was 
they who held the key to order in Lebanon. In this area, the Maronites 
had support not only from their community but also from other Christian 
groups as well^ *. 
The main axis of conflict in subsequent weeks continued to 
be the Kata'ib-Palestinian rivalry. But the violence was spreading fast 
and afar. Soon even the National Liberal Militia by ex-President Kamil 
Shamun started helping the Kata'ib. Clashes in the vicinity of Beirut 
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involved al-Karantina and al-Moslakh, whose inhabitants were Sunni, 
Lebanese Shiites, Kurds, and Syrian workers. Lebanese leftist parties 
called particular attention to the harassment of Syrian workers. Baathists, 
Nasserites and Communists supported the Palestinians in clashes that 
spread from Beirut to Tripoli in the North and Sidon and Tyre in 
Southern Lebanon. Imam Musa al-Sadr, after meeting with Arafat and 
with the Sunni Mufti, Hasan Khalid, convened at the Shii High Council 
on 19 April. The Council meeting attended by seventy-seven influential 
Shias, declared its solidarit} with the Resistance and called for 
fundamental political reform in Lebanon^ . 
Militiamen associated with the Lebanese National 
Movement (LNM) also participated in clashes with the Kata'ib. The 
LNM's influence, however, was more decisive in the political than the 
military sphere. On 13 April, immediately after the Ayn al-Rammana 
incidents, a meeting of LNM leaders demanded the immediate 
dissolution of the Kata'ib Party and the exclusion of the two Kata'ib 
ministers serving on the Lebanese cabinet. After a more broadly based 
LNM conference on 26 April, Jumbalat declared that his front in 
Parliament would deny support to any government in which the Kata'ib 
Party participated^^. 
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Lebanon had not seen anything Hke the inter-group fights 
before. But political differences acquired intractable and brought drastic 
deterioration or inter-group ties. Never before had proscription been 
instituted, however, between two such broadly based groups^'. Jumbalat 
sought to rally political support for his stand, meeting with Raymun 
Iddih, the only Maronite leader who had publicly criticized the Kata'ib 
for the Ayn al-Rammana events. 
In addition Sunni leaders tried to discourage Junbalat from 
pursuing this political course, although the)- were reluctant to cross 
Junbalat by openly opposing proscription. President Faranjiyeh, in turn 
criticized Junbalat's stance and refused to accede to his demand for 
reprisals against the Kata'ib^^. 
Immediately after the military government was announced, a 
common front was established between the Lebanese National 
Movement and the Sunni establishment. Despite earlier disagreements 
between the two groups. Kamal Junbalat felt sufficiently provoked by the 
military government to contact Sa'ib Salam, his long-standing Sunni 
political rival. Cooperation with Salam was crucial because of the latter's 
partnership in the tahaluf, the tripartite alliance formed before the war 
between Salam, Rashid Kasami (a Sunni politician), and Raymun Iddih 
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(a Maronite politician). A joint statement was issued by the tahaluf and 
Junbiat on 24 May, expressing their determination to undermine the 
military Cabinet. They may have feared that the Cabinet was a first step 
toward full military rule, or that it was intended to groom General 
Ghanim as a successor to President Faranjiyeh in 1976. The military 
Cabinet was endorsed only by Pierre Jumayyil of the Kata'ib and former 
President Kamil Sham"un, whose enthusiasm branded the Cabinet more 
starkly as an instrument of the Maronite Presidency.^ " 
Junbalat also made an overture toward the Palestinian 
Resistance by instructing the LNM to promote cooperation with the 
Resistance politically, popularly, and militarily. In one sense, the 
announcement of the militan' cabinet deflected attention from the 
Palestinian role in the war, by highlighting differences among domestic 
Lebanese contestants. Nevertheless, the Resistance felt particularly 
threatened by the military Cabinet, since General Ghanim had often used 
the Army to curb its operations in the past. Displaying an ambivalent 
posture, the Resistance declared its unwillingness to become involved in 
a domestic Lebanese matter, and asserted that it had no advance 
knowledge of the Cabinet's formation. 
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Arafat then alerted Syrian President Assad of the recent 
developments, asking his assistance in containing the situation. His 
overture was paralleled by Kamal Junbalat, who sent an envoy to 
Damascus for discussions with Syrian leaders -64 
The Resistance had previously approached Syria when 
Arafat visited Damascus several days after the Ayn al-Rammana 
incident, on 18 April^ "\ To what extent these overtures constituted an 
explicit request for Syrian involvement, and what t\pe of involvement 
was desired, is unclear. Until the formation of the military Cabinet, Syria 
steered clear of public reactions to the Lebanese events, with the 
exception of press statements supporting the "rights of the Palestinian 
people". A decision b\ Syrian leaders on more active involvement in 
mid-March reflected apprehension over the formation of the military 
cabinet^^ 
Because of precedents of indirect Syrian intervention during 
clashes between Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian Resistance in 
1969 and 1973, Syrian leaders may have felt pressured to intervene if the 
military Cabinet provoked similar clashes. Preferring to avoid this 
scenario, Syria decided lo launch a diplomatic initiative instead. 
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Syrian involvement in the Lebanese crisis intensified in 
September 1975 when large scale outbreak of violence in Northern 
Lebanon and Beirut sparked an increase in the level of Syrian mediatory 
activities and the seriousness with which this role was pursued by 
Damascus. This is the moment when Syria launched its first significant 
and of course rather cautious interventionist role in the entire crisis. But 
nothing could set back the dynamics of conflict which had been triggered 
by a bickering political elite and a weakening Lebanese state. When the 
Lebanese Army was accused of inter\'ening against members of a 
Muslim political organization in Tripoli killing twelve, flill-scale fighting 
resumed.^ ^ 
Furthermore disputes arose over the possible use of the 
Army in Beirut when \iolence broke out there on 17 September, the 
Kata'ib initiated a full-scale attack on downtown Beirut. During 
escalating attacks in the capital and its environs, the Kata'ib were joined 
by other Maronite militias, including the National Liberals' milida, 
known as al-Numas (the Tigers), and an armed band called Hurras al-Arz 
(Guardians of the leaders). Christian spokesmen demanded Army 
intervention in Beirut but was met by Muslim opposition. The 
Palestinian Resistance too opposed Army intervention . 
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In the meanwhile PLO tried to help the security scenario in 
Tripoli and after attending a meeting sponsored by the LNM, Zuhays 
Muhsin, the head of the Palestinian Military Bureau decided to increase 
the number of Palestinian patrols deployed in Tripoli . But Muhsin's 
dual role as a Palestinian leader and a Syrian supporter raised difficulties 
before PLO's desire to maintain stability in Tripoli. Soon the situation 
became such that Palestinian Liberation Army elements and the Syrian-
backed Sa 'igah members started patrolling Tripoli. In the process Karami 
lost his credibility. The Palestinians withdrew after Assad's intervention. 
But the Syrian-backed Sa 'igah remained. 
There are many unanswered questions about this preliminary 
instance of Syrian indirect intervention. Officially, Palestinian 
transnational authorities were assigned responsibility for initiating 
intervention by Palestinian brigades and then for agreeing to the PLA 
withdrawal. 
From late September 1975 until January 1976, Syrian 
diplomatic efforts were conducted quietly from the Syrian capital. 
Several important visits by Lebanese leaders to Damascus occurred, 
either at Syrian invitation or on their own initiative. 
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After an emergency meeting at the Presidential Palace in 
early October, Prime Minister Karami decided to visit Damascus, along 
with Yasir Arafat. Karami told President Assad and Foreign Minister, 
Khaddam that he was confronted with three options. One was to deploy 
the Army - an alternative which he ruled out, because of his desire not to 
inflame the fighting, and for the sake of the unity of the Army. Second, 
he could strive for national reconciliation, after stopping the fighting. 
Third, if reconciliation failed, he could offer his government's 
resignation. 
The Syrian response revealed much about Syrian 
perceptions of the Lebanese crisis and the means deemed desirable for its 
resolution. While assigning first priorit}' to achieving an end to the 
fighting, the Syrian leaders emphatically opposed deploying the Army, 
declaring that this would be counterproductive. Assad and Khaddam then 
registered their personal confidence in Karami. 
This unusually frank articulation of Syria's closer 
identification with the Resistance than with the Lebanese left, and of its 
skepticism about the urgency of the left's full program of reforms, had 
significant implications for the future. Syria also indicated that its 
support for the Resistance was predicated on full implementation and 
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respect for the Cairo and Malkert Agreements, while calling on the 
Lebanese parties including the Kata'ib to recognize the "Palestinian, 
Arab and international legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation'''. 
Immediately after the Damascus meeting to which he had 
been a party, Yasir Arafat directed the Resistance to assist in restoring 
stability in Beirut. He called on Palestinian Armed Struggle Command 
patrols in the West Beirut to apprehend armed men, dismantle barricades, 
and strengthen adherence to the latest ceasefire. He also ordered an end 
to arms demonstrations in Beirut and withdrawal of all armed elements, 
calling upon the LNM to adhere to the new measures as welf .^ 
When these efforts failed to avert unprecedented violence in 
the capital late in October 1975, Yasir Arafat led a delegation of 
Palestinian guerrilla leaders to meet Prime Minister Karami on 29 
October and offer assistance in restoring order. Similarly, Foreign 
Minister Khaddam called from Damascus to indicate Syria's willingness 
to advance any possible assistance. One result of these overtures was the 
formation, on 3 November, of a Higher Coordination Committee, whose 
function was investigate ceasefire violations and prevent such breaches 
from getting out of hand. The Committee included representatives of the 
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Army and the Internal Security Forces, as well as of Palestinian guerrilla 
groups^^ 
A temporary lull in the violence following creation of still 
another institutional mechanism did not endure. In a bold stroke Syria 
invited Kata'ib chief Pierre al-Jumayyil to visit Damascus on 6 
December. Whereas Arafat, Junbalat, and Musa Sadr, as leaders of 
partisan groups with which Syria traditionally identified, had visited 
Damascus repeatedly in previous months, the Syrian overture in singling 
out this extremist Maronite spokesman for high level consultations 
sparked widespread surprise and concern in Lebanon. President Assad 
opened the rather lengthy meeting with the Kata'ib chief by expressing 
distress over recent events in Lebanon. He pledged that Syria was willing 
to offer "every possible service", and would pursue its diplomatic efforts 
in Lebanon, "If the matter was necessary and if it was asked to do so". 
Assad emphasized Syria's desire to be considered "a friend of all 
Lebanese without exception". Elaborating the Syrian objectives, Foreign 
Minister Khaddam expressed frustration over the complexity of 
Lebanon's problems. He revealed that since the beginning of the 
Lebanese crisis, top Syrian officials had spent at least three hours a day 
following Lebanese developments. Khaddam explained that there were 
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really two crisis in Lebanon - a Lebanese-Lebanese crisis and a 
Lebanese-Palestinian crisis. As for Syria's involvement, Khaddam 
declared that Syria was not pursuing reactive strategies, but rather acting 
on the basis of its interests, and he advised Lebanon to do the same. One 
of the central causes of the crisis, he observed, was the weakness of the 
Lebanese state. 
Lebanese leaders tried to convince Syria that bloodletting in 
Lebanon would have negative fallout on Damascus. Jumayyil tried to 
convey to the Syrians that Syrian support for these groups could be 
destabilizing and demanding to Syria's regional interests. Khaddam said, 
"bloodletting in Lebanon would bloody Syria as well'" ^ 
On the day of the Jumayyil's visit to Damascus on 6 
December, violent incidents sprang up all over the country. Four 
members of the Kata'ib Part}' were ambushed and murdered in Maronite-
controlled territory by unidentified assailants. In retaliation, about two 
hundred Muslim civilians were massacred by Maronite militiamen on 
"Black Saturday" Over the next few weeks, the cycle of violence 
escalated. An alliance of Muslim and left-wing groups, reinforced by 
Palestinian militiament, were led by Ibrahum Qulaylat in a Beirut attack 
against Christian positions. They dislodged Kata'ib forces from some of 
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the large Beirut hotels and made advances against downtown Beirtu. 
Forces aligned with the LNM then overran a Christian village in the 
Bikaa Valley and the Kata'ib, in turn attacked several Muslim villages 
near Beirut^ .^ 
Faranjiyeh hoped that by inviting Syria into Lebanon, he 
could persuade the latter "to redress the balance in favour of the 
Maronites". The beleaguered Lebanese President hoped that his move 
would keep the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinians in 
line^^ 
Nevertheless, a qualitative change in the nature and scope of 
the Syrian intervention did occur in January 1976. The degree to which 
Syrian escalation occurred in response to "invitations" by various 
Lebanese parties, rather than in promotion of Syrian designs, is a 
question that arose more sharply in the next phase. 
As the polarization between the contending Lebanese 
coalitions increased, so did Syriuan concern and involvement. In the 
early weeks of January, both "invitational" and "penetrational" 
dimensions characterized the Syrian role. President Faranjiyeh was 
reportedly in continuous contact with Syrian President Assad once he 
siege of the Palestinian refugee camps began on 4 January. The two 
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leaders agreed that Faranjiyeh would visit Damascus shortly to discuss 
and overall Lebanese settlement^ .^ 
In the first official indication that Syria would intensify its 
involvement in Lebanon, Foreign Minister Khaddam asserted that this is 
a very sensitive situation in relation to Syria and in relation to the 
presence of the Palestinian Resistance there. 
Moreover, Khaddam specified that he was referring not only 
to the areas of Lebanon detached from Syria in 1920, but to Mount 
Lebanon as well - "For Lebanon will either be unified or it will be 
restored to Syria"''^ 
In actualit)\ Syria's behavior in early January was limited to 
small-scale, indirect probes, similar to those of the previous July and 
September. In two instances, Syria militarily supported the Palestinian-
LNM counteroffensive. Palestinian reinforcements from Syria joined in 
the siege of the Christian town of Zahleh in Bikaa Valley. Likewise 
Syrian -sponsored Sa'iqah guerrillar assisted Sunni forces in attacking 
Christian villages in the Northern Akkar region , 
A more complex scenario emerged, however, when the 
LNM-Palestinian offensive against Damur ran into trouble. Having 
diverted forces to Beirut and other zones of combat, the Lebanese 
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National Movement was not equipped to pursue its siege of Damur 
against Maronite resistance. Palestinian forces of limited assistance, 
since most of them were still deployed in the South, close to the Israeli 
border. Kamal Junbalat became increasingly anxious, and in a meeting at 
the home of the Sunni Mufti, Hasan Khalid, at Avamun, he joined other 
LNM and traditional Muslim leaders in initiating an appeal for Syrian 
assistance^". 
Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad later cited the appeal of the 
Avamun summit as evidence that Syria's intervention in Lebanon was 
purely invitational. In an unusual and highly revealing speech delivered 
on 20 July 1976, President Assad explained the Syrian rationale in 
responding to the LNM's appeal. Assad relates that in mid-January, 
Lebanese Muslim and leftist leaders sent urgent "signal of distress" to 
Syria, due to the military collapse of LNM-Resistance forces. The 
members of the Avamun summit urged Syrian Foreign Minister 
Khaddam to request President Assad to contact President Faranjiyeh and 
try to stop the fighting. Assad portrays himself as reluctant to comply 
with the request, not because of unwillingness to make the effort, but 
because he considered the demand unreasonable. He explained that the 
LNM and the Resistance had more weapons at their disposal than the 
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entire Lebanese Army, let alone the Kata'ib and National Liberals. He 
therefore told Khaddam "they must not hold out" and that he would not 
contact Faranjiyeh. However, Assad relented after Khaddam repeatedly 
called him to describe the desperation of the appeals who feared that 
after the fall of al-Karantina and al-Maslakh, the Kata'ib's next move 
would be to occupy West Beirut. Assad called Faranjiyeh on 18 January 
and arranged a cease-fire for that night, but the agreement didn't hold 
and fighting escalated instead. At this point Assad met with "some of our 
comrades in the leadership to determine what might be done to rescue the 
situation". Having already supplied arms and attempted mediation, The 
Syrian decided that "nothing remained but direct intervention"^'. 
At this point, Assad formed a special ad hoc cabinet to 
participate in all-important decisions involving Lebanon. The nine-
member group, under Assad's chairmanship, included prominent 
representatives of the Army, Air Force, and Intelligence Service, the 
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Leader of Sai'gah, and the two 
senior representatives of the Regional Command of the Baath Party. The 
representative of all key centers of power in the Syrian political system 
reflected the enhanced importance attached to development in Lebanon . 
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The outcome of deliberations by the Syrian ehte was a 
decision for a higher level of commitment in Lebanon. Assad explains 
the decision to intervene under the banner of the Palestinian Liberation 
Army, but later mentions that Syria moved in the PLA and other forces 
whose identity is not specified. He asserts that when the PLA began its 
entry into Lebanon, no one was aware that this was occurring. The 
autonomy of the Syrian decision is underscored by his remark that: 
We did not consult with them [i.e. the Palestinian 
Resistance] and we did not consult with the nationalist parties, and 
naturally not one of them was prepared to discuss with us any measures 
[that they took]. The important thing is that they requested us to carry out 
what [i.e. whatever] would rescue them . 
The approximately 3,500 men that entered Lebanon from 
Syria were primarily affiliated with the Yarmuk Brigade, one of the PLA 
units stationed in Syria. They were responding to a Syrian command to 
move forward, although officially all PLA units were subject to the direct 
command of Yasir Arafat. Whereas the issue of PLA loyalties would 
later arouse acrimonious Syrian-Palestinian dispute, in this instance the 
PLA intervention clearly furthered the goals of the PLO in Lebanon and 
of the Lebanese National Movement. Most of the PLA forces from Syria 
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were initially concentrated in the Bikaa Valley, but the presence of these 
reinforcements enabled Arafat to draw on his forces in Southern Lebanon 
for the siege against Damur. 
The indirect Syrian intervention quickly shifted the 
Lebanese military balance to favour the anti-establishment coalition. By 
20 January, Damur and the surrounding Maronite villages fell and were 
plundered, and Kamil Shamu'un's own home was devastated on 24 
January. The LNM pursued its attacks on Zahleh in the Bikaa and on a 
Maronite town near Baalbek while Muslim and Palestinian forces from 
Tripoli assaulted neighboring Zgharta^ "*. 
Deep pessimism arose in Maronite circles, for East Beirut 
and the Northern sector of Mount Lebanon were the only remaining areas 
squarely under their control. With these exceptions, it appeared that "the 
whole country fell now under Palestinian military occupation and, 
indirectly, under Syrian control^^ 
The arrival of the Syrian delegation was also instrumental in 
alleviating the political impasse triggered by the resignation of Prime 
Minister Karami. In view of Karami's close contact with Syria, his 
resignation may have been an important factor prompting Syria's indirect 
intervention. Karami left himself room for political maneuver by not 
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submitting his resignation in writing to the President, as tradition would 
dictate. Faranjiyeh, in turn, chose to ignore and then to reftise the 
resignation. Once a ceasefire was worked out with Syrian assistance on 
21 January and a Syrian. Lebanese-Palestinian Higher Military 
Committee was appointed to supervise its implementation, Karami 
agreed to withdraw his resignation . 
In his July 1976 speech, Assad hails the Constitutional 
Document as a major victory for all Lebanese. He takes pride in the fact 
that the document explicitly refers to Lebanon as an Arab State. 
However, he singles out two groups with vested interests in obstructing 
the reform plan. The first was the stratum of leaders and Za'ims" who 
benefited from confessionals and feared a loss of privileges if the system 
were dismantled. Although they had paid lip service to the goal of 
abolishing confessionals in the past, they were "struck with shocks" 
when this became a viable possibility. Second, members of the numerous 
Lebanese militias earned their livelihood though the fighting, and feared 
that if security was restored after acceptance of the reform plan, they 
would be unemployed^ .^ 
From the perspective of Lebanese, the view expressed by 
leading politicians displayed considerable variation. Moreover, the 
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positions of some individuals shifted over time. These fluctuation were 
associated with evolving perceptions of the domestic balance of power 
and of the reliability and usefulness of the Syrian connection. 
The Palestinian leadership, while officially welcoming 
Syrian mediatory efforts from the outset, increasingly shared Junbalat's 
suspicious of Syrian intent. Mainstream PLO spokesmen were initially 
restrained in their criticism of Syria, leading to considerable 
inconsistency in public pronouncements by Palestinian leaders. On the 
one hand, Nayif Hawatmih, leader of the leftist Democratic Front of the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), endorsed Syria's mediatory role saying: 
"Specific agreement, have been reached which give practical 
implementation to the Cairo Agreement Syria exercises the role of 
guarantor of the proper execution of these agreements and of the same 
time guarantees (that)... the Lebanese state.... Should not violate if and 
should not encourage any aggression on the part of the Kata'ib and their 
associates against the Resistance"^*. 
Despite evidence of growing antagonism to Syria within the 
Resistance, President Assad's account insists that Syria's mediation ftilly 
met Palestinian demands. He relates that as soon as a ceasefire agreement 
was achieved in January, he consulted the leaders of the Resistance to 
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find out what they wanted, before pursuing Syrian mediatory efforts. A 
PLO delegation to Damascus headed by Yasir Arafat Usted demands 
including the freedom to exercise all rights under the Cairo Agreement in 
the right to guarantee the security of the refugee camps; responsibility of 
Palestinian affairs outside the camps; and confirmation of the principles 
of no interference with he Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Assad 
comments that he would say that what was demanded was not necessary 
in its entirety or the sake of preserving the Resistance and allowing it to 
play its role against the likely enemy [i.e., Israel]. Nevertheless, President 
Faranjiyeh agreed to these demands without deleting a single letter from 
the written formulation of the Palestinian leaders. Subsequently, 
Palestinian objection are attributed by Assad to the fact that "the 
Resistance is now fighting for the goals of others". Instead of keeping 
Palestinian priorities in mind, the Resistance allowed itself to become the 
tool of forces inside Lebanon and on the world scene that want to use the 
Resistance for their tactical or strategic objective. Assad's portrait 
reveals the backdrop to Syria's disillusionment within its traditional 
Lebanese allies, as the LNM and Palestinian undermined Syrian 
mediation and prestige in Lebanon. 
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Direct Syrian Intervention during June - October 1976 
Having failed to impose its will on the NM and a majority of 
the Palestinians with the help of the limited PLA and Sa'igah forces, 
Syria now decided to launch a full-scale offensive against its erstwhile 
allies in Lebanon. 
The Syrian offensive began on 1976 when a Syrian 
armoured column consisting of 20,000 troops and sixty tanks entered 
Lebanon (see Map-4). The Following day 4.000 additional troops backed 
by two hundred tanks advanced in eastern Lebanon through the Bikaa 
Valley. Soon the strength of Syrian troops in Lebanon was doubled and 
total number of Syrian and pro Syrian Palestinian troops rose to 25,000.^ ° 
The immediate precipitant for Syrian military intervention was an attack 
on two Maronite villages in northern Lebanon by maverick units of the 
Lebanese Army late in May 1976. Residents of the villages sent a 
telegram to President Assad, appealing for Syrian assistance. In a 
subsequent justification of Syria's response, Prime Minister Karami 
suggested that Syria's intervention was "motivated by nationalist and 
humanist sentiments, in response to the request of a group of citizens 
who were in a state of despair and fear, prompting them to appeal for 
assistance to sister Syria. 
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The entry of Syrian Army troops into Lebanon in the first 
week of June 1976 dramatically contrasted with the tentativeness of 
Syria's previous commitment in Lebanon. After the reassessment of early 
1976, involving a shift in the direction of its alignments and an 
incremental rise in its commitment, the Syrian elite plunged decisively 
into direct military engagement. 
Once President Assad and his advisers decided on this 
course, they did not await invitations by parties to the Lebanese strife. 
This phase of Syrian intervention and escalation was penetration in its 
designs and implementation. Nevertheless, miscalculations about the 
costs involved in achieving more ambitious objectives obliged the Syrian 
elite to make tactical re-adjustments. The large-scale Syrian military 
offensive suffered initial reversals, only to be subsequently revived at a 
still higher level and military commitment. 
Once inside Lebanon, the troops followed three axes in their 
advance, leading toward Tripoli in the North, along the main Beirut-
Damascus highway in the center, and toward Sidon in Southern Lebanon. 
However, Syrian forces were obliged to half before reaching their 
destinations either in Sidon or in Beirut. After encountering stiff 
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resistance, the number of Syrian forces was doubled to 12,000 by 7 
June^'. 
When Syrian armored columns initially advanced along the 
Beirut-Damascus highway, they expected their heavy equipment to 
intimidate Palestinian and LNM militiamen. Instead, the latter made 
effective use of anti-tank weapons provided by Syria earlier in the war. 
Syrian forces were temporarily halted at so for, in the central sector of 
the Beirut-Damascus highway, and only with the doubling of their 
number of 7 June were they able to proceed. The contingent leading 
toward Sidon reached the environs of the city later the same day but was 
unable to penetrate flirther after an ambush by Palestinian and Lebanese 
Arab Army troops incapacitated a Syrian armored reconnaissance 
squadrom.^ ^ 
For Syrian forces were unable to with stand the attacks, 
Assad declared that Syria consciously chose not to exercise its ftill range 
of military options. If Syria had so desired, it could easily have 
responded militarily with resolute and crushing measures. However, 
Syria was convinced that the problem in Lebanon was not primarily a 
military problem, and that the conspiracy is much greater than these little 
ones carry out these small treacherous actions. Believing that the 
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underlying issues could not be resolved by military means, Syria 
instructed every soldier to strike only self-defense and within the 
narrowest limits. 
Moreover, Assad contends that the Syrian forces in Lebanon 
consisted of infantrymen lacking artillery, armour, or other means of 
support moreover, the Syrian Air Force has not fired a single shot or 
released a single bomb or a single missile in any place in Lebanon. 
Although strictly military logic would have dictated that Syria provide 
rapid support for its forces, political considerations dictated restraint. 
However, Assad insisted that "naturally, we are confident in the 
competence of our troops, and no one can surpass specified limits in 
harming them^^ 
Syrian humiliation at being unable to overcome 
unexpectedly heavy resistance by Palestinian and LNM forces was 
deepened by defections from Syrian ranks. Most conspicuous were 
defections among PLA and Saiqa forces that had entered Lebanon earlier 
under Syrian auspices. This notably took place in Beirut, in reaction to a 
confrontation on 6 June between advancing Syrian forces and 
Palestinian-LNM militiamen in the Bikaa Valley. After the Syrians were 
erroneously reported to have used their Air force for attacks in the Bikaa 
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violent clashes erupted in Beirut between Palestinian-LNM militiamen 
and Sa'igah-PLO forces already stationed by the Syrians in the capital. 
As Palestinians fought Palestinians, many of those associated with Syria 
switched allegiance, contributing to the case with which the Sa'igah-
ALA forces in Beirut were disarmed. Even more threatening to the 
Syrian elite was dissent among regular Syrian forces. Individual pilots 
and unit commanders refused to participate in the Lebanese operation, 
and after entering Lebanon some officers defected to join Palestinian and 
LAA ranks. The offenders were quickly punished, however, and 
incidents of dissent remained limited '^'. 
The spectacle of Palestinians loyal to Yasir Arafat fighting 
Palestinians loyal to Hafiz al-Assad along side Syrian Army units 
prompted recriminations between Resistance leaders and Syria. Yasir 
Arafat flatly charged that Syria was attempting to liquidate the 
Palestinian Resistance^^ 
President Assad, in his July 1976 speech, takes issues with 
the Palestinian right to pass judgments on Syrian conduct. He claims that 
the Palestinian leaders were the only ones who came forth and said that 
"Syria does not belong in Lebanon". If, by contrast, the President, Prime 
Minister, or President of the Chamber of Deputies of Lebanon asked 
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Syria to refrain from entering or to depart, Syria would acknowledge 
their right to do so and would consider complying. However, Lebanon is 
not Palestine, and the Palestinians therefore lacked any legal or moral 
premise for demanding Syrian withdrawal from lebanon^ .^ 
Moreover, Assad charges the Palestinian leadership with 
ingratitude, asserting that Syria entered Lebanon in the first place in 
order to rescue them. Now, PLO spokesmen were asking Syria to leave 
Lebanon, not for the sake of Palestine, but rather for the sake of others, 
for the sake of anything other than Palestine. Syria, however, as the 
"heart of Arabism", would not be provoked into abandoning the sacred 
Palestinian came, which is our cause and not the cause of individuals, 
particularly if these individuals act in a way which is harmful to this case. 
Syria's right to discern what would best promote the Palestinian cause 
was underscored by its numerous sacrifices on behalf of Palestine, 
unparalleled by any other Arab country . 
Other Arab countries did, however, being to take an active 
interest in the fate of the Palestinians and in the overall Lebanese conflict 
after Syria's massive intervention occurred.^ ^ An emergency meeting of 
Arab Foreign Ministers was convened on 6 June 1976 and on 9 June 
1976 Arab League decided to establish a 2,500- man inter-Arab force. 
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The task of the force was to separate the Lebanese combatant, replace the 
Syrian forces, and implement a ceasefire accord. 
On 11 July 1976 Yassir Arafat appealed to all Arab 
countries to engage n a mediatory effort, and Libyan mediation did result 
in a partial withdrawal of Syrian forces from Sidon the next day. Then, 
on 22 July, the PLO Executive Committee opened direct negotiation in 
Damascus, two days after a new Syrian offensive began against 
Palestinian National Movement positions in the Mountains east of 
Beirut^^ 
On 6 August, Maronite militiamen gained control of the al-
Nab and Shanty town, and on 12 August Tall al-Zatar finally succumbed 
after a fifty three days siege. In view of there occurrences, any prospects 
for implementing the Syrian-Palestinian agreement collapsed.'^ '^  
In unsuccessful efforts at Syrian-Palestinian negotiation in 
early September, 1976. Syria was represented by Air Force Commander, 
Naji Jamil and the PLO by Abu lyad. Abu lyad claimed that the PLO 
softened its stance during these negotiations, agreeing to unilateral 
withdrawal from the contested salient in return for binding assurances 
that Syria would not attack Palestinian and LNM forces in Lebanon. 
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Despite the omission of insistence on reciprocal Syrian withdrawal, Syria 
refused the offer'°'. 
In the meantime, the Maronite militias with Syria backing 
initiated a second assault on the two main Palestinian camps, Tall al-
Zatar and Jisr al-Basha. While Jisr al-Basha fell to its attackers towards 
the end of June the fighting over Tall al-Zatar continued for many more 
weeks. Syrian pressure against the NM-PRM forces in many parts of the 
country drained the latter's energies preventing them from mounting an 
effective defence of the camps. After a siege of fifty-two days, Maronite 
Militias finally overran this camp on 13 August amidst scenes of 
unprecedented sevager}'^^. 
The fall of Tall Al-Zater produced extreme concern in 
Riyadh'^^ On 15 August Saudi Arabia along with Kuwait called for a 
summit meeting of the Arab League in mid-October to take stock of the 
deteriorating situation in Lebanon. To assure its preferred military and 
political outcome Syria realized that it would have to intensify its 
military operation against the NM-PRM before the Arab states 
constrained its action-Syria waited for Sarkis to assume the office of the 
President on 23 September 1976 and then launched a new military 
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offensive against the NM-PRM forces in order too dislodge tiiere from 
most of their strongholds.'°'* 
Israeli Response to Syrian Intervention in the Civil War 
When the Syrian political initiative failed, Syria intervened 
militarily in June 1976 and its troops moved into Lebanon by that time. 
Then, Lebanon was a special danger spot, particularly vulnerable, 
because of its Civil War and Palestinian presence, to Israeli military and 
political penetration. The Lebanese Civil War was political manna to the 
Israelites'^^. Syria's 1976 inter\'ention in Lebanon was most immediately 
motivated by the grave security threat from the prospect that Civil War 
and partition would open the door to Israeli penetration, but the conflict 
also presented an opportunity for Damascus to insert itself as arbiter and 
draw Lebanon under its politics-military wing. In 1976 Syria intervened 
with greater force and against its former allies to prevent a Maronite 
defeat. Assad was well aware of efforts on the Maronite Right to draw 
Israel into the fighting on its behalf and feared the conflict would throw 
the Christians into the hands of Israel and balkanize Lebanon. A short 
while after the onset of the Civil War a special committee was created in 
Israel in order to deal with the situation in Lebanon. The participants in 
this committee included Prime Minster, Yibzhak Rabin, Foreign Minster, 
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Yigal Allon, Defence Minster, Shimon Peres, Minister without Portfolio, 
Yisrael Galili, Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur, head of the Mossad, head 
of the Military Intelligence Service (AMAN) and some senior officials 
from the Defence and Foreign Ministers. 
During the first few months of the Civil War, with the 
Christian camp quite clearly on the offensive, Israel felt quite satisfied 
with the military developments in Lebanon. This satisfaction, however, 
soon gave way to alarm with emerging signs of growing Syrian 
involvement in the Lebanese conflict. 
Israel has always viewed Syria as the most hostile and 
radical of all the confrontation states. Following the Syrian rejection of 
Sinai II, it was perceived as intent on forming an hostile alliance against 
Israel. Syrian activities in Lebanon, therefore aroused deep Israel 
suspicions. As the patron of Palestinian querrilla organizations as well as 
the NM, Syria was seen by Israel as scheming to bring Lebanon under its 
hegemony. The first explicit warning that Israel would respond militarily 
in the event of large scale Syrian intervention in Lebanon was made by 
Premier Rabin on 31 October 1975'° .^ A Syrian military presence in 
Lebanon according to the Israeli Chief of Staff, Mordechai Gur, would 
constitute a clear geographical change in the situation and would oblige 
116 
Israel to respond. He added, "We must make sure that Lebanon does not 
become a confrontation country"'^ ^. 
The warning given by the Syrian Foreign Minister Kahddam 
in early January 1976 to the Lebanese Front that Syria would take over 
Lebanon if they persisted in their drive towards partition immediately 
heightened Israeli concern. The Israeli Defence Minister, Shimon Peres 
declared that "any Syrian Intervention in Lebanon can not leave Israel 
indifferent. Israel would have to consider taking setps""'^ 
There were reports that Israeli troops backed by armour 
were massing along the border with massing along the border with 
Lebanon and the IDF on the Lebanese frontier was placed on full alert"'^ . 
As tension mounted the American government got in touch with both the 
countries in a bit to defuse the crisis. American reassurance to Israel that 
Syria would not intervene directly in the conflict was instrumental in 
restraining Israel"^. Syria, on its part, not wishing to provoke Israel any 
further quickly moved to bring about a political resolution of the 
Lebanese conflict once the military situation on the ground had been 
reversed in favour of the NM-PRM forces. 
In February and March, Syria intensified its efforts aimed at 
working out a political compromise however, failed due to the NM-PRM 
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opposition to the Syrian sponsored constitutional reform. As the NM 
demands were incompatible with the Syrian objective in Lebanon, a rift 
began to develop between Syria and her allies in Lebanon. A new 
alliance between the Maronites and Syria began to consolidate during 
this period. Assad began to contemplate direct intervention against his 
erstwhile allies in order to discipline them but he could not proceed 
without American assurances that Israel would be restrained from 
counter intervention. It had been maintained that, through, U.S. 
mediation, a tacit agreement was made between Israel and Syria, where 
in, Syria, in return for the deployment of its forces in Lebanon without 
Israeli interference, agreed not to interfere "in Israeli ground operations 
or air strikes against Palestinian guerilla positions, particularly those 
south of the Zahrani river". Other conditions included no movement of 
Syrian troops south of the Zohrani; no deployment of Syrian missiles in 
Lebanon; no Syrian attempt to close the Christian port of Junieh; and no 
imbalance in the Syrian moves against the Christian and Palestinians"'". 
Syria began to seek American support thoughts contacts in 
Washington for the projected Syrian military intervention. The US was 
requested to restraint Israel from intervening once the Syrian army 
entered Lebanon. Syria repeatedly emphasized that it was being 
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requested by President Franjeh, the Shamunists and the Phalangists to 
intervene in the conflict."^ 
The US in particular felt that the emergence of a radical 
regime in Lebanon would aversely affect the American sponsored peace 
process now underway. Since Syria alone was capable of restoring order 
in Lebanon, the US agreed to the projected Syrian move in Lebanon.''^ 
Later on, the US government got in touch with Israel in order to 
communicate the Syrian intentions and discuss the possibility of evolving 
a joint American Israeli strategy vis-a-vis Lebanon. After the mediation, 
Israel became increasingly prepared to accept a Syrian intervention 
provided it would be directed against the M-PRM forces in Lebanon. On 
4 March, Israel communicated in the US is tolerance threshold on Syrian 
intervention. These were a set of conditions, known as 'red lines', laying 
down the geographical as well as functional limits beyond which Syrian 
activity in Lebanon would not be allowed to escalate."'* 
1. Syria was not to station SSAM missiles on Lebanese territories. 
2. It was to respect the rights of the Lebanese front. 
3. Israel was permitted to open skies above Lebanese territory; 
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4. Syrian units were to be deployed south of line stretching for 
Zahrani on the Mediterranean to Mashki in the Bikaa valley; and 
5. Israel was to be given a 'free hand' south of this Zahrani-Mashki 
line."^ 
The acceptance of Syrian intervention in Lebanon had a number of 
advantages for Israel are as follow: 
First, Israel was spared from undertaking a costly and a 
large scale military operation itself in order to save the Christians from 
defeat. Moreover, a large scale Israeli military action in Lebanon at the 
point of time would have, it all probability, jeopardized the interim 
settlement with Egypt and reoriented the latter towards a renewal of 
military activity."^ 
Second, Israel calculated that if a part of Syrian military 
resources were diverted to the Lebanese conflict, Syria's ability to 
confront Israel in a war would be reduced of the Syrian forces on the 
Golan would be weakened the Israelis were quick to perceive that it 
rather entailed a dispersion of Syrian military energies and logistical 
resources in a potential "Vietnamese" situation. Such a situation 
absolved the Israelis from the task of making a blatant moves that could 
create unwanted international repercussions."^ 
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Third, Israel expected that a Syrian intervention in Lebanon 
would impose severe financials burdens on the country's already weak 
economy compelling the Assad regime to turn to the conservative Arab 
states in the Gulf for aid. This in turn would help reduce the Syrian 
militancy. 
Fourth, Israel anticipated that a long drawn-out presence in 
Lebanon would weaken the morale of the Syrian army as well as foster in 
discipline and corruption within its ranks. 
Finally, the Syrian action was bound to lead to deep division 
within the Arab World. As one political commentator stated after the 
large-scale entry of Syrian arm} in Lebanon: 
Peace and quit are now obtained on Israeli's frontier, the 
Arab world is fragmented.... And the dispute between Syrian and Egypt 
is a source of contentment for Israel, as it the dispute between Syria and 
the PO which affects polic\ in Damascus and bolsters relatively 
moderate views there. "'^  
Thus on April 1976 as the first limited entry of Syrian troops 
took place, Israeli reaction was low-key with the Israeli concern being 
focused only on the South'^°. During the summer of 1976 Syrian further 
reinforced its drive against the NM -PRM. Increased Syrian pressure 
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against the NM -PRM ultimately activated the other leading Arab States. 
This resulted in the Riyadh and Cairo conferences where a compromise 
was worked out in which Syria attained most of its objectives. During 
this period Israel could not but have watched with satisfaction Syria 
actively aiding the Moronites and vigorously suppressing the NM-PRM 
forces. '^' 
Establishment of Arab Deterrent Force 
Distressed by the pace of Syria's mountain offensive against the 
Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims. Saudi Arabia on 15 October issued a 
call for mini-summit at its capital, Riyadh, the following day. President 
Assad was persuaded to attend, and a special Saudi plane was sent to 
bring Yasir Arafat from Lebanon. Lebanese President Sarkis was also 
invited, as were representatives of Egypt and Kuwait. This forum then 
worked out a series of agreements to resolve the Lebanese crisis, which 
were ratified by the full plenary summit of the Arab League in Cairo on 
25 and 2 October. '^ ^ 
The result of the Riyadh Summit, endorsed by the Cairo 
Summit, affirmed the "collective Arab role" and presented a 
comprehensive plan (with decisions, mechanism, and schedule) to end 
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the war in Lebanon and return the country to normalcy. The decisions 
focused on the three major elements of the crisis: 
1. Security - a ceasefire and definite half to the fighting throughout 
all of Lebanon. 
2. Sovereignty - the application of the Cairo Agreement, and 
3. Internal accord and invitation to all Lebanese parties to enter into a 
political dialogues for achieving national reconciliation. The 
meeting established two mechanism to implemented these 
decision: 
a. An Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), under the command of the 
President of Lebanon, to impose the ceasefire apply the Cairo 
Agreement, ensure collection of heavy arms, maintain internal 
security and assists the Lebanese authorities to reactivate 
public services and state institutions and 
b. A committed comprising the representatives of Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Syria and Kuwait to ensure, in coordination with the 
President of Lebanon, the application of the Cairo Agreement. 
The re-establishment of peace, including the withdrawal of 
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Palestinian armed forces from areas occupied since April 13, 
1975, was scheduled to take place within a period of 45 days. 
The ADF was formed predominantly from Syrian troops (80 
percent, with symbolic contingents from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), and South Yemen. The ADF was accepted by the 
Lebanese National Movement and Lukewarmly accepted by the 
Lebanese Front - but only after Jordanian mediation. The ADF was 
deployed throughout all of Lebanon except in the South, here it was 
deployed only to the Litani River, which approximated Israel's "red 
line". This deployment put an end to the fighting and led to the formation 
of a broad based a political govemmet.'^ ^ 
To enforce these security measures, the Arab League 
decided to transform the 2,500 men peacekeeping force created in June 
into a 30,000 men Arab Deterrent Force (ADF).'^ "* The ADF would 
officially be under the command of Lebanese President Sarkis, who 
would determined the size of Syria's contribution relative to other Arab 
States. In practice, the failure of the Arab League to designate the 
composition of the ADF at the outset assured continued Syrian 
predominance. The allocation of $90 million by the Arab League for the 
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ADF in effect amounted to a subsidy for an enduring Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon. 
The Arab League resolutions gave prominent attention to 
the future Palestinian role in Lebanon. The Palestinians were to adhere 
strictly to the terms of the 1969 Cairo Agreement, and to withdraw to the 
areas in Southern labanon assigned to the under that accord. The FLO 
renewed its commitment to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and to refrain 
from intervening in the country's internal affairs. 
Responsibility for assuring Palestinian compliance with the 
Cairo Agreement was assigned to the ADF, and thus implicitly to Syria. 
In addition, a committee composed of Syrian, Saudi, Egyptian, and 
Kuwaiti representatives were designated to supervise implementation of 
the Cairo Agreement within forty-five days after the ADF's formation. 
Whereas conformity to the 1969 Agreement imposed curbs on 
Palestinian activity, the PLO did score an important gain at the Arab 
Summit. President Assad was persuaded to abandon his comparing to 
depose Yasir Arafat as the leaders of the organization, the two were 
formally reconciled at a meeting in Damascus on 20 October.'^ ^ 
On the issue of domestic Lebanese reconciliation, however, 
the Arab Summit resolutions had ver)' little to offer,. The Arab League 
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called for convening a political dialogue as soon as possible but 
suggested no guidelines for discussion. In fact, none of the leaders of 
Lebanese political factions was invited to Riyadh or Cairo, and they 
viewed the summit resolutions as a Palestinian - Syrian, rather than into 
Lebanese accord. Initially, both or and anti-establishment spokesmen 
opposed the accords and expressed unwillingness to cooperate with the 
ADF. 
By 14 November, however, when Syrian troops painted their 
helmets green and moved into their new positions as an Arab Deterrent 
Force, no resistance was mounted. Once explanatory factor is sheer 
exhaustion, after the lots of over 65,000 li\'es and the breakdown of fifty-
five previous cease-fire agreements, the Lebanese were in no position to 
resume hostilities without outside assistance moreover, efforts had been 
made to achieve acquiescence of the major domestic parties. 
The most strenuous opposition to the ADF, ironically, was 
voiced by Maronite leaders who objected to the presence of Syrian troops 
in Maronite territory. President Sarkis held intensive meeting with the 
leaders of the Lebanese Front - President. Faranjiyih Pierre al - Jumayyil 
of the Kata'ib Party, Kamil Shamun of the National Liberal Party, and 
Father Sharbil Karsis of the Maronite Monastic Orders, and gradually 
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persuaded them to agree to the new arrangement. Convincing the anti-
establishment forces was largely the domain of faith, which exacted 
compliance from LNM and Palestinian Rejectionsist groups. The latter at 
least derived consolation from the entry of "Arab" troops into Maronite 
territory. As for President Sarkis, he called on all Lebanese to greet the 
ADF "in love and brotherhood".'^ ^ 
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CTiAfr^H-S 
CHAPTER-III 
Syria's Policy Towards the Lebanese Conflict, 
1977-1982 
Two epochal events shaped Syria's policy toward Lebanon 
and the peace process. The first was the Golan Heights Disengagement 
Agreement that permanently pacified the Israeli-Syrian border, and the 
second was the decision by the Rabiat Arab summit to recognize the PLO 
as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. From that 
point on Asad began to pursue relentlessly the goal of dominating, 
through diplomacy and forces, Jordan, Lebanon, and the PLO, the three 
parties to the conflict with Israel. This chapter explores how Asad 
gradually dominated Lebanon and the PLO, and how he allied himself to 
Jordan. When Asad intervened militarily in Lebanon, he had to intervene 
on the side of the Lebanese state and the Christian Lebanese Front, to get 
the larger international approval probably also of Israel and the United 
States, and to project the image of a leader who wanted to curb the PLO 
and their Lebanese allies. Asad's assurances to the Christian Lebanese 
Leaders, that his military intervention was to make the PLO abide by the 
Cairo Agreement of 1969 and the Melkart Protocol of 1973, and that he 
would withdraw his troops after law and order were reestablished in 
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Lebanon, were worthless. In reality he intervened militarily to dominate 
Lebanon and to prevent it from making peace with Israel, and to use its 
territories confront Israel and foment conflict at will to undermine the 
peace process. 
Asad never gave the impression that the door to a peaceful 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was closed when he met President 
Carter in May 1977, or when he suggested unified Arab delegation to the 
Geneva Conference. Asad"s proposal for a unified Arab delegation was 
construed as simply a means to increase the bargaining powers of the 
Arabs in the negotiations with Israel. From our analysis a different 
explanation emerges. A unified Arab delegation would enable Asad to 
have veto powers over any peace move, especially by the enthusiastic 
Sadat. In other words, Asad was not trying to augment his bargaining 
powers for negotiations, but he was trying to undermine, by every means 
at his disposal, the peace process. 
It was Asad, with his endless delaying tactics, who made 
Sadat give up on the Geneva peace conference, and embark upon his 
historic visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977. Although Asad was 
publicly against Sadat's peace opportunity to rally all the other parties to 
the conflict against Sadat, and thus further delay the peace process. It was 
them that Asad invented the doctrine of strategic parity with Israel as the 
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sine quo non condition for peace negotiations with Israel. This meant the 
indefinite postponement of the peace process. 
Israel's Litani Operation 
The Litani Operation was the culmination of a process of 
local escalation in south Lebanon coupled with PLO's actions inside 
Israel. In retrospect, it appears that the Litani Operation was not a sign of 
a new strategy or a major departure from previous perceptions. Once 
Israel decided to back Sa'ad Haddad's militia and to protect the Christian 
villages, it became necessary for the Israeli Defense Force to increase its 
activity in the border area. As PLO strength in the south increased, the 
ability of the Christian militia to defend the Christian \ illage diminished 
and direct Israeli activity became necessary. Israeli incursions into south 
Lebanon were therefore inevitable. 
When the Likud Government came to power in May 1977, 
there was no significant change in the general Israeli strategy. Although 
the new Defence Minister, Ezer Weitzman, was less patient with 
Palestinian activity, he was nevertheless not keen on a real change in 
strategy. Nor did Menachem Begin direct any major change in policy and 
strategy in regard to Haddad's area, or to the general situation in south 
Lebanon. 
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During the summer of 1977, Syria was trying to control and 
limit the activities of the PLO in Lebanon in general and in the south in 
particular. Within the context of these activities the PLO was forced to 
sign the Shtura Agreement on 24 July 1977, which stipulated that 
Palestinian forces should withdraw from the area bordering Israel, 
elements of the Lebanese Army should be sent to the south and south 
Lebanon should be declared a demilitarized zone. The agreement did not 
come into force, however, the clashes between the PLO and the 
Christians in the south continued. 
Israel became more concerned because of the clear increase 
in the size of PLO forces in the south. It also rejected the ideas of sending 
Lebanese Army units into the south (an idea back by the United States 
and Syria). This would have meant the closure of the "Good Fence' and 
end of the close relations with Haddad's militia. The "Good Fence' 
policy, initiated by former Prime Minister ,Yitzhak Rabin for 
humanitarian relief after Israel was approached by South Lebanese 
Christians, was expanded as a resuh of 'Litani Operation" (see Map-5) to 
a regularized proxy relationship as Likud regarded the volatile political 
situation in Lebanon with suspicion. This suspicious was not only 
directed at the Palestinians but also at Syria which was threatening the 
independence of the Maronites in Beirut. In fact, only one option open: to 
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increase the military bacicing to the Christians, allowing them to conduct 
large-scale military operations. It should be noted that the Israeli 
reasoning was in a sense of logical continuation of the strategy devised 
and implemented by the Yitzhak Rabin's Government, which rejected the 
idea of a Syrian deployment in the south and encouraged the activity of 
Haddad. It is true that the Lebanese army was not the Syrian army. 
However, it was doubtful whether the Lebanese army would have been 
capable of imposing its will on the PLO. Furthermore, the Lebanese 
Army was seen at the time as being under Syrian control. 
Israel was concerned not only with the pressure applied on 
the Christian villages in the south, but also with the possibility of 
renewed Palestinian actions against northern Israel. Aiding the Christian 
militia appeared to be the most effective means of limiting the activities 
of the PLO. Israeli armour took part in the operation and occupied 
positions in south Lebanon. In response, the Palestinians began rocket 
attacks on Israel. 
While the fighting continued, Israel also sent deterrent 
signals to Syria. The United Sates was active in trying to calm the 
situation and to pre-empt further escalation. Under US pressure, the 
Israeli forces withdrew and a cease-fire was declared. This was not a 
formal cease-fire but a series of 'understandings' and tacit agreements 
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between Israel, Lebanon, the Palestinians, Syria and Haddad, all attained 
through the good offices of the United States. 
Once Israeli involvement began and the United Sates tried to 
negotiate a cease-fire, Israel decided to try and use the situation for an 
overall settlement of the situation in south Lebanon. 
The cease-fire collapsed because of the inherent tension 
between the Palestinians and the Christians in the south. The Palestinians 
increased their presence in the south and also moved in heavy weapon, to 
increase the pressure on the Christians. Israel extended artillery support to 
the Christians but avoided intervening with ground units. In November a 
process of direct escalation between Israel and the Palestinians 
developed. In retaliation for Palestinian rocket attacks on northern Israel 
and Israeli reaction launched a series of air strikes. 
On 11 March 1978, a group of Palestinians landed on the 
Israeli coast. They hijacked a bus full of civilian passengers and drove to 
the suburbs of Tel-Aviv where they were stopped by Israeli security 
forces. In the ensuing battle thirty-five Israelis, most of them civilians 
were killed and seventy-one wounded. 
This murderous operation sent a wave of outrage throughout 
Israel. The salience of revenge Israel is such that an operation s expected 
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to be almost automatic. Moreover, the Israeli retaliation is usually 
designed to cause more damage and pain to the Arab side than was 
caused to Israel. 
The plan of operations was to attack south Lebanon, with the 
objective of causing as many casualties as possible to PLO units, 
destroying their infrastructure and establishing control over certain 
important dominating positions within a 10 km strip from the 
international border. However, the plan ultimately responded to the 
Israeli need to create some kind of security zone along the border within 
which the Haddad militia could extend its control and obviously with 
continued Israeli military help. Such a security zone would alleviate the 
threat to the Israeli settlements in the north and would also resolve the 
problem of the Christians. 
The first stage of the operation code-named 'Even 
Hachochma' (the wisdom stone) was completed by 15 March, 1978. 
Opposition to the action was very limited; most of the Palestinian 
guerrillas withdrew in the face of the superior Israeli forces, and did not 
even participate in the fighting. According to various estimates there had 
been about 5,000 armed Palestinian guerrillas in south Lebanon, but their 
exact distribution was not known. Even if all of them were concentrated 
near the international border, they would not have been a match for the 
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Israeli forces. Apart from the ground thrust, Israeli are and naval units 
attacked many Palestinian bases throughout Lebanon. 
Simultaneously with the launching of the operation, Israel 
notified the US about the operation, stressing that was not planning to 
stay in Lebanon. In that communications, as well as in public statements, 
Israel declared that its objective was to reach a solution to the problem of 
south Lebanon. Once that was achieved, Israeli forces would withdraw. 
The initial US reaction was perceived by Israeli decision 
makers as indicating that the US was ready to acquiesce in the operation. 
But, in fact, the US v\as increasingly concerned about Israeli plans for 
south Lebanon. With no prior political preparation or co-ordination 
between Israel and the US, Washington was not sure of Israel's real 
intentions there. Furthermore, it was not clear what kind of 'solution' to 
the situation Israel was interested in and by means of what procedures. 
The U.S. was also concerned about Israeli-Syrian relations. The set of 
understandings, both tacit and explicit, reached between Israel and 
Syrian, in which the US u as partly related as a go-between, was liable to 
crumble under the pressure of the Israeli invasion. Moreover, the US was 
interested on expanding its influence in Syria, in order to bring it into the 
orbit of Israeli invasion seemed adversely to affect American prospects 
on these issues as well. 
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In its absence, the US did not co-ordinate its activities with 
moves by Israel, but sought to glean some advantage from a quick 
political move to obtain the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south 
Lebanon. When the Lebanese government began preparations to request a 
Security Council resolution demanding an immediate Israeli withdrawal, 
the United States took the initiative, and proposed a draft resolution 
which eventually became Security Council Resolution 425, (see 
Appendix-2), thus creating United Nation Interim Force In Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) (see Appendix-3). 
The deploN ment of UNIFIL in south Lebanon created a new 
situation with both benefits and costs for Israel. On the positive side, the 
PLO military units were not allowed to be redeployed south of the Litani 
(except for the Tyre enclave). The infrastructure of the Palestinian 
organizations south of the Litani had been destroyed by Israel, and no 
opportunity was allowed for it to be repaired. Furthermore, UNIFIL had 
become an additional obstacle to the penetration of Palestinian units into 
Israel. There v^ e^re numerous attempts by such units to cross the UNIFIL-
held territory on their way to the international border, and on many 
occasions the UNIFIL units were able to stop these attempts. 
At best, finally, the UNIFIL has been accepted as symbolic 
to help justify to the public the risks of withdrawing the Israel Defense 
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Force (IDF) after the Litain Operation. To Israeli strategic planners it was 
clear that a battalion commander of an international peacekeeping force 
would never expose his men to the risk of determined guerrilla attacks, 
the peacekeepers has neither the national interest nor the mandate to take 
necessary and effective counteraction. 
The Litani Operation was conducted by Israeli Forces 
equipped with heavy amour and a lot of fire power. The Israeli High 
Command was anxious to keep down casualties as much as possible and 
therefore relied on applying intense fire power when ever there was any 
resistance. As a result considerable damage was caused to civilian 
property along the routes of the Israeli advance. In some places a mass 
civilian migration ensured. Those fleeing were primarily Shi'i civilian 
who, along with the Christians, had been the main victims of the war in 
the south. They had suffered enormously from the Palestinian 
organizations that had controlled the areas until the Litani Operations, 
and also from Israeli retaliatory actions. 
In summary, the Israeli operation failed in its attempt to destroy the 
Palestinian organizations in the south since most of the Palestinian 
guerrillas fled northwards and built up an elaborate infrastructure north of 
the Litani. It also failed in its attempt to impose a new political order in 
the south. 
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Conflict Between Syria and the Lebanese Front 
The Israeli "Litani Operation" changed the relationships 
between Syria and the various Lebanese organizations as well as with 
some of the leading Lebanese political figures. It also tied the PLO even 
more strongly to Syria. As a result of the Litani Operation, a dramatic 
change in alliance took place between Asad and the charismatic leader of 
the Shi'ite community, Imam Musa al-Sadr. In an open letter addressed to 
the Arabs about Southern Lebanon Published in Al -Nabar al - Arabi 
wal-Duwali, on March 25. 1978. Imam Musa al -Sadr accused the United 
Stated of "blessing" the Israeli military operation.' He also claimed that 
the United States had put "two conditions: not to target civilians... and 
not to clash with the Arab Deterrent Force [Syrian troops] even if it did 
clash with Lebanon, its independence, its sovereignty, its dignity and its 
unity".^  By pointing out to the fact that the Syrian troops of the ADF 
suffered no causalities and were not involved in the fighting, in contrast 
to the Lebanese population of Jabal Amil, in southern Lebanon, which 
was faced with death and destruction. Imam Musa al -Sadr took a clear 
stand in favor of ending the war in southern Lebanon. He wished to stop 
the PLO attacks against Israel, which had triggered the Israeli Litani 
Operation. This position was contrary to Asad's strategy of keeping 
southern Lebanon an arena of a low -intensity conflict with Israel. By 
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opposing Asad, Musa al-Sadr signed his own death warrant.-^  his staged 
disappearance in late August 1978 in Libya, was planned by Asad and 
executed by the Libyans in cooperation with Zuhair Muhsin, the head of 
the Syrian controlled al-SaMqa organization. The fact that Imam Musa 
al-Sadr was instrumental in issuing a fatwa declaring the Always of Syria 
part of the mainstream Ithna Ashariya. Shi'ite did not protect him from 
Asad'sire. Rather than being gunned down or blow up, as Kamal Junblat 
was in March 1977. or Bashir Gemayel in September 1982, or even Mufti 
Hasan Khalid in May 1989. al-Sadr just disappeared, a respectful Shi'ite 
exit from this world, reminiscent of the Ghayba.^  
The genius of Imam Musa al -Sadr was that during the entire 
period from April 1975 until his disappearance in Libya in August 1978, 
he kept the Shi'ite community out of direct involvement in the violent 
conflict in Lebanon. He thus acted as he veritable shepherd and protector 
of his community. That is why the vice president of the supermen Islamic 
Shi'ite Council, Shaikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al - din, could rightly 
claim, in April 1980, that the Shi"ite community did not fight in the war. 
[and that] violence is not the proper means for the realization of political 
reform. 
As was pointed out earlier, Asad, in cooperation with al -
Quahdhafi disposed of Imam Mussa al - Sadr, in late August 1978, to 
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clear the way for a more intensified struggle against Israel from Southern 
Lebanon, at the expense of the civilian population of Jabal 'Amil. The 
change occurred with the Amal movement, in April 1980, when Nabih 
Birri became its leader. The new leader was known for his unwavering 
support of the Syrian regime since December 1975. From then on, Amal 
under Nabih Birri became a major instrument in the hands of Asad in 
Lebanon. Asad's association with Amal, a Shi'ite's organization linked in 
some way to the Islamic Revolution of Iran, dispelled the allegations that 
the Asad regime was fighting Islamic organizations and was run by a 
heretic Muslim sect that is the Alawites. Perhaps Asad hoped that the 
Association also lent him some much needed legitimac> domestically and 
regionally. 
The Israeli troops withdrew on Junel2. 1978, from the 
region of southern Lebanon, which it had occupied since March 14, 1978. 
This not only led to deployment of the newly constituted UNIFIL but also 
to the handling over of part of the territory to Israel's Lebanese ally. 
Major Sa'd Haddad. This re-deployment coincided with the armed 
clashes that took place between the partisans of former President Franjiya 
and the militias of the Phalangist party, resulting in the killing of 
Franjiya's son, Tony and his wife and daughter, in Ihdin, on June 13, 
1978. 
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Asad figured out that as Israel had already withdrawn its 
troops from Southern Lebanon, and the Egyptian -Israeli peace talks 
were underway, Israeli leaders would not be in a mood to engaged in a 
fight over Lebanon. So he launched an offensive against all those who 
were opposed to Asad's indefinite tutelage over Lebanon, that is, the 
Christian Lebanese Front and its major militia, the Lebaniese Forces led 
by Bashir Gemayel. Asad's guns began to intensely shell east Beirut and 
its hinterland, on July 1, 1978, and continued for six consecutive days. 
This led to the resignation of President Sarkis on July 6, 1978. 
According to Pakradouni the American Ambassador parker 
pleaded with Sarkis to rescind his resignation.^ President Jimmy Carter 
called for an immediate cease - fire, and also attempted to make the UN 
Security Council take charge of the Lebanese problem. But the Lebanese 
government rejected the American plea because of Syrian pressure. 
Syria and its various allies, including leftist parties and the 
PLO, encouraged Prime Minister al Huss, by virtue of his position, to 
block governmental decisions and obstruct President Sarkis's plans, he 
did the same with respect to President Carter's proposal. By depicting its 
adversaries as agents of Israel, Syria got the support of the Arab 
countries. 
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When President Sarkis withdrew his resignation he became 
the target of criticism by both the Christian Lebanese Front and Syria. 
When he depicted Syrian troops in his speech, which rescinded his 
resignation, as similar to "regular Lebanese forces." The Lebanese Front 
accused him of Providing legitimacy to the Syrian troops, which had just 
bombarded East Beirut and its Christian hinterland. While Syrian had 
accused Sarkis of Supporting the Lebanese Front by demanding the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from the Christian areas. 
While Syria adamantly refused to allow the Lebanese army 
to replace Syrian troops in East Beirut, Asad wanted the Lebanese army 
to be sent to Southern Lebanon where Major Sa"d Haddad was in control. 
Ostensibly its mission, was to spread the power of the Lebanese state or 
al-Shariya to Southern Lebanon. Its real aim was, however, to pit the 
units of the Lebanese army against one another, and make it falter in its 
mission. Israel would then be blamed for this. Only one battalion of the 
Lebanese army managed to reach the village of Kawkaba, on July 31, 
1978. But it came under shelling form Major Sa'd Haddad's troops and 
was virtually surrounded. It had to stop, and eventualK' withdrew. Thus 
the mission of the Lebanese army had failed and "was a serious 
embarrassment to the Lebanese eovemment." 
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Syria was proposing to President Sarkis to send more troops 
to Southern Lebanon, and "to use force."^ Former President Chamoun 
sent an open letter to President Asad, on September 22, 1978 urging him 
to withdraw the Syrian troops of the ADF from Lebanon. The exiled 
Christian leader Raymond Edde called from Paris, on September 26,1978, 
requesting the replacement of the Syrian troops by European and Arab 
troops.'*^ The answer to these demands was an escalation of the conflict 
between the Syrian troops and the militias of the Lebanese Front, 
especially from September 23,1978, to October 6, 1978. The irony of all 
this was that the renewal of the mandate of the ADF, by the helpless 
Lebanese government, on September 27, 1978, while the guns of the 
Syrian troops were blasting the civilian population in East Beirut and its 
hinterland, did take place.'' 
President Carter proposed on September 28, 1978, an 
international conference for the solution of the Lebanese crisis, to include 
the United States, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and France. Syria 
immediately rejected the proposal and "intensified its military 
operation."''^  In a message to the country, on October 2, 1978, President 
Sarkis called for a new plan for the redeployment of the Syrian troops of 
the ADF, and for a cabinet of national unity. Syria again rejected this 
proposal, and the fighting increased to an unprecedented level.'^  
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President Sarkis decided to contact President Asad himself 
while the latter was on a visit to East Germany. Pakradouni relates what 
he describes as a surrealist telephone conversation between Sarkis and 
Asad on October 4, 1978. Sarkis told Asad: "No country in the world 
would tolerate what was happening now, I want a response to my plan of 
the re-deployment of the forces of the ADF, and prior to that I want an 
immediate cease - fire." Asad answered as though nothing was troubling 
him and all the destruction that was wreaked on Lebanon by his army was 
perfectly normal: "We are studying the plan of re-deployment, and we 
want to know the views of the different parties towards the crisis in 
Lebanon." Sarkis was furious and told Asad: "I am head of state, and the 
sole interlocutor to speak on behalf of Lebanon. 1 do not accept that you 
deal with anybody else.'* Asad tried to calm down Sarkis by inviting him 
to Damascus "to discuss all aspects of the situation. The Asad -Sarkis 
talks were tense, and Sarkis did not mince his words. He complained that 
Syrian guns were shelling his presidential residence at B'abada. An irate 
Asad called into the meeting the chief of staff of the S) rian army, Hikmat 
al-Shihabi, who denied any knowledge that this shelling was going on or 
that his troops were responsible for it. 
Despite the cease -fire declared by the UN Security Council 
on October 7, 1978, which was accepted by Syria, the latter rejected all 
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attempts to involve the UN, the United States, or France in the crisis in 
Lebanon. Even Saricis's proposal for an Arab summit to discuss Lebanon 
was rejected by Syria. Instead, and for tactical purposes Asad accepted to 
convene a conference of the Arab countries represented in the ADF, but 
only at the foreign ministers level. The conference was held, in Bayt al-
Din, in the Syrian controlled region of al-Shuf, during October 15-17, 
1978, with the participation of Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Sudan. 
At first, the representatives of the Arab countries tended to 
support the Syrian viewpoint, and the conference appeared to be reaching 
a dead end. Then Sarkis told the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and 
Syria that if they did not budge then the conference should come to a 
close. The Saudis then convinced the Syrians to replace their troops in al-
Ashrafiya (East Beirut) with Saudi and Sudanese troops from the ADF. 
As the Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam did not want to replace the 
Syrian troops by the Lebanese army, he agreed to this compromise. 
The Bayt al - Din conferees created a follow-up committee 
composed of representatives from Saudi Arabia, Syrian, and Kuwait to 
supervise the implementation of the conference resolutions. The Bayt al-
Din conference was a success for Syria as it reaffirmed its dominant role 
in the ADF and gave it Arab legitimacy for whatever it was worth. ^ ^ 
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By late 1978, all the factions of the PLO were beholden to 
Syria. Asad had, by then, reneged on his promise to the Christian 
Lebanese Front and the Lebanese state to implement the Cairo Agreement 
and its Melkart Protocol, which had been the raison d'etre of the ADF. 
As the PLO did not oppose the Syrian militar}- presence in Lebanon, the 
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam in turn, began to argue that the PLO 
had ceased to be an obstacle for the Lebanese state. "The real obstacle 
now are those who deal with the Israeli enemy in order to prolong the 
state of anxiety and instability in the countn.' and create despair."'^ 
Khaddam also dismissed the thesis that the Lebanese conflict and its 
continuation would constitute a threat to Syria's security. This 
demonstrates clearly the flaws in the assumption, held by many such as 
Patrick Scale, that Lebanon is Asad'squagmire.''^  In the same interview 
Khaddam made a statement that betrayed Asad's attitude toward the 
return of the Golan Heights and the peace process. He brushed aside the 
occupation of the Golan Heights as constituting a problem, and referred 
to it simply as part of the overall problem, namely "the Arab - Israeli 
struggle." This meant that Asad was thriving on the Arab Israeli conflict 
and that the return of the occupied Golan Heights to Syrian was of no 
urgency whatsoever. 
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Asad and Arafat cemented their alliance by convening the 
PNC's fourteenth congress in Damascus during the period January 15-22, 
1979. During that conference the Palestinian leaders saying the praises of 
Asad for his support of the PLO.'^  Asad basked of the ostracism imposed 
on Egypt, and attempted to inherit Sadat's legacy of the October War of 
1973. Asad claimed in his speech, in the opening session of the PNC 
congress delivered on January 15, 1979, that Sadat had fought that war 
with the limited objective, reviving the diplomatic efforts for the peaceful 
resolution of the Arab - Israeli conflict. Meanwhile Asad claimed that he 
had fought it as "a war of liberation." Asad also maintained that the war 
in Lebanon was tantamount to "revenge" for the "October war of 
liberation" by the enemies of the Arabs. 
This was another example of projection, on a somewhat 
undefined other, of the very actions that Asad and Arafat were 
responsible for. 
On March 1, 1979, a new law regulating the Lebanese Army 
was passed unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies. The U.S. 
Ambassador, John Gunther Dean played an important role in convincing 
some of the reluctant politicians like former President Chamoun to 
endorse this new national defense law. '^ Instead of taking over the various 
positions held by the PLO and Lebanese militias, the Lebanese 
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government decided to send units of the Lebanese Army to the security 
zone held by Major Sa"d Haddad. Consequently, on April 18, 1979 the 
commander of the Lebanese Army, General Victor al-Khuri, ordered a 
battalion, carefully composed to have a sectarian balance, to proceed to 
the villages of Ma'raka, al -Shihabiya, and Tabnin close to the security 
zone. However, the battalion was immediately faced with artillery fire 
from Major Sa'd Haddad's troops. This mission like the previous one in 
July 19798 failed miserably, because major Sa'd Haddad, who had 
hitherto declared his loyalty to the Lebanese Army decided to establish 
on the same day, April 18, 1979, an independent entity that he called the 
State of Free and Independent Lebanon. 
President Sarkis issued a presidential decree, No. 1924, for 
the dismissal of Major Sa'd Haddad, on April 19, 1979, from the 
Lebanese Army. He was also court - martial led in absentia, because inter 
alia, he was working with Israel. Only former President Chamoun 
defended Sa'd Haddad as a patriot who was protecting the villages in the 
security zone from attacks by various Palestinian and Lebanese militias. 
Chamoun added that it was shameful that, on the one hand, Sa'd Haddad 
was regarded as a traitor, while, on the other hand, the Lebanese Army 
unit that moved to Southern Lebanon on April 18, 1979, had to pass 
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through Lebanese villages and towns which were occupied and lived 
under foreign [meaning Syrian and Palestinian] armed terror. 
Thus by sending army units to Southern Lebanon, President 
Sarkis fell into Asad's trap. He naively accepted the latter's urging to 
send the Lebanese army units to the securit)' zone. 
Thus, instead of the Lebanese Army replacing the Syrian 
troops of the ADF, let alone those of the various Palestinian and 
Lebanese militias, Asad wanted it to go only to the security zone, so that 
it would fail again, and get discredited. By putting Sa"d Haddad on trial 
in a military court for dealing with Israel, this was a warning and set a 
precedent for all Lebanese politicians who dealt with Israel, that they also 
could face similar charges. During the Summit meeting between Asad 
and Sarkis, which took place on May 13-14. 1979. Sarkis insisted that 
Palestinians should withdraw their arm men from Southern Lebanon, and 
freeze their guerrilla operations. Asad told Sarkis that he would not ask 
Arafat to freeze his military operations but merely to reduce them. 
The Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin called upon 
President Sarkis, on May 7, 1979, to negotiate an end to the conflict in 
Southern Lebanon with Israel, by coming to Jerusalem. Begin 
volunteered to go to Beirut, or even if that w ere preferable to meet in a 
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neutral place to sign a peace treaty with Lebanon in few days.^ ^ Begin 
pointed out that neither Israel nor Lebanon problems that Lebanon faced. 
He called upon the Syrian occupation army to leave at once, for it had 
ceased to have even to cover of being part of a joint Arab Defense Force 
[ADF] after Saudi Arabia withdrew its troops. The ADF is now a mere 
Syrian Force which destroys Lebanese villages and bombards innocent 
Christians and is the source of all problems in Lebanon. 
The reaction of the Lebanese government was expressed on 
the same day by Prime Minister al-Huss who maintained that Begin's call 
for a peace treaty with Lebanon was puzzling in the wake of the ferocious 
aggressions on Lebanon which Israel had launched, and which led to the 
death of many civilians and caused tremendous destruction. Al - Huss 
failed to mention the cause of Israel's attacks in Southern Lebanon, 
namely the continued military operations against Israel by the PLO and 
its allies from their bases in Southern Lebanon. 
Sarkis's response to Begin's call, on the other hand, merely 
reiterated that Lebanon had an armistice agreement since 1949 with 
Israel. He appeared to agree implicitly with Begin that there were no 
territorial disputes between the two countries by stating that the Lebanese 
- Israeli border was an internationally recognized border. Sarkis, unlikely 
al - Huss, clearly stated what had become of Southern Lebanon with the 
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armed presence of the PLO and its allies. He described the continued 
conflict as aberrant conditions... which were of a transient nature. 
Nevertheless, Sarkis was unwilling to take advantage of the opportunity 
offered by Begins, for three reasons. First, Sarkis did not want to follow 
in Sadat's footsteps for fear that Syria and the PLO would ostracize 
Lebanon from the Arab World as they had done with Egypt. Second he 
knew that Asad would have incited his proxies and allies, who were 
already publicly maligning, Sarkis for his close relationship with the 
Lebanese Front, to raise the ante to force him to resign. Third, Sarkis held 
the strange notion that Lebanon should be the last Arab country to sign a 
peace treaty with Israel, because of his fear that the last Arab country to 
sign a peace treaty with Israel, because of his fear that the Christians of 
Lebanon would be percei\'ed in the Arab world, as too enthusiastic about 
making peace with Israel. 
On June 18. 1979, 1.200 Lebanese Army troops entered the 
Christian Southern suburbs of Beirut. It was the first time in four years 
that the Lebanese Army had been successfully deployed in these suburbs 
after local rival militias had rendered them insecure for their inhabitants. 
The popular enthusiasm with which the Lebanese Army was welcomed in 
Beirut worried Syria. It did not portend well for the Syrian troops 
stationed in Lebanon. Syria had always opposed the utilization of the 
165 
Lebanese Army to keep law and order, because its presence could render 
the Syrian Army's role in Lebanon superfluous. Consequently, two days 
after the Lebanese Army entered the Christian southern suburbs, clashes 
took place between the Syrian troops and the Lebanese Army in the 
region of Byblos and in the mountainous area of Aqura, which links 
Byblos to the Biqa valley. There is some evidence that the Syrian troops 
provoked these clashes, to put pressure on Sarkis (who was in the process 
of forming a new cabinet) and to discredit the Lebanese Army, which 
many Lebanese regarded as the last resort for ending conflict in 
Lebanese. 
The Syrian newspaper Al-Ba'th described the deployment of 
the Lebanese Army in conflict - ridden sports as a positive and an 
exhilarating step, that could, however, produce serious negative 
consequences if not completed. The implicit criticism of the deployment 
of the Lebanese Army was unmistakable. On the Lebanese side, the 
military confrontation between Syrian troops and the Lebanese Army 
prompted former President Chamoun to send a petition to the UN 
Security Council, as well as to major powers to investigate the Syrian 
army's actions against the army of the "legitimate authorities." 
Asad faced a growing domestic opposition from the militant 
groups of the Muslim Brothers since the mid 1970s. This opposition 
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reached a turning point on June 16,1979, when it launched an attack on 
the Aleppo Artillery School, which killed an estimated eighty - three 
Alawi cadets and wounded fifty - four others. To divert the attention of 
the Syrian public from what sharpening inside Syria, Asad ordered Syrian 
fighter planes to intercept Israeli Planes (the first attempt since March 
1974) that were bombing Palestinian guerrilla bases in Southern Lebanon, 
on June 27, 1979. The Syrian Airforce lost five MIG 21 planes while the 
Israeli Airforce incurred no losses. Asad wanted to rally support among 
the Syrian people by demonstrating that Syria was being threatened by 
Israel. Furthermore, confrontation over the skies of Lebanon was also to 
show the Arab countries that, after the signing of the peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel, Syria had become the only confrontation state 
against Israel, and therefore, deserved more political and financial 
support from them, especially from the oil producing Arab States of the 
Gulf. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion, one can draw from 
this limited confrontation between Syria and Israel in Lebanon, was that 
Asad wanted to remain indefinitely in Lebanon to make sure that Syria 
could continue to have indirect, and occasionally direct confi-ontations 
with Israel. This was vital for the survival of the regime as the Syrian-
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Israeli border had been sealed off since the signing of the Golan Heights 
Agreements on May 31, 1974. 
Instead of a decrease in the PLO operations, as Asad had 
promised Sarkis, there was an increase in the violence in Southern 
Lebanon, followed by massive Israeli retaliatory attacks. The fighting 
between the PLO and its allies on the one hand, and the troops of Sa'd 
Haddad backed by Israeli artillery and Israeli Airforce on the other, 
continued almost unbarred from May 18 until August 26, 1979. Sa'd 
Haddad accused Syria of playing a direct role in the conflict by using the 
Palestinian Al-Sa'iqa organization as a channel for "infiltrating the 
South.^ ^ 
Consequently, there was not much hope that the Sarkis -
Arafat meeting which was held on September 24, 1979, would succeed in 
reducing the violence. Arafat had already taken a stand with respect to 
Southern Lebanon. In an interview on July 22, 1979, Arafat adamantly 
refused to withdraw his forces from the region: "our withdrawal from the 
South means... I have capitulated to the plot of Camp David." Sarkis 
advised Arafat that armed struggle had exhausted its useflilness for the 
Palestinians, and that he should stop his guerilla operations from 
Lebanon. Arafat showed a certain flexibility with respect to the 
deployment of the Lebanese Army in Southern Lebanon. He claimed that 
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he was not against such deployment, but that it was Lebanon's Arab 
Army, supported by Syria, which opposes such deployment.'^ ^ 
At the Arab Summit, which was convened in Tunis during 
November 20-22, 1979, Sarkis did not mince his words. He maintained 
that while all the other Arab countries had closed their borders to the 
PLO, all of them are with the PLO as long it stays in Lebanon.^ ^ He 
accused the PLO of destabilizing and demanded complete withdrawal of 
the Palestinian Forces from Lebanon's borders with Israel.^ ^ This 
infuriated the PLO, and the Arab leaders ended up backing the PLO at the 
expense of Lebanon. 
Syrian Redeployment in Lebanon 
On February 4, 1980, Syria, in an unexpected move, decided 
to withdraw some of its troops from the coastal road between Beirut and 
Sidon, and from Beirut and its suburbs and redeploys them in Al-Biqa 
valley. This move coincided with clashes between Syrian security forces 
and members of the Muslim Brothers in Aleppo."*^  
The Lebanese government was taken by surprise, and Prime 
Minister al-Huss hurried to Damascus to persuade Syria to postpone the 
implementation of this decision until the deployment of the Lebanese 
Army in place of the Deterrent Forces can be coordinated. Al -Huss was 
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received on the same day by Asad who agreed to postpone 
implementation of the decision for few days until Lebanon makes the 
necessary arrangements in this regard, affirming that the Syrian Forces 
will continue to abide by the tasks for which they entered Lebanon; 
namely, maintaining Lebanon's unity and safety and the security of its 
citizens. 
The coverage of al -Huss's visit by the Syrian media was 
intended to demonstrate to the Syrian public that Asad's role in Lebanon 
had been so constructive that the Lebanese Prime Minister had begged 
Asad to keep his troops in Lebanon. However, evidence clearly indicated 
that the crisis of the withdrawal of Syrian troops from certain localities 
was contrived. Asad's proxies and allies flocked to Damascus. Former 
President Franjiya met Asad on February 5, the Druze leader, Walid 
Junblat and Amal leader, Hussein al - Hussain were received by Asad 
on February 6, and the PO leader, Arafat met Asad on February 7, 1980. 
One could not escape from the conclusion that Asad was trying to create 
a crisis in Lebanon to divert the Syrian public from the major internal 
strife in Syria. 
As Arafat and the pro - PLO, Lebanese National Movement 
feared that the Syrian troops would be replaced by units from the 
Lebanese Army, a series of incidents took place against the barracks of 
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the Lebanese Army in West Beirut on February 13, 1980. Arafat 
maintained that the Syrian partial withdrawal would lead to the 
deployment of the PLO"s forces to fill in the vacuum left by the ADF's 
withdrawal."^' In fact, Syria allowed the pro-Syrian units of the PLA to 
take over the positions that had been held by the Syrian troops on the 
coastal road between Beirut and Sidon, in an effort to rekindle the 
conflict between the Lebanese Army and the FLO. 
A leading Lebanese journalist, Salim al -Lawzi, published in 
the widely read Arabic weekly al -Hawadith a series of articles on the 
internal political situation in Syria and its role in Lebanon. This incurred 
Asad's wrath. He was kid-napped in Lebanon on February 24, 1980, and 
his mutilated body was found in Beirut on March 4, 1980. It was a clear 
message form Asad to the Lebanese journalist, who had hitherto enjoyed 
the freedom of the press, that if they were critical of Syria they would 
suffer the same fate. 
After the Arab Summit in Tunis failed to resolve the 
problem of Southern Lebanon, Sarkis tried to start a dialogue between 
Syria and the Christian Lebanese Front, and in particular with Bashir 
Gemayel. A date, Februar}' 23, 1980, was set for Bashir's envoy, Karim 
Pakradouni to meet with Khaddam. On the very same day, while 
Pakradouni was negotiating with Khaddam, an attempt to kill Bashir by 
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blowing up his car took place. It was unsuccessful because Bashir was 
not in it, but his eighteen month daughter and three body guards were 
killed. On March 12, 1980, former President Chamoun"s car was targeted 
in a similar fashion, but that to was unsuccessful and he suffered only 
minor injuries. When asked whether an Arab countn,' (i.e., Syria) was 
behind the attempt, Chamoun affirmed categorical K' that there was no 
doubt about it. 
The dialogue between the Christian Lebanese Front and 
Syria, which Sarkis supported, continued despite the unsuccessful attempt 
at Bashir Gemayel's life. The latter welcomed the withdrawal of Syrian 
troops from the Eastern-Southern Christian suburbs of Beirut, which had 
taken place on March 7, 1980. Bashir told Pakradouni to intensify his 
contacts with Syria: We work for our interest. 1 am willing to go with 
Syria as far as it is deemed, necessary for our cause. 
Bashir Gemayel gave the Syrians, after the withdrawal of 
March 7, 1980, the benefit of doubt. He hoped that the growing militant 
opposition against Asad in Syria would weaken his regime and force him 
to withdraw his troops from Lebanon. In realit} Asad's apparent 
flexibility was tactical at best. His aim was not to achieve anything 
tangible but to gain time while his regime was threatened by domestic 
challenges. The only tangible results of the Syrian - Phalangist dialogue 
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was the exchange of Prisoners, fifty - five Syrian soldiers for sixteen 
Phalangist members, on April 12 and 17, 1980, respectively. 
When the Syrian troops withdrew from the Christian Eastern 
-Southern suburbs, about one thousand two hundred troops from the 
Lebanese Army took over their positions. The commander of the 
Lebanese Army, Brigadier- General Victor al - Khuri visited Damascus 
on March 9, and again on May 24, 1980. During Khuri's second visit, the 
government - controlled Syrian Newspaper tishrin criticize the direct 
linking of the Lebanese Army Intelligence Bureau to the Commander of 
the Lebanese Army. The Tishrin editorial proposed the abolition of the 
Commando Force, which was created by the head of the Army 
Intelligence Bureu, Johnny Abduh, on the grounds that it was 
unnecessary under the current defense policies of the Lebanese 
government. This indicated that Syria was watching the growing role of 
the Lebanese Army with consternation. It was worried that the army 
would become strong enough to replace the Syrian troops in Lebanon. 
Syria's ally the PLA attacked the Lebanese Army's Muhammad Zughaib 
Barracks in Sidon on March I, 1980. On June 3, 1980, a delegafion of the 
newly reorganised Lebanese National Movement of Leftist Parties and 
organizations, which had become totally subservient to Syria, visited 
Damascus, and called for the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army on a 
173 
balanced basis. This phrase would become a refrain used by the pro-
Syrian and pro-PLO detractors of the institution of the Lebanese Army. 
When Christian Lebanese Forces were formed on August 30, 
1976, they comprised essentially the militia of the Phalangist party 
Headed by Bashir Gemayel and the Numur militia of the National 
Liberals Party Headed by Dany Chamoun. Throughout 1979, clashes 
between the two militias became more frequent and resulted in over one 
hundred causalities from both sides. On July 7, 1980. Bashir Gemayel 
decided to end the fighting by mounting a coordinated attack on all the 
major branches and barracks of the Numur militia, thus decimating the 
power base of Dany Chamoun. 
Although his favorite son of Dany was defeated, Camille 
Chamoun remained the President of the Lebanese Front. He neither 
demanded the punishment of those who were responsible for the military 
actions against his partisans, nor did he threaten to end his alliance with 
the Phalangists. In the word of Bashir Gemayel, Camillle Chamoun is 
really a great statesman who knows how to win and how to lose. 
Bashir Gamayel's relentless efforts to unify the militias of 
the Lebanese Forces under his command was partly rooted in the fear that 
the security of the Christian East Beirut and its mountain hinterland 
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would be endangered, if the armed clashes between the Phalangist and the 
Numur militias continued. A more significant reason was Bashir's 
ambition to become the supreme leader, so all the Christian militias as a 
prelude to becoming President of Lebanon. 
After the attack of July 7, 1980, Sarkis was in an unenviable 
position because, on the one hand, he felt strong sympathy for Dany 
Chamoun, but on the other, he did not want to jeopardize the recent 
rapport that he had established with Bashir Gemayel. Sarkis had to take 
some action after the attack. He accepted the resignation of Prime Minster 
al -Huss and tried to form a new cabinet to include those who wielded 
effective political power or in the Lebanese political parlance of the time 
al Fdaliyat. On July 20, 1980 Sarkis asked Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh, a former 
Prime Minister, and a well -respected moderate politician to head the 
new Cabinet, however, al-Sulh was unable to form a new cabinet because 
of Asad's veto, which as always, was not expressed directly by Syrian 
officials but indirectly through their surrogates. What Munah al -Sulh, 
the envoy of Taqi al - Din al Sulh, was told in Damascus was what the 
pro-Syrian Lebanese National Movement had publicly stated in a 
declaration, issued on July 25, 1980. Basically, Sarkis was accused of 
having accepted al -Huss's resignation to cover up for Bashir Gemayel's 
seventh of July operation. This the Syrias found unacceptable and 
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retaliated by preventing the formation of a new cabinet and launching a 
series of terrorist attacks. To silence the free press of Lebanon, the 
President of the Lebanese Press Syndicate, Riyah Taha, a prominent 
journalist, who hailed from the al-Hirmil region, was assassinated on July 
23, 1980. Car bombs targeted Christian East Beirut and its hinterland, on 
July 30, August 7, August 24, September 27, and November 10, 1980, 
resulting in the death of ten people, and the wounding of over one 
hundred and fifty others. 
The internal opposition to Asad in Syria mounted during 
1980. On June 25, 1980, Asad himself became the target of assassination, 
but escaped with minor injuries. The next day he ordered the massacre of 
about eight hundred prisoners in the Palmyra prison. Salah al - Din al -
Bitar, a leading intellectual and a former Syrian Prime Minister, who was 
the CO -founder with Michel Aflaq of the Ba'th Party in 1947, was killed 
by Asad's agents, in a car bomb in Paris on July 21, 1980. He had been 
organizing the Syrian opposition abroad, and in his last interview before 
his murder, al - Bitar called for an end to the dictatorship of the Asad's 
regime, and the reestablishment of democratic rule and freedom in Syria. 
Asad sided with Iran in the Iran - Iraq war, and antagonized 
King Husain of Jordan. He also accused the king of supporting and giving 
haven to Syrian Muslim Brothers who were behind the violent attacks 
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against the Asad regime in Syria. Under those circumstances it was not 
surprising that Asad decided to boycott the Arab Summit scheduled to be 
convened in Amman, during November 25-27, 1980. He also wanted 
Sarkis to follow suit. So he sent him the Chief-of-staff, Hikmatal -
Shihabi, on November 24, 1980, to convince him not to attend the Arab 
Summit. Sarkis told al -Shihabi that he did not need convincing because 
he was on the side of Asad on this issue. Then he added "tell President 
Asad that it is a good time to end the cabinet crisis." As a quid pro quo, 
for his boycott of the Arab Summit, Sarkis was asking Asad to remove 
obstacles to the formation of his cabinet. He was successful and the 
cabinet was formed on October 25, 1980, headed by Shafiq al - Wazzan. 
Once Sarkis sided with Asad and declined to attend the Arab 
Summit, the tone of the parliamentary opposition led by Franjiya, 
Karami, and Junblat changed. Al - Wazzan's cabinet managed to get a 
vote of confidence, with forty one votes in favor, six votes against, and 
one abstention of December 20, 1980, fifty three days after it was formed. 
A conflict erupted, on December 21, 1980, between Bashir's 
Lebanese Forces and the Syrian troops in the city of Zahle in the central 
Biqa' region. It was rooted in Syria's attempt to deploy its troops in 
Zahle. Bashir Gemayel's reaction to the presence of the Syrian troops was 
to attack them and five Syrian soldiers were killed. Consequently, Syrian 
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troops surrounded the city and began to bombard it. The attack was to 
seek conflict with Bashir Gemayel's Christian Lebanese Forces and get 
some support from the Syrian Sunni Muslim public. Bashir, on the other 
hand took advantage of the siege of Zahle by Syrian troops and their 
shelling and killing of innocent civilians, to appeal to the UN and the 
Western power to put an end to the war waged by Asad on Zahle, and on 
Lebanon as a whole. 
The attacks on Zahle during the Christmas season produced 
a strong humanitarian reaction in the capitals of the West. The strongest 
condemnation of the "barbaric shelling" of the innocent inhabitants of the 
city of Zahle came from French politicians. On December 24, 1980, the 
French Government protested the bombardment, by Syrian artillery, of 
"the Christian and Francophone city of Zahle." On December 26, 1980, 
two rockets were fired against the French Embassy in Beirut. 
Objections were immediately raised against the French, by 
Syrian surrogates, for their interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. 
Even Prime Minister, Shafiq al -Wazzan, in the wake of his first visit to 
Syria since he took office, was critical of the French role. Al -Wazzan 
praised the role of the Syrian troops in Lebanon while the civilian 
populations of Zahle was being subjected to a savage bombardment by 
these very troops. Bashir Gemayel took him to task by pointing to al -
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Wazzan's silence about the "Syrian war of destruction against Zahle, and 
his lack of national sentiment in not expressing his solidarity with two 
hundred thousand of his follow citizens [people of Zahle]." Lebanese -
French relations were not tarnished by al - Wazzan's statements. As the 
French Ambassador to Lebanon, Louis Delamare, asserted the friendship 
between France and Lebanon is so old and dynamic that it will not be 
affected by a transient incident. 
There were several reasons for Asad's escalation of the 
conflict in Lebanon. He hoped it would help him domestically to be 
fighting what the Syrian media depicted as "agents of the Zionist enemy", 
that is, Bashir Gemayel's Christian Lebanese Forces. Also, in a program 
entitled "The Lebanon We want to Build" issued on December 23, 1980, 
the Lebanese Front demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian troops. The 
request worried Asad who feared that the renewal of the mandate of the 
Syrian troops, which was due to January 1981, would become conditional 
rather than, as it had been hitherto, indefinite. Furthermore, the new 
Reagan Administration that was coming to power in early 1981, might 
regard the role of the Syrian troops in Lebanon as dispensable and 
pressure them to leave. 
Finally, the most effective intervention in the Zahle conflict 
was neither the French nor the American, but the Israeli threats that Syria 
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received via France and the United States. They led to the lifting of the 
siege on Zahle a week later. 
In a declaration issued on January 14, 1981, the Lebanese 
Front maintained that the Syrian Troops (ADF) had ceased to be a 
deterrent force but had turned into "a military occupation." Therefore, the 
only option left for Lebanon was to request the deployment of UN forces 
all over the Lebanese territories and not to confine them to Southern 
Lebanon. To counter the Lebanese Front's demand for the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops from Lebanon, former President Franjiya was promptly 
invited on January 14, 1981, to Damascus, to show that Syria had support 
among the Christians. Accompanied by a group of journalists, Franjiya 
provided Asad with the opportunity to emphasize the positive role Syria 
was playing in Lebanon. In Franjiya's words that: Syria has no objective 
in its presence in Lebanon other than assisting the [Lebanese] state to 
spread its authority and preserve the unity of the Country. Franjiya 
reiterated a theme that would particularly appeal to Asad that: all 
Lebanese who reside in regions where the Syrian troops are operating 
enjoy a safe environment. 
The leader of the Lebanese Front, Camille Chamoun, had no 
illusions that Muslim and Christian Politicians residing in the Syrian 
controlled regions were able to express their views freely. According to 
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him, no national reconciliation was possible unless Lebanon was liberated 
from all non-Lebanese troops, that is, both Syrian troops and the PLO. He 
claimed that not a single prominent Lebanese politicians, living in areas 
controlled by the Syrian troops or the PLO, dared to engage in a dialogue 
with the Lebanese Front without fearing for his life and property. 
President Sarkis visited Damascus during March 10-11, 
1981. The Lebanese president pointed out that despite the presence of 
Syrian troops in West Beirut, an average of eight people a day were being 
killed and the shelling on central Beirut was continuing for the past six 
years. Sarkis told Asad: Palestinian actions in Southern Lebanon would 
ruin the country, that rightly or wrongly Syria appeared to be hindering 
an accord among the Lebanese, and that finally, there would be no 
solution without a Syrian - Phalangist reconciliation. In order to pacify 
Sarkis, Asad appeared to accept a dialogue with any Lebanese faction 
including the Phalangist party, and even expressed certain reservation 
about the Palestinian attitude toward Lebanon. Nevertheless, he was 
vague in his reply, and maintained only that to reach a solution was not 
an easy task as the conditions on the ground were complex. When Sarkis 
warned Asad that Syria's image would be tarnished and that the Syrian 
troops were increasingl) being viewed as an army of occupation, Asad's 
response was "a smile \\ ith a lot of meaning." On the eve of Sarkis's visit 
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to Damascus, Bashir Gemayel, the Commander of the Lebanese Forces, 
had issued a statement maintaining that President Sarkis should insist on 
the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Syrian occupation 
army, which should be followed by the establishment of regular 
diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria. 
Camille Chamoun was totally pessimistic about reaching an 
agreement with Asad. He believed that Sarkis should not have bothered to 
go to Damascus, because no accord in Lebanon would be possible 
through Syria mediation, as Asad was dead set against any such accord. 
As the demand, by Christian Lebanese leaders, for the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon became more frequent, Asad 
decided to confront those leaders by escalating the fighting. Asad's 
prediction, at the conclusion of the Asad - Sarkis meeting, that the 
security situation might remain the same or become worse was ominous. 
Camille Chamoun criticized this statement by Asad saying that: "the issue 
of Lebanon has become a past time from Syrian Officials, it has become a 
diversion... from problems faced by Saria domestically. 
Although Sarkis had no illusions about improving the 
situation in Lebanon as result of his Damascus visit, he hoped that "a 
truce" would follow. But his hopes were dashed when the Syrian troops 
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suddenly bombarded East Beirut and Zahle simultaneously on April 2, 
1981. This ushered in the second phase of the Zahle conflict, which began 
in December 1980. 
The main thrust of Syria's onslaught was on Zahle, which it 
surrounded once again with Syrian Special Forces ready to enter the city. 
President Sarkis telephoned Asad and asked him to receive his envoy, 
Elias al -Harawi, who represented Zahle in the Chamber of Deputies, and 
was then Minister of Public Works. At the meeting, Asad harshly 
criticized the Christian Lebanese Front and the Christian Lebanese 
Forces. He was incensed by their frequent demands for the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops, and their portrayal of it as an army of occupation, on part 
with PLO forces. Asad told al-Harawi that he would never permit the 
Lebanese Army to be deployed anywhere in Lebanon, if the Lebanese 
Front did not revere its stand on the presence of Syrian troops in that 
country. Asad added that although Syria had signed a treaty of friendship 
and cooperation with the Soviet Union, it had kept a channel of 
communication with the U.S.A. 
Asad also warned al - Harawi that the Lebanese Forces 
should not be fooled by the international diplomatic support they were 
getting, because by the time these diplomatic cables of protest and 
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condemnation were written, we will find sufficient time to bombard 
Zahle with one tiiousand shells. 
When President Sarkis telephoned Asad for the second time 
in three days, on April 6, 1981, Asad stole his thunder by protesting that 
the Lebanese Army was shelling the Syrian Army. Sarkis was taken 
aback by Asad's allegation and cut short the conversation. He suggested 
instead that the Syrian Foreign Minister, Khaddam be dispatched to 
Beirut to further discuss the conflict with him. 
When Sarkis met Khaddam he put forward the demands of 
the Lebanese state, including an immediate end to the bombardment of 
the positions of the Lebanese Army by the ADF. He reminded Khaddam 
that the ADF was supposed to be under the command of the Lebanese 
President in accordance with resolutions of the Riyad and Cairo Summits 
of October 1976. Sarkis also asked for the removal of the Syrian 
commanded PLA, which was deployed on the Green Line next to the 
Lebanese Army. Finally he requested that units of the Lebanese Army be 
sent to the besieged city of Zahle. 
Khaddam retorted that the Biqa region and Zahle were part 
of the security zone that protected Damascus, and therefore, the presence 
of the Christian Lebanese Forces in Zahle was unacceptable to Syria. 
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Khaddam expounded on his theory that the conflict in Zahle was a plot 
hatched by Israel with the support of the U.S. and the complicity of 
Bashir Gemayel against Syria. Khaddam agreed to sending the 
Gendarmerie (the Internal Security Forces) to Zahle, but not the Lebanese 
Army until certain conditions were met. The foremost among these 
conditions was putting the Lebanese Army units under the command of 
the ADF, that is, under Syria's command. In five days of fighting against 
Syrian and PLA forces, during April 2-6, 1981, the Lebanese Army lost 
eight men and over a hundred were wounded. 
Bashir Gemayel maintained that the targeting of the 
Lebanese Army was because it is composed of Christians and Muslims 
and that both are resisting [the Syrian occupation]. The Syrians are 
attacking the [Lebanese] Army for one reason only, and that is to 
undermine its unity. He added that when Taqi al -Din al-Sulh, the Prime 
Minister designate, managed to form a national unity cabinet in August 
1980, Syria prevented that cabinet from seeing the light of day. We would 
like to address ourselves to Taqi al -Din al Sulh and implore him to 
reveal who put an end to that cabinet, and the reasons for the obstacles 
that were set up against the reconciliation efforts. We also address 
ourselves to the prominent personalities of West Beirut to ask who 
prevented them from getting in touch with the political leaders of east 
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Beirut to achieve a national reconciliation which could not be 
accomplished except by the Lebanese themselves. 
The link between Secretary of State Haig's visit, which 
began on April 4, 1981, and included Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi 
Arabia, and the Escalation of violence in Zahle was made in the Syrian 
press. Although Syria had started this phase of the Zahle crisis, it claimed 
there was an American-Israeli plan with multiple objectives that included 
the partition of Lebanon, the putting of pressure on S}'ria and exposing 
Syria's security to danger. 
The Zahle conflict had another dimension. It was meant as a 
reminder to the new Reagan Administration that Syria could always 
create conflicts on the Lebanese arena. His was especially true when 
demands, such as those by Christian Lebanese politicians were made for 
the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The initiation of the 
conflict on the eve of Secretarj' of State Haig's first visit to the West 
Asia, was a clear message to that effect delivered to the Reagan 
Administration. 
Syrian - Israeli Clashes and the Missile Crisis 
Syria tightened its siege on Zahle (see Map-6), and 
continued its offensive by occupying strategic heights on the Mount 
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Senin connecting Zahle to Mount Lebanon. It used helicopter-borne 
commando troops. Asad's strategy was to push hard against the Lebanese 
Forces, so that Bashir Gemayel, who had spearheaded the demand for the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, would talk to Syrian and in 
the process of negotiations withdraw his demand. Bashir Gemayel did not 
mind meeting Asad's special operations envoy Muhammad al-Khuri. 
Asad tactically decided to feign a conciliatory attitude toward Bashir 
Gemayel. The latter, however, had no illusions. In his third meeting with 
al-Khuli on May 5, 1981, Bashir outlined a plan that comprised the 
deployment of the Lebanese Army from Jizzin, in Southern Lebanon, to 
Zgharta in Northern Lebanon, and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon. He also called for the establishment of a new political system 
which would not be based on bicephalism. 
The day after the downing of the two Syrian helicopters, 
Asad reacted by deploying batteries of SAM-6 and SAM-2 surface to air 
missiles in the Biqa region. He, thus, added a new dimension to the Zahle 
crisis, namely a Syrian missiles crisis that pitted Syria against Israel to 
rally Arab support on his side. The United States responded swiftly to the 
new crisis . Presidential envoy Ambassador, Philip Habib was dispatched 
to Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. Habib told President Sarkis that his mission 
was to prevent a confrontation between Syria and Israel, because the 
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Reagan Administration believed that any Israeli-Syrian war could lead to 
a confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
President Sarkis realized that Habib's mission was limited in 
scope, and that the United States had no intention of addressing the 
Lebanese conflict in its entirety. The issue of the presence of the Syrian 
troops in Lebanon receded to the background as the resolution of both the 
Zahle crisis and the Syrian missiles crisis became the principal concerns 
of the United States and Saudi Arabia. 
Israel continued to threaten to destroy the Syrian missiles in 
Lebanon, and had been on the verge of doing so, on two separate 
occasions on May 1 and 4, had it not been for Ambassador Habib who 
persuaded it not to act. For three weeks after that Syria showed some 
tactical flexibility, but then Asad realized that his brinkmanship of 
deploying the surface -to-air missiles had survived despite Israeli threats. 
On May 17, 1981, the Israeli government decided to seek diplomatic 
channels to resolve the Syrian missiles crisis. This emboldened Asad who 
subsequently resorted to violence to put pressure on both President Sarkis 
and Bashir Gemayel to withdraw their demand for a Syrian pullout. On 
the eve of and during Ambassador Philip Habib's second visit to 
Lebanon, Syrian guns shelled the presidential palace in Ba'abda on May 
21, and again on May 23, 1981. On May 23, the residence of the 
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American Ambassador in Yerze, where Ambassador Habib was staying, 
also became the target of Syrian shelling. 
Syria's weakening position in Lebanon enabled even 
President Sakis to adopt an independent position. He demanded the 
problem of South Lebanon, including both the Palestinian presence and 
the Israeli retaliation, be discussed at the forthcoming tenth Arab Summit. 
His initiative displeased the Syrians, as it was a demonstration of 
independence and was close to the position of the Lebanese Front. 
The summit again demonstrated the deep splits within the 
Arab world and its inability to devise plans for joint political effort on 
any issue, including Lebanon. The tenth Arab Summit created a follow -
up committee to supervise the implementation of various undertakings in 
regard to South Lebanon. 
The meeting of the follow - up committee was held on June 
6, 1981, in Bayt al -Din, and was chaired by President Sarkis. 
Concomitantly, Syrian bombardment of Zahle resumed, and violence 
erupted in the city of Tripoli. In that meeting, the Syrian Foreign 
Minister, Khaddam stated that Bashir Gemayel, in his meeting with 
Muhammad al-Khuri, on May 5, 1981. had proposed a Christian entity 
that would take over part of Lebanon in agreement with Israel. To prove 
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his accusation, Khaddam produced an altered record of Bashir Gemayel's 
meeting with al-Khuri. Khaddam insisted that he would not meet Bashir 
Gemayel until he had severed his relations with Israel. 
Khaddam's demand was partly rooted in the ideological 
stand of Asad's relentless struggle against Israel, and partly designed to 
appeal to Syrian and Arab public opinion in order to enhance Asad's 
image as the leading confrontation leader in the Arab world. More 
significantly, Syrian insistence on severing the relations between Bashir 
Gemayel and Israel was intended, in real politic terms, to undermine 
Bashir's alliance with Israel, which could have led eventually to the 
ouster of Syrian troops from Lebanon. 
By transforming the Zahle conflict into a confrontation with 
Israel over the Syrian missile crisis, Asad made it impossible for any 
country at the Arab League meeting to propose a resolution mandating 
the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. 
The second meeting of the follow-up committee was held on 
June 23 and 24, 1981, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Khaddam, the Syrian 
Foreign Minister, insisted that the issue of Bashir Gemayel's relations 
with Israel was the key to the resolution of the Zahle conflict. Saudi 
Arabia, on the other hand, separated the two issues, and called for an 
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immediate cease-fire. For Saudi Arabia, Zahle became the litmus test of 
its influence in Lebanon and the region as a whole, especially after many 
personalities including the Maronite Patriarch, Antoine Khuraysh, 
religious and civil leaders of Zahle appealed to the Saudi Arabian King to 
intercede with Syria and end the siege. 
The show of force by Israel against Syria had weakened the 
latter, and consequently bolstered the moderate Arab States like Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, which played a crucial role in the follow-up 
committee. Saudi efforts also had the backing of the United States, 
attested by the presence of President Reagan's envoy Ambassador Habib 
in the region during June 9,-2, 1981. 
On June 30, 1981, the Zahle conflict, which had lasted for 
six months, was finally resolved. Three hundred and fifty members of the 
Lebanese gendarmerie with eight armored cars and twenty other vehicles 
were deployed throughout the city, and ninety-five members of Bashir 
Gemayel's Lebanese Forces were evacuated, with their arms, fi-om Zahle 
and back to the Christian hinterland. A celebration was held, on June 30, 
1981, in East Beirut for those ninety-five members of the Lebanese 
Forces so were decorated for their valor in defending the city of Zahle. 
Bashir Gemayel in his address credited these fighters for making Zahle an 
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international city, in the course of which the Lebanese cause acquired an 
unprecedented international dimension. 
Syria also declared victory, because the fighters of the 
Lebanese Forces were evacuated from the city of Zahle. However its 
claim that they surrendered their weapons to the ADF [Syrian troops] 
before they were transported from the city, was false. The Syrians, 
however, managed to veto the deployment of the Lebanese army in the 
city of Zahle. 
Until mid-1981 Syria relied on the Lebanese Prime Minister 
to reject or undermine what the President of the Republic proposed. But 
by early July 1981, Prime Minister Shafiq al - Wazzan, fully endorsed 
the position of President Sarkis and accepted what was called Lebanon's 
"Working Document" (Warqat Amal), drafted by the Lebanese Foreign 
Minister Fu'ad Butros. That document included, inter alia, the phased 
withdrawal, by August 1, 1982, of Syrian troops from Lebanon. President 
Sarkis related to Pakradouni that he could not believe his eyes when 
Prime Minister al-Wazzan concurred with the "Working Document," 
which was tantamount to an official demand by Lebanon for the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops. Prime Minister al -Wazzan's stand was not 
based solely on his personal views. This was the position taken by the 
bulk of the Muslim establishment whether Sunni or Shi"ile. Thus, by July 
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1981, there was a Christian-Muslim consensus that the conflict should 
end, and that the Syrian troops should withdraw from Lebanon by August 
1, 1982. 
Syria's reaction to this accord among the Lebanese was 
completely negative, and it began a campaign to undermine this Lebanese 
Christian - Muslim consensus. The Syrian press attacked Bashir Gemayel 
even after he submitted his letter to President Sarkis on July 6, 1981 
indicating that he had se\ ered his relations with Israel. The Syrian Tishrin 
newspaper commented that the severance... is a necessar}' condition but 
not sufficient to start talks on a Lebanese accord. The Syrian Minister of 
Defense, Mustafa Tlas \ isited northern Lebanon on July 11, 1981, during 
which he criticized those who demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon. Tlas claimed that both the Lebanese President and Prime 
Minister regarded the ADF [Syrian troops] as a legitimate army and as 
their official army. According to Syrian Defense Minister Tlas, the Arab 
follow-up committee was originally intended to assist the Lebanese 
President Sarkis to implement the resolutions of the 1976 Riyad Summit. 
One of the resolutions was to put on trial those who deal with Israel. 
Today what is demanded from this committee is to assist to prosecute 
those who deal with [Israel]. But is came to Lebanon and gave those who 
deal with [Israel] an-exoneration. A perusal of the resolutions of the 
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Riyad Summit of 1976 clearly shown that there was not a single 
resolution about those who deal with Israel. Therefore what Tlas claimed 
was a figment of his imagination, aimed at putting further obstacles ; the 
way of a Christian -Muslim consensus on the withdrawal of S ;an 
troops by August 1,1982. 
The new French President, Francois Mitterand, elect n 
May 1981, showed serious interest in ending the conflict in Lebanon a 
letter sent to President Sarkis, on June 8, 1981, Mitterand advised " s 
become necessary to provide greater support for the independ^ 
sovereignty and security of Lebanon." His Foreign Minister, C e 
Cheysson, made an official visit to Lebanon during August 29-30, 
in which he offered Frances help to resolve the Lebanese crisis, wh r^ 
in conjunction with the Arab follow-up committee or through the ;:. C. 
The French foreign minister stated, in a press conference on August 30 
1981 of Lebanon as "occupied" by a foreign power, a clear allusion to 
Syria. Cheysson reaffirmed Frances continued interest in training the 
officers of the Lebanese army and in supplying it with arms."''' 
Although Cheysson visited Latakia in Syria where he met 
President Asad, on the heels of his visit to Lebanon, the Syrians were 
very much concerned about this increased interest France in Lebanese 
affairs. At the end of Cheysson's visit to S}ria. Syrian Foreign Minister 
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Khaddam deceptively claimed that France and Syria were in complete 
agreement with respect to Lebanon. A few days later, on September 4, 
1981, Syrian intelligence agents assassinated the French Ambassador to 
Lebanon, Louis Delamare, in West Beirut/'* Typical of Syrian deception, 
the Syrian newspaper Tishrin, accused Israel of the assassination of the 
French Ambassador. It cited, inter alia, that Israel's motive "was revenge 
for the way he [Delamare] had depicted [the situation in Lebanon] and 
transmitted this depiction to his countr>'. This is turn determined 
[Frances] attitude towards the Lebanese crisis."''"' The reality was that this 
was precisely the reason wh) the Asad regime had ordered the 
assassination of the Ambassador in East Beirut on October 26. It then 
shifted the blame on Israel. 
Syrian opposition to Arab follow-up committee 
The assassination of French Ambassador Delamare 
coincided with the convening of the meeting of the Arab follow-up 
committee during September 3-4, 1981. Syrian foreign Minister 
Khaddam claimed that there was no problem between Syrian and 
Lebanon, and reiterated that the problems existed only among the 
Lebanese themselves. Syrian wanted to undermine the Christian -
Muslim consensus that had emerged in the wake of the Lebanese workine 
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Document, which had the support of both President Sarkis and Prime 
Minister al-Wazzan. 
Syria and its allies openly attacked the unity between 
President Sarkis and Prime Minister al-Wazzan. For instance the leader of 
the Organisatin for Communist Action (OCA), Muhsin Ibrahim, called 
for the resignation of Prime Minister al-Wazzan. Former Prime Minister 
Sa'ib Salam who supported al-Wazzan answered, on September 22, 1981, 
that those who called for the resignation of Prime Minister al-Wazzan did 
not have any popular support because the Lebanese people would not 
accept to replace the legitimate authorities b\ people who were against 
legitimate authority and who were outlaws. Syria opposed the move. On 
October 27, 1981, the follo\\-up committee held a meeting at the 
ambassadorial level. A report of that meeting was presented by President 
Sarkis and Prime Minister al - Wazzan to the Lebanese cabinet the 
following day. Everything that the Lebanese Authorit} put forward was 
rejected in one way or another. The main objective of some was... to strip 
the legitimate authorities of ever>' weapon the>' had, so as to be able to 
impose anything on them now or in the future. 
The fifth meeting of the Arab follow - up committee was 
convened during November 7-8. 1981. Three of its resolutions dealt once 
again with nitty-gritty issues such as abiding h\ a complete cease fire, the 
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opening of the rest of the passages between East and West Beirut, the 
deployment of the Lebanese Gendarmerie on the East side of the Green 
Line in Beirut. The fourth resolution, however, was inspired by the 
Syrians. It called for the formation of a force to inspect the sea ports and 
the Lebanese coastline to prevent the supply of arms of the various 
militias. Its real objective was to prevent Bashir Gemayel's Lebanese 
Forces from getting arms from the Israelis. Former President Chamoun 
rejected this resolution in its entirety, and pointed out that the supply of 
arms to the Pro-Syrian militias did not come by sea but by land from 
Syria Territories and from the Syrian army's arsenal itself 
The inability of the Arab follow- up committee to resolve the 
crisis in Lebanon was primarily due to Syria, which was putting forward 
at every meeting of the follow - up committee impossible conditions. 
Syria tried to subvert the Christian-Muslim consensus. There were 
persistent Syrian efforts to put pressure on Prime Minister-al-Wazzan... 
to withdraw his signature from the Lebanese Working Document because 
it demanded a timetable for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon." In defiance of the Christian - Muslim consensus, which called 
for the withdrawal of Syrian troops fro Lebanon, the Syrian President 
Asad, in a interview published on December 12, 1981, deceptively 
maintained, if they [the Lebanese] agree that the ADF [Syrian] troops 
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should leave, then we shall do so thankfully. But if they demand from us 
to stay in Lebanon we shall stay put... without concern for the difficulties 
[involved]. Former President Chamoun made a very perceptive comment 
on the Syrian President: Hafiz al-Asad is the most intelligent and capable 
of the Arab leaders. One can easily be enchanted if one is engaged with 
him in a conversation. But what ever effort you may exert to fathom... 
his plans you will not succeed, for generally the consequences of his 
actions are at loggerheads with his declared intentions. 
Strengthening Ties between the Phalangists and Israel 
On November 29, 1981, the Lebanese Phalangist Party 
celebrated its forty-fifth anniversary. Bashir Gemayel spoke openly about 
the need for a strong Lebanese president to end the conflict and unity the 
whole country. He argued that for free and honest presidential elections to 
take place it was imperative that Syrian troops withdraw from Lebanese 
territories by the summer of 1982. Bashir Gemayel proposed that the 
Arab follow - up committee be Transformed to an operational body in 
charge of supervising the withdrawal of the Syrian troops and the PLA 
(which was under Syrian control) from Beirut. It would also have to 
oversee their replacement with the Lebanese forces as well as with the 
official Lebanese army and Gendarmerie by January 15, 1982. He also 
proposed that the unruly PLO forces should be kept under control. Bashir 
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Gemayel presented a timetable for the rest of the country on the same 
lines as those applied to Beirut, with a deadline of May 15, 1982 . He 
also proposed that the Lebanese Government negotiate with both Syrian 
and the PLO to set the basis for well defined and correct relations which 
would guarantee the complete retrieval of Lebanese sovereignty and 
authority. Bashir Gemayel believed that the Christian Muslim consensus 
was strong and that the Muslims of Lebanon wanted the legitimate 
Lebanese army to replace all then Lebanese forces that were occupying 
large areas of Lebanon. He hoped that the Arab follo\N-up committee 
would be instrumental in resoh ing the Lebanese crisis as the Lebanese 
themselves had already agreed to through the Lebanese working 
Document. Nevertheless Bashir could not pin all those on the Arab 
follow-up committee as the Arab counties had hitherto accomplished very 
little with respect to Lebanon. 
A crucial landmark in Bashir"s alliance with Israel was Ariel 
Sharon's first visit to East Beirut and its hinterland, in the second week of 
January 1982 and a month later, in February 1982, the Israeli chief of 
Staff Rafael Eaten visited Junya and was received with the Israeli flag 
fluttering alongside its Lebanese counterpart, [and] the band playing 
'Hatikvah', the Israeli national anthem.'' Bashir wanted the Israelis to 
clear Lebanon of both the PLO and Syria. He told Rafael Eitan that he 
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wanted the Israeli Defense Forces to reach up to the northern city of 
Tripoli. Bashir realized that getting rid of the PLO was going to solve 
only half the problem that Lebanon was facing. The other half was the 
presence of the Syrian troops in Lebanon. Asad had refused to withdraw 
from Lebanon by August 1, 1982, as stipulated by the Lebanese Working 
Document, which both President Sarkis and Prime Minister al-Wazzan 
had fully endorsed. Despite the fact that they represented the Legitimate 
authority and that their views represented the Christian -Muslim 
consensus, Syria did not give in as attested by the unsuccessful meetings 
of the Arab follow - up committee. 
Bashir was therefore interested in an Israeli operation that 
would also push out the Syrian troops firom Lebanon. When high ranking 
Israeli officer who was a member of a group of IDF officers visited 
Beirut, in April 1982, "to coordinate operational details" with the 
Lebanese Forces remarked that Israel had no interest in picking a fight 
with Syria, Bashir shot back, 'If you don't intend to take on the Syrians, 
don't come.^ ^ 
Even Ariel Sharon was not interested in a war with Syria. 
During the same month when he visited East Beirut and met the Christian 
Lebanese leaders, "Sharon and his aide [General Avraham Tamir met 
secretly in Geneva, in January 1982, with Syria's Gen Rifa'at Assad, the 
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President's brother.^ ^ Sharon assured the Syrians that he was determined 
to destroy [the] Palestinian military infrastructure in Lebanon, without 
infringing [on] Syrian interests.''^  Sharon was under the illusion that by 
getting rid of the fighters of the PLO in Lebanon, while leaving the 
Syrian military presence intact, Israel would be safe from terrorist 
operations from Lebanese territories. Instead Israel was faced by the 
Hizbullah, which Syria substituted for the PLO. 
The violent uprisings of the Muslim Brothers against the 
Asad regime reached an unprecedented lexel with the Hamah uprising, in 
February 1982. It was brutally put down by Syrian armed forces, which 
destroyed most of the old quarters of the city of Hamah. An estimated 
twenty thousand civilians were killed.'" Rifa' at Asad, Hafiz Asad's 
brother and henchman had threatened, earlier on July 1, 1980, that he was 
ready to kill one million Syrians if this was necessary to keep the Asad 
regime in power.''^  
To distract attention from the massacres committed against 
his own people, Asad needed a conflict with Israel to divert hostility 
away from the Syrian 'Alawi regime. Asad knew, from his brother Rifa' 
at secret contacts with Ariel Sharon, that Israel was bent on a war against 
the PLO in Lebanon. Although S\ria was not going to be the target of 
Israel's impending war, a limited participation of Syrian troops in 
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Lebanon against Israel was abound to boost the Asad regime and silence 
his domestic opposition. 
On June 3, 1982, Abu Nidal's operatives shot and gravely 
wounded the Israeli Ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, just outside 
the Dorchester Hotel in London. The Gunman, Nawwaf Rusan, who shot 
Ambassador Argov had an Iraqi passport, and some analysts and 
journalists believed that Iraq was behind the attack.'*"' Patrick Seale has, 
however, rightly pointed out that by June 1982, Abud Nidal was already 
on exceedingly bad terms with Saddam. The only plausible explanation 
was that Syria was behind it. The Abu Nidal gunman who shot 
ambassador Argov was in fact "a colonel in Syrian intellience."'*'* 
In response to the Abu Nidal's assassination attempt of 
Israeli Ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, Israel retaliated against the 
PLO in Lebanon. This eventually escalated in to the long - planned 
Operation Peace for Galilee on June 6, 1982. 
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CHAfTEX- 4 
destroyed any Palestinian and Lebanese resistance there, simultaneously 
committing a series of violations against the civilian population,^ Israeli 
troops proceeded to penetrate as far as Beirut. By 18 June 1982 they had 
surrounded the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) armed forces 
in the western part of the Lebanese capital. 
According to Lebanese statistics, the Israeli offensive, 
particularly the intensive shelling of Beirut, caused 18000 deaths and 
30000 injuries, mostly among civilians. 
Despite the fact that the Syrians became involved in the 
fighting, the Israelis tried to avoid a military confrontation with Syria. 
The Israeli Prime Minister Begin sent a message, on June 8, 1982, 
through ambassador Philip Habib to Asad which included four points: 
"(a) We do not want war with your army, (b) Instruct \"our army not to 
fire on our soldiers. If our soldiers are not hit, they will not attack, your 
army, (c) have your army withdraw from west to east and from south to 
north to the starting point where it was positioned .... On Saturday [June 
5], before we commenced our campaign. The Israelis hoped that Asad 
would reach an arrangement with them on the aforementioned points. As 
Sharon put it in his memoirs: "An agreement by the Syrian at that point 
would have given us all the objectives we launched the Peace for Galilee 
Operation to achieve." 
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Asad 's response was to move, on the same day, six 
additional SAM-6 batteries into the Biqa' region of Lebanon,. The fact 
that these batteries were brought in from the Golan Heights rather than 
from other regions of Syria, was a clear message from Asad to Israel that 
he would like to keep the confrontation limited to Lebanese territories.'* 
Early in the morning on the next day, that is, on June 9, 1982, Prime 
Minister Begin relayed, through the American Ambassador Sam Lewis, a 
message to Asad demanding the removal of these new Sam - 6 batteries 
by 5 A.M.^  As Asad wanted a confrontation with Israel, he did not 
respond to the new demand of the Israelis, and refused to meet 
Ambassador Philip Habib who had arrived in Damascus on the same day, 
making him cool his heels for several hours. Israel had no choice but to 
destroy the Syrian missiles, a total of nineteen (seventeen SAM-2 and 
SAM-6, and two SAM-8) batteries. When the Syrian air force fighters 
rose to their defense, the ninety- six Israeli F-15 and F-16 jets shot down 
twenty - nine Syrian MIGs.^  
When Ambassador Philip Habib at last was able to see 
President Asad in the late afternoon of June 9, the latter was defiant and 
refused to accept the Israeli demand for the removal of the PLO forces 
operating from the Syrian lines in the Biqa region. Asad agreed to a cease 
fire, but regarded the Israeli condition about the removal of the PLO 
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forces as both a big demand and an unreasonable one/ Despite the 
battering of the Syrian forces. Asad told Philip Habib: We also have a 
condition for a cease fire, a full Israeli withdrawal. 
Philip Habib naively believed Asad, who had thrived on the 
presence of the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon since march 
1978, and who had just provoked Israel to launch its operation peace in 
Galilee. Habib contacted President Reagan about Asad's demand. The 
reply he received from the Reagan administration that the United States 
"was prepared to guarantee an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon." But 
Asad insisted that the withdrawal "begin forthwith". Asad already knew 
that Israel's war objective was only to push back the PLO forces fourty 
kilometers from the Israeli border. His demand for an immediate Israeli 
withdrawal, and his refusal to prevent the PLO forces from operating 
from Syrian lines, can therefore be construed as a clear indication that he 
wanted the war to continue. When Philip Habib relayed a new demand 
from Israel, that is, a "satisfactory security arrangements in the fourty-
kilometer zone." Asad argued "that is not within my power to decide. If I 
were the President of Lebanon, and it were up to me, I would refuse to 
recognize Israel's right to impose security arrangements on the soil of 
another country." This statement reveal Asad's agenda men and 
henceforth, namely, that the pacification of the Lebanese - Israeli border 
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would never be allowed. The policy was pursued by Asad form then until 
his death in June 2000, and continues under his son Bashshar, despite the 
internationally recognized full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon 
on May 24, 2000. 
On June 10, 1982, an advancing Israeli mechanized brigade, 
heading north toward the village of Sultan Ya'qub in the eastern Biqa 
region, was ambushed by a Syrian mechanized brigade. It suffered heavy 
losses. Seven tanks were abandoned and another tank with its four 
crewmen was captured by the Syrians. An air battle, which took place on 
the same day, led to the loss of another twenty five Syrian MIGs and the 
loss of four helicopters. Just before a cease fire, agreed upon by both 
Israel and Syria, took effect at noon on June 11, 1982, another air battle 
resulted in the shooting down on eighteen Syrian MIGs.^  On the ground 
the Syrians were also battered before the cease fire deadline. As the 
Syrian Third Division moved southward and westward in the vicinity of 
Sultan Ya'qub village, the 82"*^  Armored Brigade of that Third Division 
was trapped by the Israelis and was virtually destroyed.^  
Asad was able to achieve his objectives, namely to have a 
limited confrontation with Israel, and keep his forces solidly deployed in 
northern, central, and northeastern Lebanon because of two major 
reasons. First, because of the Israeli obsession with the PLO leaders and 
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their forces in West Beirut. Ariel Sharon had linked up the Israeli forces 
with the Christian Lebanese Forces in Ba'abdah and Beit Meiy in Mount 
Lebanon, and had attacked and defeated the Syrian forces and their allied 
militias, from 'Alay to Sofar during 22-24, 1982.'° These battles cut off 
the Beirut Damascus highway, and trapped the PLO leaders and fighters, 
as well as the Syrian 85"^  Brigade in West Beirut. The other reason was 
that the U.S. administration misunderstood Asad's motivations and 
Played into his hands. A conversation between the American envoy 
Ambassador Philip Habib and Ariel Sharon at the house of the head of 
Lebanese military intelligence, Johnny Ahduh, on June 15, 1982, is very 
revealing. By mid - June Sharon was convinced that the withdrawal of an 
external forces from Lebanon was the sine quo non condition for 
pacifying permanently the Lebanese - Israeli border. Sharon relates that 
when he put forward his proposal. Ambassador Philip Habib said: The 
withdrawal of external forces cannot be symmetric. What do you mean it 
can't be symmetric? I asked. Well, he said, the Syrians have security 
interests in Lebanon. What security interests do they have in Lebanese? I 
said. Did Lebanon ever attack Syria? Did they ever threaten Syria? Has 
Syria suffered from any terrorist activities coming from Lebanon? The 
answer to such questions was obvious." 
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After two months of fighting, a cease-fire was negotiated 
through the mediation of United States Envoy PhiUp Habib. Under the 
terms of these negotiations, the PLO was to evacuate Beirut under the 
supervision of a multinational force deployed in the evacuated part of the 
town. The Habib Accords envisaged that West Beirut would subsequently 
be under the control of the Lebanese army, and the Palestinian leadership 
was given guarantees by the Americans regarding the security of civilians 
in the camps after their departure. 
On August 23, 1982, Bashir Gemayel, who was very popular 
among Maronites was elected President of Lebanon by the National 
Assembly. Israel had relied on Gemayel and his forces as a 
counterbalance to the PLO, and ties between Israel and Maronite groups 
had grown stronger. 
Bashir Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon by a vote 
of 57 to 5 blank votes. Those who attended the parliamentary session 
were sixty - two deputies (forty three Christians as nineteen Muslims) out 
of the surviving ninety - two (fifty - one Christians and Forty - one 
Muslims) deputies.''^  Bashir Gemayel's agenda was clear he wanted the 
Syrian army and the PLO forces out of Lebanon, and he also sought an 
agreement with Israel, perhaps, at first, sort or a peace treaty, to pacify 
permanently the Lebanese - Israeli border. These goals were at 
215 
loggerheads with Asad's strategy with respect to both the domination of 
Lebanon and the undermining of any peaceful resolution of the Arab -
Israeli conflict. It was not surprising that the Syrian press depicted the 
elected President, Bashir Gemayel, as the "instrument to complete the 
occupation of Lebanon by Israel, and transform the country into a base 
for the Camp David alliance."''* 
After the election of Bashir Gemayel, Asad threatened in a 
statement by a high - ranking Syrian military officer that if Bashir 
Gemayel were to sign a peace treaty with Israel, Syria would be in state 
of war with Lebanon. Asad further threatened that Syrian troops will not 
withdraw from Lebanon except when the last Israeli soldier leaves 
Lebanon. This sort of thinking appealed very much to the leaders of Arab 
states, who made their position clear in the resolutions concerning 
Lebanon issued at the Arab summit held in Fez, Morocco, on September 
8, 1982. Although the final communique asserted that the task of the ADF 
(i.e., the Syrian army in Lebanon) had ended, it called for negotiations 
between the Lebanese government and the Syrian government to arrange 
for the withdrawal of Syrian troops in the Light of the Israeli withdrawal 
from Lebanon. Fu'ad Butros, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, expressed 
his dismay with the Arab summit because it implied that the Syrian troops 
would only withdraw after the withdrawal of Israeli troops. Consequently 
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President Asad began to talk about his willingness to withdraw his troops 
from Lebanon, knowing well enough that the Arab states would never put 
the Syrian troops on equal footing with the Israeli troops when the 
demand was voiced by Lebanon for a simultaneous withdrawal. 
The evacuation of the PLO ended on 1 September 1982. 
After the expulsion of the PLO fighter from Beirut was completed, two 
days later, Israel deployed its armed forces around the refugee camps. 
When the PLO was forced out of West Beirut and from the 
southern half of Lebanon by August 30, 1982, the major religious 
communities were relieved. The majority of the Christians who had been 
opposed to the military presence of the PLO, since the late 1960s, were 
delighted. The Shi'is of Jabal Amil in southern Lebanon were also 
relieved as they had suffered from Palestinian domination. They bore the 
brunt of the effect of the PO's quixotic attacks across the Lebanese -
Israeli border, which resulted in the inevitable Israeli retaliation on the 
people of Jabal Amil themselves.'^ The religious leader who would and 
perhaps even could have shielded his community from these catastrophes, 
the Charismatic Imam Musa al -Sadr, had been conveniently disposed off 
four year earlier. The Sunni community, which had hitherto been the 
staunch supporter of the PLO, had become disillusioned when the PLO -
Israel conflict engulfed the Sunni urban strongholds of Sidon and West 
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Beirut. It was quite a dramatic change to witness the way PLO leader 
Arafat, whom the Sunni estabUshment of West Beirut had Sidon had 
supported through thick and thin, was quiciciy abandoned by them when 
the PLO - Israel war had reached their domain. The only people who 
regretted the departure of Arafat and his PLO from Beirut were the 
leaders of the defunct Lebanese National Movement, a motley of Pan -
Arab, Pan - Syrian nationalists and communist parties and militias.'^ 
There was a spirit of optimism in the air, if not euphoria, 
about an end to the conflict in Lebanon and the conflict across the 
Lebanese Israeli Border. 
The Assassination of Bashir Gemayel 
Bashir Gemayel was killed nine days before his term as 
President began. His hubris was his over self confidence that made him 
set an official schedule of meetings, without taking into account security 
concerns. From Asad's point of \ iew it became vital to eliminate Bashir 
Gemayel from the political scene because he could free Lebanon from 
Syrian military and political domination. All evidence points to Asad and 
his Air Force Intelligence Chief Muhammad al-Khuri, having engineered 
the plot to kill Bashir Gemayel. On September 14, 1982, a bomb 
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exploded in the Phalangist Party office in East Beirut killing Bashir 
Gemayel and twenty - six others.'^ 
The election of Bashir's brother Amin Gemayel as President 
of Lebanon on September 21, 1982 (by a vote of 77 to 3), did not 
constitute a threat to Asad for se\eral reasons. First, Amin Gemayel had 
neither the Charisma not the vision of his brother. Second, unlike Bashir, 
Amin Gemayel had no close ties with Israel. Third, the fact that Bashir 
was killed upon orders from Asad, was perceived as sufficient to deter 
Amin Gemaye from following in his brother's footsteps. Thus the demise 
of Bashir Gemayel was a great achievement from Asad's point of view. 
The Sabra - Shatila massacres that followed Bashir Gemayel's demise 
must have delighted Asad as the\ implicated the Christian Lebanese 
Forces headed by Elie Hubayqa and smeared the image of the Phalangist 
party and the Gemayels. In addition it embarrassed their Israeli ally who 
was is control of west Beirut then. It would also eventually lead to the 
resignation of Ariel Sharon, as the Minister of Defense, who was the 
main architect of the Israeli invasion of June 1982. 
Asad's task thus became easier to achieve after the death of 
Basir Gemayel. The Asad regime never publicly acknowledged its 
responsibility for the act. In explaining the reasons for the killing of 
Bashir Gemayel, the official S>Tian media fed into the conspiratorial 
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mode of thinking that was and still is prevalent in the West Asia. Syrian 
officials blamed Israel for the death of Bashir Gemayel supposedly 
because he had asked of the withdrawal of Israeli troops and because he 
did not want to sign a peace treaty with Israel.'^ 
Sabra and Shatila Massacre 
On Wednesday 15 September, the day after the assassination 
of President elect Bashir Gemayel, the Israeli army occupied West Beirut, 
"encircling and sealing" the camps of Sabra and Shatila, which were 
inhabited by Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, the entirety of armed 
resistors (more than 14000 people) having evacuated Beirut and its 
suburbs^° (see Map-8). 
On 10 September 1982, the Multinational Forces left Beirut. 
The next day, Mr. Ariel Sharon announced that "2000 extremists" had 
remained inside the Palestinian refiigee camps around Beirut. 
According to statements made by Ariel Sharon on 22 
September 1982 in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), the decision that the 
Phalangists should enter the refugee camps was made on Wednesday, 15 
September 1982.'^ ' Also according to general Sharon, the Israeli 
command had received the following instruction: the Tsahal (Israeli 
Defense Forces)^^ forces are forbidden to enter the refugee camps. The 
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"mopping-up" of the camps will be carried out by the Phalangists or the 
Lebanese army.^ ^ 
On 15 September 1982, Israeli fighter-bombers were flying 
low over west Beirut and Israeli troops had secured their entry. General 
Sharon was present to personally direct the Israeli penetration, installing 
himself in the general army area at the Kuwait embassy junction situated 
at the edge of Shatila camp. From the roof of this six-storey building, it 
was possible to observe the town and the camps of Sabra and Shatila 
clearly. 
By midday, the camps of Sabra and Shatila - in reality a 
single zone of refugee camps in the south of West Beirut - were 
surrounded by Israeli tanks and soldier, who had installed checkpoints all 
around the camps in order to monitor the entry or exit of any person. 
During the late afternoon and evening, the camps were shelled. 
By Thursday 16 September 1982, the Israeli army controlled 
West Beirut. In a press release, the Israeli military spokesperson declared, 
"Tsahal controls all strategic points in Beirut. The refugee camps, inside 
which there is a concentration of extremists, are surrounded and sealed. 
On the morning of 16 September, the following order was issued by the 
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army high command: "The searching and mopping up of the camps will 
24 be done by the Phalangists/Lebanese Army. 
During the course of the morning, shells were being fired 
down at the camps from higher elevation and Israeli snipers were 
shooting at people in the streets. By approximately midday, the Isaeli 
military command gave the phalangist militia the green light to enter the 
refugee camps. Shortly, in the evening, a unit of approximately 150 
phalangists entered Shatila camp from the south and south-west. 
The phalangist militia raped, killed, and injured a large 
number of unarmed civilians mostly children women and elderly people 
inside the "encircled and sealed" camps. These actions, accompanied for 
following by systematic roundups, backed or reinforced by the Israeli 
army, resulted in dozens of disappearances. 
The Israeli army had full knowledge of what was going on in 
the camps right up until the morning of Saturday 18 September 1982, and 
its leaders were in continuous contact with the militia leaders who 
perpetrated the massacre. Yet they never intervened. Instead, they 
prevented civilians from escaping the camps and arranged for the camps 
to be illuminated throughout the night by flares launched into the sky 
from helicopter and mortars. 
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The count of victims varies between 700 and 3500. The 
exact figure can never be determined because, in addition to the 
approximately 1000 people who were buried in communal grave by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or in the cemeteries of 
Beirut by members of their families, a large number of corpses were 
buried beneath bulldozed buildings by the militia members themselves.^ ^ 
Also, particularly on 17 and 18 September, hundreds of people were 
carried away alive in trucks towards unknown destinations, never to 
return. 
The United Nations Security Council condemned the 
massacre with Resolution 521 (see Appendix-4) (19 September 1982). 
This condemnation was followed by a 16 December 1982 General 
Assembly resolution qualifying the massacre as an "act of genocide". 
This Israeli action breached its agreement with the United States not to 
occupy West Beirut,'^ ^ the US had also given written guarantees that it 
would ensure the protection of the Muslim of West Beirut. Israel's 
occupation also violated its peace agreements with Muslim forces in 
Beirut and with Syria. 
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Israel - Lebanon Peace Treaty and the Syrian Response 
On December 9, 1982, fighting erupted suddenly in Tripoli 
between the Alawi militia of the so - called Arab Democratic party and 
the Sunni militias of Bab al - Tabbanah. This prompted Rashid Karami, 
Tripoli's most preeminent political leader, to appeal to Asad to end the 
conflict. Karami implied that Asad was calling the shorts: a gesture from 
him [Asad] would put an end the everyone who has not been convinced 
yet that such actions constitute a source of danger. From then on fighter 
Latin engulfed the city of Tripoli involving Syrian troops of the ADF two 
Syrian delegations visited Tripoli on December 15 and 30, 1982, 
ostensibly to resolve the conflict. The first delegations headed by the 
Foreign Minister Khaddam and the Defense Minister Tlas, and the second 
headed by Syrian Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Addi who 
gave a sum equivalent to $3 million for victims of the fighting. Karami, 
whether he believed what he said or not, declared on December 30, 1982, 
that the fact that the two Syrian delegations had visited Tripoli within ten 
days, and that the Syrian President himself was involved in the payment 
of compensation for those suffered from the damages inflicted upon them 
by the fighting, was "irrefutable evidence that they [Syrians] were against 
what was taking place in Tripoli. This statement by Karami must have 
pleased Asad because it covered up his deceptive actions. The situation 
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was reminiscent of previous occasions when Asad fomented a conflict, 
and called for numerous cease - fires that would not hold, so that 
eventually the local political leaders as well as the Lebanese government 
sought Asad's mediation to stop the conflict, which he had wittingly 
incited. 
As the American sponsored negotiations between Lebanon 
and Israel began on December 28,1982, the fighting in Tripoli escalated, 
Prime Minister al-Wazzan found it strange that despite all the efforts 
exerted at the highest levels to calm down the situation in Tripoli, cease 
fires did not last for long, and the conditions became worse and the 
fighting more severe. Syria was trying to undermine the Lebanese -
Israeli negotiations, which had just started. The Syrian Tishrin newspaper 
stated on January 3, 1983, that the Lebanese - Israeli negotiations (see 
Appendix-5) "aimed to make Lebanon a hostage to the will of both the 
United State and Israel and to expand the Camp David process via the 
normalization of Israeli - Arab relations". Former Prime Minister Karami 
telephoned, on January 2, 1983, the Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam 
and told him "not all the news you had received were true, the situation in 
the city [Tripoli] was dependent upon the stand taken by Jabal Muhsin 
[where the Alawis reside]... send us someone with the mandate to stop 
the deterioation immediarely." Karami added that the conflict was not 
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and should not be "between Tripoli and Syria and that is whey I am still 
calling upon his excellency President Hafez Asad who is capable of 
ending the sedition." The next day the Lebanese Prime Minister Shaqfiq 
al - Wazzan, contacted the Syrian Prime Minister and al Ra'uf al -Kasm, 
"requesting Syrian help to end the tragic situation in Tripoli". On Janaury 
4, 1983, Rashid Karami visited Damascus and met President Asad who 
confirmed Syria's willingness to give the cit}- of Tripoli all the support it 
needed, to save it from the "conspiracy" that had been hatched against it. 
While Asad was receiving Kaarami in Damascus, a news reporter wrote 
of "the gates of Hell which opened in Tripoli... and the circle of fire and 
shells which besieged its people, victims of hunger, cold weather and 
fear, because of he lack of fuel, bread, water, electricity and telephone, 
without anyone being able to assist them." 
All groups in Tripoli had called for the "evacuation from the 
city and its outskirts of the deterrent forces [Syrian troops] and al armed 
organizations, Lebanese and on - Lebanese, and the handing over of 
security to the legitimate government i.e., the army and the internal 
security forces." This was precisely what Asad meant by conspiracy: 
"any request from Tripoli for the deterrent forces [Syrian troops] to move 
out of Tripoli and the north would be viewed by Syria as a conspiracy 
against it... every time the pressure of the Tripoli request increases 
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groups in Tripoli supportive of Syria [the Alawis of Ba'l Muhsin] 
explode the situation." 
Some leading politicians like former President Camille 
Chamoun openly accused Syria of being behind the ongoing conflict in 
Tripoli.^ ^ The Sunni deputy, Abduh Uwaydat, called for the Lebanese 
government to save Tripoli because the Syrian troops of the ADF had 
become "a force of occupation" and had to be withdrawn back to Syria. 
Syria and the Hizbullah 
Asad also tapped a new source, namely the Iranian 
volunteers who, in agreement with the Iranian Defense Minister, were 
sent to Lebanon, on June 10, 1982, to fight the Israeli occupation. 
Hussain Al -Mussawi left Amal and formed the Islamic Amal in protest 
against the leader of Amal, Nabih Birri, who had joined the Salvation 
committee {Lajnat al - Inqadh) former on June 14, 1982. similarly, the 
representative of Amal in Tehran, Ibrahim Amin Al -Sayyid, also broke 
away from Amal. 
In September 1982, two thousand Iranian volunteers arrived 
by air to Syria and were swiftly moved to northern Biqa' where the 
nucleus of Hizbullah was formed out of the secedes from Amal.^ ^ The 
first public activities of Hizbullah and the Iranian revolutionary Guards 
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was the seizure of the town hall in Ba'albak by an estimated five hundred 
masked supporters of the Iranian Revolution and the storming of the 
Lebanese Army barracks in Ba'albak on the eve of the anniversary of 
Lebanese independence, November 22, 1982. The attackers tore down all 
the Lebanese flags and the portraits of the President of Lebanon. 
Thus the authority of President Gemayel and his government 
was being challenged in the Alay and al -Shif regions in Mount Lebanon 
in the city of Tripoli, and in the Northern Biqa region. The orchestrate of 
these conflicts, the Syrian President Asad, sent a cable on the same day to 
President Gemayel congratulating him on the anniversary of Lebanon's 
independence and wishing "the Lebanese people what they yearn for, in 
security, progress and prosperity." This was typical of Asad's duplicitous 
behavior: sending a cable of felicitations to President Gemayel on 
Lebanese Independence day while concomitantly unleashing his new 
instrument of terrorism. Hizbullah, to attack the Lebanese Army barracks 
in Ba'albak and tear down the Lebanese Flag; the symbol of that 
independence. Asad's message on the ground was loud and clear. 
As the fourth round of talks between Lebanon and Israel 
took place, on January 6, 1983, the Lebanese Prime Minister al -Wazzan 
visited Damascus, on January 8, 1983, and met Asad to discuss ending 
the conflict in Tripoli, and the Lebanese - Israeli negotiations. He was 
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reassured of the Syrian stand especially with respect to withdrawal of 
foreign troops, and he had clearly stated that Lebanon did not put the 
Syrian withdrawal on the same level as that of the Israeli withdrawal. 
The basic flaw of the Lebanese foreign policy toward Syria 
was rooted in the misconception that Asad would withdraw his troops 
from Lebanon when Israel and Lebanon feached an agreement for the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops. The truth was the opposite of that premise: 
first, as long as the Israeli troops were in Lebanon, the balance of power 
on the ground would be favorable to Lebanon, and thus there will be a 
greater chance for Syrian troops to withdraw, while if Israeli troops were 
pulled out, then the balance of power would be favorable to Syria; 
second, President Gemayel and his advisors misinterpreted Asad's 
objective in Lebanon, and did not realize that Asad had no intention of 
removing his troops from Lebanon voluntarily. The deception practiced 
by Asad was continuous. 
President Gemayel tried to inform Asad of the progress of 
the Lebanese -Israeli negotiations, by telephoning him on January 15, 
1983, and sending his envoy Jean Ubayd the following day. However this 
did not make Asad soften his stand and in fact had the opposite effect. 
The Syrian media claimed, on January 20, 1983, that the Lebanese -
Israeli negotiations were not simply an internal Lebanese matter but to a 
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large extent a Syrian concern. If the stations of early warning were to be 
located on Lebanese soil, cautioned the official Syrian Ba'th newspaper, 
then it would lead to a loss of Lebanese sovereignty all over Lebanon and 
would constitute a threat to Syria.'^ ' Syria and the PLO (which still had 
thousands of fighters in northern Lebanon) continued to reassure Lebanon 
that it would evacuate its troops from Lebanon. Prime Minister al -
Wazzan claimed on February 8, 1983, that he had received written 
assurances from both Asad and Arafat to that effect. There is no evidence, 
however, that these written assurances ever existed,"'^  or that Asad and 
Arafat were willing to live up to their promises. The Israelis had a better 
understanding of Asad"s goals at the time, and the head of the Israeli 
delegation negotiating with Lebanon. David Kimche, stated that "the 
Syrians did not intend to evacuate from Lebanon." 
Syrian Efforts to undermine Lebanon-Israel Peace Negotiations 
As the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel proceeded, 
the fighting between Junblat's Druze militia and the Christian Lebanese 
Forces intensified. On January 30 and again on February 4, 1983, Syria 
ally Junblat shelled the coastal Matn area and Christian east Beirut. Thus 
Syria relentlessly kept the pressure on President Gemayel and his 
government to prevent Lebanon from signing an agreement with Israel. 
President Gemayel had weakened his position vis-a-vis both Asad and 
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Arafat, by sending them his envoys and meeting Asad at the Non -
Aligned conference in New Delhi on March 9-10, 1983, to get their 
support. Simultaneously he shunned direct contacts with high -ranking 
Israeli officials whose backing he would have needed to end the 
continued occupation of the northern Biqa' valley and northern Lebanon 
by the Syrian army and the PLO fighters. Ariel Sharon, the Israeli 
Defence Minister at the time, put it bluntly to Pierre Gemayel, the 
Phalangist leader. He "doubted whether his son Amin Gemayel would 
remain President if he continued to receive orders from Syria, the PLO 
and Saudi Arabia. In other words, Amin Gemayel was not listening to, let 
alone coordinating with, the Israelis in order to achieve his goals. 
The negotiations between Lebanon and Israel could have led 
to three outcomes: first, it was possible that no agreement would be 
signed, and that the Israeli troops would stay indefinitely in Lebanon. His 
outcome would have been welcomed by Asad because he could then have 
justified the continued presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon and claim 
publicly that Israel had no intention of ever leaving Lebanon. Second, an 
agreement that Israel supported enthusiastically could have been reached. 
This would have been the worse scenario for Asad because Israel then 
could have forced the Syrian troops and the PLO fighters to evacuate 
Lebanon, and the latter would have become sovereign and independent 
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again. Third, and agreement could have been signed, which Israel would 
have deemed unsatisfactory and non-implementable. This option would 
have been the ideal situation for Asad because he would then have had a 
cause to mobilize his usually subservient politicians and militia leaders 
against the Lebanese government that signed the agreement. More 
significantly, as Israel would not have been satisfied with the agreement it 
would not have exerted any effort to defend it. Thus from Asad's point of 
view, a well orchestrated military campaign against the Lebanese 
government could force it to abrogate the agreement, without necessarily 
antagonizing Israel so that it did not feel compelled to intervene on behalf 
of the Lebanese government. Only a Lebanese -Israeli agreement that 
included full normalization between the two - countries would be worth 
defending from Israel's point of view. 
As the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel were 
moving toward an agreement by early April 1983, Asad increased his 
pressure. Utilizing his new instrument of fundamentalism, Hizbullah, 
Asad ordered the blowing up of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, on April 18, 
1983, which resulted in the death of forty nine people and the injury of 
over a hundred people. The objective of carrying out such a 
fiindamentalist operation was to undermine the U.S. sponsored 
negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, and putting an end to the role 
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of Multi - National Force (MNF), which included a large contingent of 
U.S. marines. The United States also began to train the Lebanese Army in 
December 1982, the latter could have become a force that Syria would 
have had to contend with. The U.S. officer in charge of training the 
Lebanese Army claimed, in June 1983, that within six or seven months of 
training, the Lebanese Army would be capable of controlling all of 
Lebanon.^ '* 
Asad had to act swiftly to undermine the role of the United 
States in bolstering the Lebanese state. Typical of Asad's style of 
deception and lies, the Syrian government - controlled press accused the 
implausible other, namely Israel, of being behind the fundamentalist 
operation against the U.S. Embassy on April 18. In a revealing example 
of pure psychological projection, the Syrian newspapers preposterously 
claimed that Israel executed he operation frits, to push the American 
public to pressure the U.S. administration to pull out its contingent from 
the MNF. Second, to hamper the ongoing negotiations between Lebanon 
and Israel. These were precisely Asad's motives in ordering this extremist 
operation. The Syrian newspaper Tishrin, claimed that only the Mossad 
had the capacity to undertake such an operation.^ ^ 
During this time when the US targets were chosen inside 
Lebanon a large number of casualties were reported. The tragedies 
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favored none though there were temporary beneficiaries from all the 
parties while Lebanon remained in turmoil. 
As the negotiations were coming to a fruitful end, the 
Syrians escalated the violence against regions controlled by the Lebanese 
government. The violence during May 5-8, 1983, included fighting in the 
Shouf and Alay regions and the shelling of the northern and upper Matn 
as well s the Greater Beirut area. President Gemayel asked the 
commander of the Lebanese Army, Ibrahim Tannus, to get in touch with 
the Syrian Chief of Staff, Hikmat al-Shihabi, to stop the shelling, which 
was originating from Syrian - controlled areas.^ ^ But Asad's extremists 
and military campaign in Lebanon continued unabated.^ ^ 
When the full text of the Lebanese - Israeli Agreement was 
given to Asad during a visit to Damascus by Foreign Minister Salem, on 
May 12, Asad called it "a peace treaty harmful to Lebanon, to Syria, and 
to the Arab world."^^ After that visit Foreign Minister Salem returned to 
Lebanon in a military helicopter, and gave a statement about his 
discussions in Damascus to the waiting journalists, ending it on ominous 
prophetic note "god help Lebanon.""'^  
There was an obvious difference between what Amin 
Gemayel and his foreign minister were saying about Syria, namely that 
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they were willing to keep the dialogue going with Syrian officials, and 
what Asad's goal was. namely to dominate Lebanon through military 
means/° On the other hand, President Gemayel and his government were 
unable to get the support of Israelis, let alone have televised meetings 
with them, which made the Israelis "furious."'*' It was ironic that Amin 
Gemayel and his government were talking, at the highest level, with 
Syria, which was bent on wrecking the Lebanese -Israeli Agreement and 
on dominating Lebanon again, while simultaneously shunning Israeli 
high officials who were instrumental in liberating Lebanon from the PLO 
forces and the Syrian Army in the southern half of the country including 
Beirut. There were other misconceptions held by Lebanese officials who 
believed that Syria would evacuate its troops from Lebanon after Israel 
pulled out its troops. Former President Chamoun, who was not in power 
then, understood Asad's modus operandi, and stated, on May 9, 1983, 
that he expected "the Syrians would reject any Lebanese -Israeli 
Agreement shown to them because they need a pretext to reftise to pull 
out their troops from Lebanon.''^  
The rejection of the Lebanese -Israeli Agreement by Arafat 
in a meeting of the PLCs executive committee, held in Damascus on 
May 8-9, 1983, did not save Arafat's PLO from becoming Asad's next 
target. The Syrian leaders unleashed the dissident PLO factions against 
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Arafat, who was declared a persona non grata in Syria and had to leave 
Damascus on June 24, 1983.''^  These two campaigns were a clear message 
to Israel that Asad was wiling to push Arafat's PLO out from the rest of 
Lebanon, if the Israelis could in turn forget about the Lebanese - Israeli 
Agreement 
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, regarded Syria as the 
main obstacle to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon. 
However, after the attack on the PLO, he expressed, on June 29, 1983, a 
favorable opinion about the Syrian attempt to control the PLO saying it 
may facilitate the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. Thus 
Shultz also misconstrued the goal of the Syrian offensive against the 
PLO. When he met Asad on July 6, 1983, in Damascus and asked his 
support for the Lebanese -Israeli Agreement, he was unable to change 
Asad's position as the latter rejected it in too. 
Asad pursued his objective of dominating Lebanon, by 
appealing to the anti -Israel sentiment that pervaded the Arab world, and 
portraying President Gemayel and his government as "agents" of Israel, 
and also that the Lebanese government "represented the Government of 
Menachem Begin."'*'' When the Lebanese Parliament approved the 
Lebanese -Israeli Agreement on June 14, 1983, by sixty - five votes, 
against two votes, and four abstentions, the Syria mass media raised 
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questions about the legitimacy of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.'^ ^ 
The Syrian media continued its smear campaign against the Lebanese 
government by depicting its decision as devoid of Legitimacy/^ Syria 
rallied its allies, Walid Junblat and Nahib Birri, who visited Damascus on 
July 4, 1983, and after intensive meetings with Syrian officials rejected 
the Lebanese -Israeli Agreement, and confirmed the complete support of 
the Lebanese people against the Israeli occupation. The also rejected the 
deployment of the Lebanese Army in the mountain regions of the Shauf 
and Alay after an expected Israeli withdrawal. 
Shelling reached a crescendo during President Gemayel's 
visit to the United States in July, 1983 leaving tens of dead and wounded, 
mostly civilians. Syria accused the implausible other, in this case the 
Lebanese government for the eruption in fighting. It claimed that the 
government was attempting "to cover up the project for the partition of 
Lebanon". 
To undermine Gemayel's visit to the United Sates, Syria 
released the acting President of the American University of Beirut, David 
Dodge, on July 21,1983, the only American hostage then, who had been 
kidnapped, on July 19, 1982, by HizbuUah. President Reagan had to 
thank Asad for his humanitarian efforts. This embarrassed President 
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Gemayel who had been trying to get the full support of the United States 
for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. 
It was also during Gemayel's official visit to the United 
States that the Syrian - sponsored National Salvation Front was officially 
proclaimed by Walid Junblat, on July 23, 1983, in the Syrian -occupied 
town of Ba'alba Junblat did not mince his words when he stated that the 
National Salvation Front's aim was to confront President Gemayel and 
his government. He spoke of the Syrian -controlled northern and eastern 
regions of Lebanon as liberated area." The Syrian Foreign Minister 
Khaddam fully endorsed the National Salvation Front and affirmed that 
Syria would "give support to any Lebanese who was working to save 
Lebanon from the Israeli occupation and the Phalangist factional 
hegemony."''^  
Asad tried to draw the peacekeeping Multi-National Force's 
Mission (MNF) into the conflict, Pro-Syrian militias attacked the U.S. 
Marines on August 28 and fought with them for ninet>' minutes. Heavy 
fighting and shelling took place on August 29 and led to the first 
American casualties, two marines killed and fourteen wounded.^ *^  Asad's 
tactic was simple to attack the MNF, particularly the US and French 
forces, and when they responded, accused them of taking sides against 
the Druze and Shi'i militias that had attacked them in the first place. 
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The Syrian media accused the Lebanese Army, the 
Phalangist Party and the U.S. marines of sheUing West Beirut. They 
called for the imposition of "deterrent Arab penalties against the partisan 
Lebanese authorities."^' These Syrian media attacks were voiced on the 
eve of sending an official letter from the Lebanese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Elie Salem, based on a decision by the Lebanese cabinet, to 
secretar}' general of the League of Arab States, demanding the 
withdrawal of both Syrian and FLO troops from Lebanon. President 
Gemayei had also sent an official letter to President Asad asking him to 
withdraw his troops. 
The Geneva-Lausanne Conference, 
In 1983, the signing of the Lebanese - Israeli May I?"' 
Agreement left the Lebanese government in a predicament. The 
agreement had the support the United States, but was rejected by majority 
of Lebanese and strongly opposed by several Arab countries, especially 
Syria. To deal with the impasse, President Gemayei accepted a Saudi-
Syrian initiative and formed a Committee for National Reconciliation 
composed of himself and nine other prominent political figures. 
Politically, the participants were divided into four blocs: the Front for 
National Salvation (Rashid Karamesh, Suleiman Frangieh, and Walid 
Jumblatt), the Lebanese Front (Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayei), 
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The Amal Movement (Nabih Birri), and independents (Saeb Salam, Adel 
Osseiran, and Raymond Edde). With the exception of Nabih Birri (Leader 
of the Amal militia) and Walid Jumblatt (who had succeeded his father as 
leader of the Progressive Socialist Party), the appointed members were 
longstanding veterans of the Lebanese establishment. Representatives 
from Syria and Saudi Arabia were also invited to attend. The participants 
were to discuss issues concerning Lebanon's identity, Israel's occupation, 
comprehensive reform measures and the role of the military.^' 
From the outset, the Geneva meeting was stalemated. The 
Muslim participants and Frangieh, with encouragement from the Syrian 
representative, insisted on the abrogation of the May 1 ?"' Agreement and 
on forcing Israel's withdrawal before attending to Lebanon's domestic 
conflict issues. The Israeli - Lebanese agreement was portrayed as 
impairing Syrian security interests and unacceptable on political grounds. 
Moreover, it appeared doubtful that any parallel Agreement would 
reassure Syrians that they would be better off by leaving than staying. 
The accord came to symbolize for Syria and the Lebanese opposition the 
political advantages gained by the Phalangists as a result of the Israeli 
invasion. At the Geneva national reconciliation talks, Syrian backed 
opposition leaders called for renegotiation of the agreement. Given 
domestic pressures in Israel to speed a pullout of the Israel Defence Force 
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(IDF) from Lebanon, the government appeared ready to negotiate the 
timing of withdrawal. But Syria was adamant that the accord should be 
formally abrogated and new security arrangements be negotiated to 
assure the protection of Lebanon's identity and sovereignty. The National 
Assembly of Lebanon, under pressure from Syria and Muslim niililias, 
cancelled the May 17* Agreement on 5 March 1984. 
During the Lausanne meeting convened following the 
abrogation of the May 17 Agreement in March 1984, two visions of 
Lebanon were discussed. Members of the Lebanese Front proposed the 
establishment of a federal system composed of confessionally 
homogeneous units. Muslim participants submitted a joint settlement plan 
that proposed elimination of political sectarianism, administrative 
decentralization, limiting the powers of the President and expanding the 
powers of the Council of Ministers. Clearly, the leadership of the 
Lebanese Front was demanding political decentralization (a federal 
system) to counter the demands of the Muslim leadership for the 
elimination of political sectarianism. (Abolishment political sectarianism 
would undermine the Maronite leaders' privileged status in the political 
system and relegate them to a minority position). Similarly, Muslim 
participants were demanding the complete elimination of the sectarian 
system to counter the Maronite establishment's resistance to any reform. 
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During the deliberations, it became evident that agreement was possible 
on a broad number of necessary reforms. Unfortunately, differences over 
the relative powers of the President, on the one hand, and the Council of 
Ministers and Prime Minister, on the other, prevented participants from 
approving an accord that could have settled the civil war. On this issue, 
participants divided along religious lines.^'' 
The Geneva-Lausanne Conference was the only forum that 
Lebanon's leading political figures attended in person, and in which they 
had an opportunity to fully articulate their positions in uninterrupted 
negotiations. This occasion was also the closes that Lebanese leaders ever 
came to reaching an agreement. Although the conference disbanded 
without adopting a mutually acceptable agreement-testimony to the 
continued strength of sectarian rivalries and suspicions-the common 
ground between the various factions has expanded. 
The Damascus Tripartite Agreement, 28 December 1985 
The deadlock reached at Lausanne signaled an end to hopes 
for national dialogue and reconciliation at the hands of the traditional 
elite. Lebanon's most prominent oligarchs proves unable, or unwilling, to 
make the concessions required resolving internal differences. In the 
aftermath of the Lausanne conference, fighting erupted on many fronts 
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and among various factions, including former allies. Syria attempted a 
new approach to peacemaking. The leaders of the three major militias, 
Elie Hobeiga (Lebanese Forces), Nabih Birri (Amal), and Walid Jumblatt 
(PSP), met in Damascus to negotiate a settlement plant. 
The resulting Tripartite Agreement departed radically from 
former peace plans in several areas, especially in its call for the abolition 
of the sectarian system and for the definition of a special relationship with 
Syria.^^ Following a transitional period, the sectarian system of 
representation in the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of 
government would be totally abolished. Even the three highest offices-
President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Pari lament-would no 
longer be apportioned on a sectarian basis. A Senate would be created, 
and each mohafazah would become an electoral district. With respect to 
Syria, the agreement considered the establishment of distinctive relations 
with Syria to be the test of Lebanon's "Arabism" and called for strategic 
complementarily between the two countries. 
The Tripartite Agreement, however, was short-lived. Two 
weeks after its signing, Samir Ja' Ja' led a rebellion that removed Elie 
Hobeiqa from the leadership of the Lebanese Forces, and annualled the 
accord. Nevertheless, the plan's two new elements (phased abolition of 
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sectarianism and special relations with Syria) became key issues that any 
future settlement would have to address. 
On 22 October 1989, the Lebanese Parliament adopted the 
Document of National Understanding, better known as the Ta'if Accord. 
Gradually, institution of the state revived and a measure of stability and 
peace reappeared. 
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CHAPTER-V 
Ta'if Accord and Its Aftermath 
The Ta'if Accord, also known as the Charter of National 
Reconciliation, signed on October 22, 1989, in the city of Ta'if in Saudi 
Arabia occupies an important place in the history of modem Lebanon 
(see Appendix-6). It took fifteen years of incessant fighting and 
destruction of the country before a settlement agreement was 
implemented. 
It symbolizes the end of the tumultuous civil war (1975 -
1989) that turned Lebanon into a daily violent new item. It also 
symbolizes Syria's success to impose the Syrian order upon Lebanon and 
turn it for all means and purposes into a protectorate following a long 
struggle with the various Lebanese rival factions. 
Before the Ta'if Accord, every peace making effort 
collapsed due to various factors including the combinations of 
international, regional and the internal one. External powers had used 
Lebanese groups to promote their own interests. At the same time, 
Lebanese factions had exploited Arab government infighting to forge 
252 
external alliances to support their political and military programme. It 
demonstrates that Lebanese war was a series of proxy wars.^ 
In the earlier peace attempts, domestically, traditional 
mechanisms for dealing with the conflict were unable to contain the inter 
locking conflict issues during the 1967 - 1975 period. When the war 
started, these issues became even more irresolvable because Lebanon's 
traditional clilc hcciinic nuirgiiuili/cd iiiui (he luimhci- Draiincci domcslic 
actors (and their regional sponsors) began to burgeon."^ 
In the aftermath of the eruption of violence in 1975, 
Lebanese leaders were faced with these alternative courses of action 
relating to internal political reform: preservation of the status quo, 
abolition of the sectarian system, or adoption of reform measures that 
would allow for some re-adjustment of power - sharing arrangements. 
First alternative was totally impractical as it would not help to solve the 
problem in the light of the fiindamental socio - economic and 
demographic realities. Implementation of the second alternative in a crisis 
atmosphere proved to be unrealistic. The third alternative which called 
for a negotiated compromise eluded the feuding parties until the Ta'if 
accord. 
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The 1989 Ta'if Agreement symbolized a juncture in the 
Republic of Lebanon's political existence. When compared to previous 
attempts at ending the civil conflict, the Ta'if Agreement not only 
encompassed al facets of the economic and political set up of the country 
but was also blessed with favourable intcrnalionai and regional 
circumstances. The Arab League Committee of six was activated in 
January 1989. At the Casablanca Summit meeting of the Arab League on 
25-26 May, a Tripartite High Commission consisting of President Chadli 
Bendjedid of Algeria, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and King Hussain II of 
Morocco was created to chart out a plan to resolve the Lebanese problem. 
Specifically, the mandate of the triumvirate, with the help of the Arab 
League's indefatigable assistant secretary - general, former. Algerian 
foreign affairs minister Lakhdas Ibrahimi, was to facilitate the election of 
a new Lebanese president and promote the adoption of presidential 
reforms.'' 
The Ta'if accord was not radically different from previous 
attempts to reform the Lebanese political system. The most serious 
attempts to settle the conflict were the National Dialogue Committee 
(1975), the Constitutional Document (1976), the Arab Summit 
Conferences at Riyadh and Cairo (1976), the Geneva - Lausanne 
Conference (1983, 1984) and the Damascus Tripartite Agreement (1985). 
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Many of the features of the accord were anticipated by the Constitutional 
Document accepted by the President Franjiyah in 1976 and the Tripartite 
Agreement of 1985, both of which were mediated by Syria. In this way 
the Ta'if Accord is rooted in a well established "tradition" that renders 
Lebanon more of a contractual consociative counting than one based on a 
Constitution.^ 
In fact, as Kamal Salibi has stated, "there are no major 
differences in essence between the National Pact of 1943 and Ta'if 
Moreover, "the philosophy behind the Ta'if Agreement and the way it 
was achieved was Lebanese. It was a Lebanese formula similar to the 
formula that was bom in 1943."^ However, the accord is seen as a process 
and not a definite settlement. Another characteristic of the accord is that 
the signatories were not belligerents in the war unlike other peace 
attempts. 
The United Nations (UN) Security Council had expressed 
support for the accord on 31 October 1989 while the Legislature, the 
Chamber of Deputies approved constitutional reforms based on the Ta'if 
Agreement on 21 August 1990. 
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Constitutional Reforms 
The Ta'if accord contains a number of important principles 
on which the Lebanese state is built. 
Domestically, there are many important points to be noted 
that in a statement of general philosophy, the accord reendorses that 
Lebanon is a country where various communities co-exist. It again sets 
forth the basic principles like independence, unity, sovereignty, a liberal, 
parliamentary democracy, Arabness and the dcfinilc nature of a 
"Lebanese homeland for all her sons". There is a structural regulation in 
the document which reads as follows: "There shall be no constitutional 
legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the pact of communal co-
existence".^ 
Regarding to institutions, the controversial aspect of the 
accord was the elevation President of the Chamber of Deputies, thereby 
an office, the President, traditionally reserved for a Maronite. The terms 
of the Speaker which is customarily reserved for a Shiite Muslims, and 
the nomination of the Prime Minister would be consulted by the Speaker 
as well. 
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Seats in the parliament were equally distributed between 
Christian and Muslims. Thus in the 108 seat parliament a 54 - 54 seat 
balance was maintained between Christian and Muslims. The pre-
eminence of the presidential post which is the symbol of the political 
predominance of the Maronites became a thing of the past.^  Shiite 
Muslims which is the third largest community compromised in foavour of 
Sunni Muslims where they equalled in the number of seats in parliament. 
Likewise the Alawi community gained two scats in parliamcnl. I'hc 
confessional distribution of Lebanese parliament is given in tabic 2. 
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Table -2: Confessional Division of the Lebanese 
Confession 
Christians 
Orthodox 
Catholic 
Muslim 
Maronite 
Orthodox 
Catholic 
Armenian 
Armenian 
Protestant 
Other*** 
Subtotal 
Sunni's 
Shia 
Druze 
Alawi 
Subtotal 
Total 
1972* 
Parliament 
30 
11 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
54 
20 
19 
6 
0 
45 
99 
; parliament 
1989 Ta'if 
accord 
30 
11 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
54 
22 
22 
8 
2 
54 
108 
1990 
Vacancies 
12** 
4 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
17 
5 
3 
5 
0 
13 
30 
Source: See Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon after Ta'if, Is the Civil War Over", 
Middle East Journal, vol., 45, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 463. 
* Although the last general election was held in 1972, the last parliamentary 
election was actually in 1974 when Rafiq Shahin won a by- election in 
Nabatiyya. 
** Maronite deputy Fuad Tihini of the Shuf died after implementation of the 
accord in September 1990 and he is not included in the total vacancies shown. 
• * * This seat was held by Farid Jibran, a Roman Catholic affiliated with the 
(Druze) Progressive Socialist Party. 
The question of sectarianism has always dominated the 
Lebanese political scene.^ The Ta'if accord went a bit further by 
suggesting certain steps for its gradual termination. For example the 
accord's text terminated certain criteria for recruitment of public servants, 
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except for posts at high levels. Mentioning of religion on identity cards 
also was stopped. 
The Ta'if accord deals with important security and foreign 
policy provisions. The security plan's ultimate aim is for the state to 
"extend its authority over all the territory of Lebanon by means of its own 
forces", although Syrian forces "shall assist the legitimate Lebanese 
forces" in this task.'° 
The Ta'if Accord and the Withdrawal of External Forces 
The accord also talks about Lebanon's relation with Syria. 
Two years after the adoption of constitutional reforms, Syrian forces 
should redeploy to the Biqa Valley. A Lebanese - Syrian agreement 
would determine the size of the remaining Syrian forces staying on 
Lebanese soil. The accord also called for the establishment of "privileged 
relations" vis-a-vis Syria. Lebanon and Syria are expected to maintain 
close relations "in all area"." The Ta'if accord states that the Tripartite 
Arab High Commission would assist the two governments in concluding 
this agreement. It talks about Lebanon's relations with Israel also. The 
Accord demands the implementation of UN Resolution 425 that demands 
the withdrawal of Israeli troops.'^ 
Syrian Influence 
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There were 40,000 Syrian soldiers and assorted secret 
service agents in Lebanon. Although, Syrian troops were not accepted as 
a permanent fixture in the Lebanese landscape, an armed Syrian presence 
was seen as a necessary condition for proceeding with the implementation 
of certain of the Ta'if accord's provisions, especially disbandment of the 
militias.''* 
Moreover, Lebanese political leadership always followed the 
shadow of Syria and never took any action without consulting Syrian 
President Hafiz al- Assad.'^ 
Early Achievements of Ta'if Accord 
Despite skepticism both in Lebanon and outside regarding 
the government's ability to tackle the challenging task of implementing 
the provisions of Ta'if Accord, there were remarkable achievements. 
The important achievements were: 
Elimination of General Awn's opposition, in October 1990; 
unification of the Lebanese army in October/November 1990, 
establishment of a security zone in Greater Beirut; free of all militias 
(December 1990), formation of a new Cabinet of reconciliation under 
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Omar Karami in December 1990, cessation of hostilities between the 
Amal and the Hizbullah and the replacement of fighters by army units in 
South Lebanon in February 1991, disbandment of all militias except PLO 
and Hizbullah (May 1991), formalization of the distinctive relationship 
between Lebanon and Syria through the signing of the "Treaty of 
Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination' in May 1991, and the 
replacement of PLO fighter s by the Lebanese Army in South Lebanon in 
July 1991. 
The Ta'if accord received wide international support, 
including the USA, the erstwhile Soviet Union, Britain and France. But 
General Michel Awn, the Christian leader and appointed interim Prime 
Minister in 1988, had set up a rebel government in east Beirut and 
declared 'War of Liberation'.'^ He refused to accept the Ta'if accord by 
1 "7 
denouncing it as a betrayal of Lebanese sovereignty. He accused that it 
did not contain a definite time table for a complete Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanese territory. '* 
General Awn received the support of some Christian 
factions. He attempted to impose political control over the Christian 
militias by ordering his forces to close all the barracks of the Lebanese 
Forces (LF) in east beirut.'^ 
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In October 1990, the government with Syrian support took 
military action to remove him by force. General Awn was defeated and 
had to take refuge in the French Embassy in Beirut. But the government 
did not allow him to leave for France, as he was charged with 
embezzlement of public funds and crimes against the state.^° Finally in 
August 1991 the government allowed him to leve for France. 
Lebanon - Syria Treaty of May 1991 
The signing of the Treaty of Fraternity, Cooperation and 
Coordination between Syria and Lebanon was a significant 
development,'^' The treaty declared that Syria and Lebanon had 
'distinctive brotherly relations', based on their 'geographic propinquity, 
similar history, common belonging, shared destiny and common 
interests'.^^ 
The Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Phalangist Party opposed 
the treaty, while internationally, Israel criticized the excessive Syrian 
influence over Lebanon.^ ^ 
In the backdrop of the particular political situation after Gulf 
War (Syrian participation in the anti-Iraq coalition), Syria was given 
more or less free hand in Lebanon.^'' The new treaty legitimized Syria's 
defacto control over Lebanon by formalizing the deployment of Syrian 
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troops in designated locations in Lebanon. It has been the first time for 
Syria to recognize Lebanon as an independent political entity, and the 
prospect opened up for peace and political stability. 
Ta'if and the Parliament 
The last general elections prior to Ta'if accord was held in 
1972, Though frail and diminished in numbers by natural and unnatural 
deaths, Parliament played its constitutional role by electing Rene 
Muawwad President in 1989 and following his assassination, seventeen 
days later, elected Elias Hrawi to the office.^ ^ 
As part of the Ta'if accord, number of deputies were 
increased form 99 to 108 and equally split between Muslims and 
Christians.^^ There were forty vacant seats in the Parliament due to death 
or resignation. The Ta'if accord included a provision for an exceptional 
procedure to fill the vacant parliamentary seats, namely, the appointment 
ofdeputies".^^ 
Interestingly, appointment of deputies to an elected body 
seemed to be anomalous, but no one questioned the need to reactivate 
parliament. Some feared that 'appointive deputies' may represent vested 
interests. 
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Proposals for holding by polls were put forward as an 
alternative to the 'appointment of deputies', arguing that, if conducted 
with integrity, would lead Ta'if process to genuine national 
rapprochement. Due to Syrian disinterest, holding of by elections was 
shelved, as they feared that it would undermine their influence in 
Lebanon.'^ ^ On 9 May 1991, forty deputies were appointed in the midst of 
an increased domestic resentment and criticism against the appointments. 
TaMf and the Electoral Process 
Surprisingly, Syria started initiating the discussion for 
elections by early 1992. An explanation to this was that Syria wanted to 
ensure a complaint legislative body prior to the Syrian redeployment as 
mandated by the Ta'if Accord.^ *^  
Ta'if Accord provided for a new electoral law on the basis of 
the six provinces: the North, Beirut, the Biqa, Mount Lebanon, the South 
and Nabatieh. Treating the six provinces as electoral constituencies was 
intended to ensure: 
(a) Co-existence among the Lebanese communities 
(b) Political representation for all classes and age groups in the 
population 
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(c) And the effectiveness of that representation.'" 
The electoral law also increased seats in the Parliament from 
108 to 128, the twenty additional seats being shared equally between the 
leading Christian and Muslim seats.^ ^ The allocation of the 128 seats is 
shown in the table 3. 
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Table 3: Distribution of seats in parliament Total seats 128:64 Christians, 
64 Muslims 
Christian Muslims 
Sects Seats Sects Seats 
Maronite 34 Sunni 27 
Greek 14 Shii 27 
Orthodox 
Greek Catholic 6 Druze 
Armenian Alawi 
Other 
Christians 
Total 64 Total 64 
Total seats = 128 
Source: Data drawn from Augustus Richard Morton and Jillian 
Schwedler, "Swiss soldiers, Ta'if Clocks and Early Elections", 
in Deirdre Collings, Peace for Lebanon (London, 1994), p. 52. 
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The Parliamentary Elections 1992 
Christians factions opposed holding of the elections before 
Syrian redeployment, as they would influence the outcome. However, 
Lebanese government, pliant to Syrian interests, neither postponed the 
elections nor requested an international monitoring. Government went 
ahead with the preparations for elections, by August 1992. 
Lebanon uses a list system for elections whereby the elector 
casts his or her ballot for multiple candidates. For example, in the 
constituency of Aley, five seats are at stake: two for Maronites, one for 
Greek Orthodox, and two for Druze. The elector, therefore, casts a total 
of five votes, allocated respectively, among the Druze, Maronite, and 
Orthodox candidates. To ensure victory, candidates try to assemble (or 
join) a slate that will appeal across confessional lines. While voters are 
not obliged to cast their votes for an entire slate, they often do. 
The 1992 elections illustrated the extent of Syrian presence 
as well as that intensified the anti-Syrian sentiments, especially Christian 
Maronite. They called for the boycott of the Syrian - steered election 
process. But government was of the view that elections should be held 
before the Syrian forces' pullout as the Lebanese army had not got a firm 
grip over the whole of the country. '^' 
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In the event, the boycott was a remarkable technical success, 
although the wisdom of the boycott was questioned privately, by some 
Lebanese Christians, who note that the boycott provided a Parliamentary 
membership skewed in Syria's favour and with previous little scope for 
the active protections of civil rights.^^ 
Pro-Syrian candidates gained considerably, owing to the 
excessive Syrian influence coupled with the Christian boycott. The 
turnout was very high in Muslim areas while it was low in Christian 
area.'^ ^ The religious affiliations of the deputies elected to the parliament 
are given in table 4. 
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Table -4: Religious groups in the Parliament (General Election, 23 
August, 30 August, 6 September and 11 October 1992. 
Maronite Catholics 3 
Sunni Muslim 27 
Shi'a Muslims 27 
Greek Orthodox 14 
Druze 8 
Greek-Melkite Catholics 6 
Armenian Orthodox 5 
Alawites 2 
Armenian Catholics 1 
Protestant 1 
Others 3 
Total 128 
Source: The Middle East and North Africa, London: Europe Publications, 
42"^ * edition, 1996, p. 669. 
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Raflk Hariri Takes Over 
With election of the new Parliament, first ever since 1972, 
on 22 October, 1992, Rafik Hariri, a Sidon born multibillionaire 
businessman, was invited to form the government by President Ilrawi. 
Amal movement leader Nabih Berri was the elected speaker, traditionally 
reserved for a Shiite.^ '^  
Since the Ta'if Accord, the most challenging task faced by 
the government was the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-torn 
Lebanon. The economy was completely devastated. As the attempts by 
the previous governments at the economic reconstruction were more or 
less ineffective, it was Rafik Hariri's task to formulate a new plan of 
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reinvigoration of the economy. 
Harri's appointment was greeted by a surge of confidence in 
the Lebanese pound, unprecedented since the currency started its free fall 
in the mid-1980s.''^ His top priority was to tackle the budget. 
Politically, Prime Minister Hariri found himself in a volatile 
and fluid conflictual situation. The flare up of violence between 
Hizbullah forces and Israel in the South indicated that the new 
government had to settle the difficult problem of reconciling its aim of 
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disarming all militias with the desire to regain sovereignty over the whole 
of the country 40 
However, Harir achieved a popularity unmatched by any 
Lebanese politician for many years on the basis of his reputation for 
honesty and effective management, the fact that he had no connection to 
Lebanon's traditional political class, and in the expectation that he can 
deliver some kind of miracle cure to Lebanon's ills.'*' 
The question of the re-election of president was another 
contentious issue when President Elias Hrawi was retiring in November 
1995. The election invoked controversy because of the presence of two 
interests: one was the extension of Hrawi's term and, second was Army 
Commander, Emile Lahoud's intention to contest. But according to the 
constitution, Clause two, Article 49 of the constitution, the President 
should serve a single six years term, which prevents a reelection or 
extension; Clause three. Article 49 bars public sevants of the top rank 
such as the commander of the army or Governor of the Central Bank 
from standing for election unless they resign two years in advance.'*^ 
However, these speculations were put to an end by the 
Syrian President's positive not to grant an extension for Hrari. Thus, 
through an amendment Hrawi's term was extended for three years. 
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The Ta'if Accord cannot ensure a long - term peace because 
the poHtical stability and the rebuilding of its economic base depend on 
the actors, and more so on their actions than a documents or constitution. 
However, the accord's provisions lays stress on external and domestic 
prerequisites to durable peace.''^ Externally, Lebanon's stability is 
inextricably linked to the degree of legitimacy and sovereignty respected 
by external actors. Domestically, socio-political stability is conditioned 
by a measure of legitimacy the state derives from its people, i.e. the 
reestablishment of state authority subsuming the sectoral or communal 
loyalties. 
Lebanon's domestic instability produced a patron client 
relationship between the external and internal actors. This instability was 
caused by rapid changes in the socio-economic and demographic spheres 
combined with rising political discontent and the ideological polarization 
of the masses. As the Lebanese State was not strong enough to exert 
influence over its populace, the whole domestic stability was dependent 
on the solidarity of the power elites and the control they had on their 
respective constituencies. 
The termination of conflict in the wake of the 1989, Accord 
did not mean that all domestic differences were reconciled or the root of 
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the problem was resolved. Undoubtedly, the accord created an 
environment conducive for restoring normally and peace in Lebanon. 
With regard to Syria's influence, it is considered as a mixed 
blessing. Although it protects Lebanon from the external penetrations 
there is a significant section in Lebanon which perceives the Syrian 
domination with a "conquered" feeling.'^ '* However, despite the negative 
domestic fallout that Syria's presence provokes, its insulating effect has a 
positive domestic consequence: it allows the Lebanese to focus better on 
their internal problems."*^ 
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CnAfTEH- 6 
CHAPTER -VI 
Conclusion 
In the 1970s, various internal tensions inherent to the Lebanese 
system and multiple regional developments contributed to the breakdown 
of governmental authority and the outbreak of civil strife in 1975. The 
cause of the Lebanese civil war was neither exclusively internal nor 
exclusively external, nor was its settlement. Syria as an external major 
power had intervented in the Lebanese conflict. 
The Syrian role in the Lebanese civil war has to be analysed from 
the point of view of the developments that had been taking place at the 
regional level during the two years following the October war. The 
Egyptian - Israeli disengagement agreement on Sinai in September 1975 
left Syria isolated. After the Sinai accord Egypt withdrew from the 
confrontation against Israeli occupation. The Sinai agreement meant that 
Egypt could not effectively come to Syria's rescue if war broke out again 
with Israel. Thus Syria felt particularly vulnerable to an Israeli military 
attack from across the Golan Heights. However, there was another more 
serious dangers - the danger of an Arab - Israeli war sparked off by an 
Israeli invasion of South Lebanon. 
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Israeli occupation of South Lebanon would increase Syria's 
strategic vulnerability considerably by providing Israel with new front in 
any future war. The Israelis could engage the Syrians on the Golan 
Heights while simultaneously launching an offensive aimed at Damascus 
through the highly exposed Bekka Valley in Lebanon and the Syrian are 
incapable of fighting the Israelis on two fronts. The operation of 
Palestinian guerillas had already provoked a series of Israeli raids into 
Lebanon and the Syrians feared that if the guerilla operations continued. 
Israel would use them as a pretext for occupying South Lebanon. 
Consequently, the Syrian regime pursued a convoluted course 
regarding Lebanon. On the one hand, Syria supported the PLO and other 
Muslim radical elements in Lebanon, which were considered useful as 
troublemakers against Israel and were also perceived as increasing Syrian 
influence over events in Lebanon. On the other hand, it seems that Syria 
would have preferred the political system to remain intact and 
controllable. Thus, Syria sought to end the Civil War in order to preserve 
the status quo, albeit in a modified form. 
Another consideration which shaped Syrian policy towards the 
Lebanese conflict was the Syrian desire for a peaceful settlement of the 
Arab - Israeli dispute on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal from more or 
less all the Arab territories occupied since 1967 and the setting up of an 
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independent Palestinian state on the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza 
Strip. Then, from the Syrian viewpoint, in such a case the need for Syrian 
intervention in Lebanon became all the more necessary. 
And the final consideration that determined Syria's policy towards 
the civil war was the Syrian belief that Lebanon and Syria are really 
integral parts of a greater Syria and that the divisions between the two 
countries was a result of conspiracy hatched by the French to serve their 
own colonial interests. To Assad the Syrian and Lebanese are one people 
and it is difficult to draw a line between Lebanon's security in its 
broadest sense and Syrian security. 
All these considerations which underlay Syria's policy towards the 
Lebanese civil war. The civil war which started with the Ayn al-
Rummana massacre passed through five distinct phases. The first phase 
was characterized by fighting between the Palestinians and the Kataib 
party, which resulted in a cabinet crisis. The cabinet crisis in turn was 
transformed into a conflict among Lebanese themselves. It ended with the 
formation of the six-member 'Salvation Cabinet' of Karami. 
The second phase was characterized by a temporary halt in the 
fighting which lasted until early September 1975 when large-scale 
fighting broke out and resulted in the destruction of the downtown 
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commercial area of Beirut. This phase ended with the formation of a 
twenty-member National Dialogue Committee. The third phase was 
characterized by the continued efforts to reach an agreement on political 
reforms. 
In the fourth phase the conflict took on a Lebanese - Palestinian 
character when the Christian started the siege of the Palestinian camps of 
Tell al-Zatar and Jisr al - Basha. This phase also witnessed an increase in 
the role of Syrians in trying to bring about a ceasefire. Syrian mediation 
efforts led to the declaration of the Constitutional Document. 
The final phase of the civil-war was characterized by a continued 
offensive of the National Movement and Palestinians against the 
Christians who were now on the losing side. In the face of the continued 
National Movement offensive Christian strong - holds every where began 
to shrink and for the first time Syria began to give indications that it no 
longer supported the Muslims and was quite prepared to move against 
them. The final phase came to an end with the Syrian military 
intervention on 9 April 1976 against the National Movement and 
Palestinians. 
During the first two years of the war, the balance offerees favored 
the LNM and their Palestinian allies. They tried to advance their plan but 
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were unable to impose it, especially after the Syrian military intervention 
in 1976. By 1977 the LNM forces were in retreat and their ability to 
influence political events declined, especially after the assassination of 
Kamal Junblatt in 1977. Gradually, the LNM abandoned its program of 
political reform and in 1980 began building bridges with the traditional 
Islamic leadership. The new program that it developed was based on a 
preservation of the traditional confessional system but with a 
redistribution of confessional power to reflect demographic and political 
changes. During the period of 1976 to 1982, the Lebanese state under 
President Elias Sarkis undertook various initiatives to find a negotiated 
settlement to the Lebanese conflict, but none succeeded. Meanwhile, the 
Lebanese Front was gradually strengthening its position and awaiting 
favorable regional developments to impose its own will. 
The Israeli invasion of 1982 dealt a staggering blow to the 
Palestinians and the LNM and dramatically strengthened the Lebanese 
Front, bringing its militant leader, Bashir Gemayel, to the presidency. 
Bashir Gemayel was assassinated within days of his election, and his 
brother, Amin, was hastily elected in his stead. In the wake of the 
invasion American involvement in Lebanon grew, aimed mainly at 
brokering a withdrawal agreement between Lebanon and Israel that, it 
was hoped, would be a precursor to a ftiUer peace treaty between the two 
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countries. However, by 1984, less than two years after the Kata'ib and 
President Amin Gemayel's coming to power, the Israeli "new order" in 
Lebanon had all but collapsed. The Lebanese-Israeli agreement initialed 
on May 17, 1984, ran into strong opposition from Syria, was not ratified 
and was soon abrogated by the Lebanese government; Israel began 
withdrawing from most Lebanese territories except a border strip in south 
Lebanon under the control of Israel's surrogate South Lebanon Army; the 
Lebanese government turned away from Israel and the U.S. and opened a 
dialogue with Syria to find a way out of the impasse. Indeed, by 1985, 
Syria had regained most of the power over Lebanese affairs that it had 
lost to the Israelis and Americans in 1982. 
On another level, internal battles of that period, in the Mountain 
and Shouf area (1983), in Beirut (1984), and in East Sidon (1985) 
increased the sectarian character of the Lebanese conflict. Confessional 
segregation reached its peak and the confessionally-based militias ruled 
the various regions in closed and semi-closed enclaves. In the Christian 
areas the militias spread slogans of a "Christian republic," "Christian 
security," federalism and partition. In the Muslim areas, the emerging 
radical Islamic movements raised the slogans of an Islamic republic. 
In 1983, a meeting in Geneva of representatives from the major 
Lebanese factions for a national dialogue conference achieved little 
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progress. They were able to agree on only one issue, the Arab identity of 
Lebanon. When these representatives met again in Lausanne in 1984, 
they were not able to make any further progress. In December of 1985, 
and with the encouragement and support of the Syrians, representatives of 
the dominant confessional militias, the Christian Lebanese Forces, the 
Shiite Amal Movement, and the predominantly Druze Progressive 
Socialist Party, met in Damascus and reached an agreement, known as the 
Tripartite Agreement, on political reforms and special relations with 
Syria. However, in early 1986, President Amin Gemayel and Samir 
Geagea (intelligence chief of the Lebanese Forces) organized a coup 
against the Lebanese Forces leader Elie Hubayka. Hubayka was ousted 
from his position as the leader of the Lebanese Forces and the Tripartite 
agreement as rendered null and void. 
A state of political paralysis prevailed in Lebanon between 1986 
and the end of President Gemayel's term on September 23, 1988. In fact, 
Prime Minister Rashid Karami and the cabinet boycotted the President 
Karami tendered his resignation as Prime Minster but soon thereafter, on 
June 1, 1987, was assassinated. Yet, the cabinet continued to ftinction 
with Salim al-Hoss as acting Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the Lebanese 
and Syrian governments pursued talks to find an alternative to the 
Tripartite Agreement. The talks became deadlocked after the 
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assassination of Karami, but not before agreement on the broad outlines 
of political reform, relations between Lebanon and Syria, and the position 
vis-a-vis the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. Most of the points 
agreed upon in these talks found their way into the Taif Agreement of 
1989. 
At the end of Gemayel's term, in September 1988, the failure to 
elect a new president led to a political vacuum which threatened to lead to 
partition. Gemayel appointed an interim cabinet headed by Army 
commander Michel Aoun, but this cabinet's authority was only accepted 
in the predominantly Christian areas; in West Beirut and other regions of 
the country, the original cabinet headed by Salim al-Hoss was regarded as 
the legitimate one. Executive authority was thus split between the 
military government of Aoun and the civilian government of Hoss. The 
two governments stood against each other and each claimed exclusive 
legitimacy. The legislative authority also experienced a vacuum because 
the parliament failed to renew the one year term of the speaker or to elect 
a new one. 
The Lebanese conflict had always been linked in significant ways 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The various Lebanese factions had, 
repeatedly, attempted to exploit their associations with one or another of 
the conflicting regional parties to promote their own internal interests. 
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Such associations complicated and prolonged the civil war. Indeed, the 
polarization among the Lebanese and their efforts to defend or promote 
their interests invited and facilitated external intervention. However, if it 
was necessary to settle the internal dispute in order to decrease the role of 
external forces, it was also necessary to have their tacit acceptance or to 
minimize their capabilities to oppose a settlement in order for such a 
settlement to succeed. In 1989 such conditions were available. 
Israel had already lost interest in Lebanon after 1984-85 and was 
preoccupied with the rising Palestinian intifada which had erupted in 
December, 1987, in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza 
strip. As for the Palestinians in Lebanon, the exodus of Palestinians 
troops from Beirut in August of 1982 dramatically weakened their 
influence. Later development between 1983 and 1988, battles between 
Syrian and Palestinian troops in the north, battles between Amal and the 
Palestinians in Beirut, and various intra-Palestinian fights, contributed 
further to the weakening of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The remaining 
Palestinian armed forces were isolated in a few refugee camps of South 
Lebanon. 
In contrast to the Israelis and the Palestinians, Syrian influence in 
Lebanon increased steadily. Syrian influence in Lebanon had always been 
considerable, but the military intervention of 1976 gave it a solid material 
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footing. In the Civil War, Syria initially supported the LNM and their 
Palestinian allies until the Spring of 1976 when it became evident that the 
balance of forces was tipping dramatically in the latter's favor. On June 1, 
1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon, upon an invitation by the President 
and the Lebanese front and supported the Lebanese front in holding back 
LNM and Palestinian armed forces. In October 1976, two Arab summits 
held in Cairo and Riyadh endorsed the Syrian intervention. They 
established an Arab Deterrent Force, the majority of which was 
composed of Syrians. In 1982, Syrian troops were also forced by the 
Israelis to evacuate West Beirut along with the Palestinian troops. 
However, within a few years, Syria was able to regain its influence in 
Lebanon. In 1987, Syrian troops reentered West Beirut as well as various 
regions of the Mountain, the Shouf and the southern suburbs of Beirut. In 
1990, Syrian troops reentered East Beirut and other predominantly 
Christian areas that they had been forced out of in 1978. 
Part of this re-expansion of Syrian power was with Arab and 
Western acquiescence. This acquiescence was partly to avoid inter-Arab 
conflicts and partly to curry Syrian favor in the Persian Gulf and the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. In 1989, Iraq, free from the pressure of the 
war with Iran, intervened in support of General Aoun and the Lebanese 
Forces and against Syria. This could have led to an escalating regional 
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conflict between Iraq and Syria; therefore, the Arab states, led by Saudi 
Arabia, held a summit meeting in Casablanca and formed a Tripartite 
Committee composed of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hassan of 
Morocco, and President Shadli Ben Jedid of Algeria to deal with the 
Lebanese crisis. 
The Arab initiative in the Lebanese conflict was not only a way to 
minimize the threat of regional escalation, but was also interpreted by 
some as an attempt by the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, to 
counterbalance Syrian influence in Lebanon with a little bit of its own 
influence. 
The U.S. was interested in curtailing the crisis in Lebanon so as not 
to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process. After the development of the 
Gulf crisis in 1990, the U.S. had the added concern of containing Iraq and 
gaining Syrian support for the Gulf war coalition. The end of then Cold 
War and the break up of the soviet Union strengthened American 
influence in the region and allowed it to pursue its policy objectives with 
fewer global obstacles. The U.S. supported the Ta'if negotiations and lent 
its support both in Arab circles and vis-a-vis Syria toward the successful 
completion of those talks. 
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The Ta'if Agreement (officially, the Document of National 
Accord) was the document that provided the basis for the ending of the 
civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. The signing of 
the Arab League sponsored Ta'if Accord in October 1989 brought a new 
dawn of peace into Lebanon. It set in motion the process of national 
reconciliation in Lebanon after more than sixteen years of fierce fighting 
and bloodshed. The end of war underlined the need to build a state of 
peace - one that can consolidate the foundations of stability and set the 
country on a steady course of orderly evolution and progress. 
The Ta'if Accord has muzzled the fighting warlords in Lebanon, 
but it alone cannot ensure a long-term peace. For, the political stability 
and the rebuilding of its economic base depend on the actors and more so 
on their actions than a document or constitution. However, the accord's 
provisions lays stress on external and domestic prerequisites to durable 
peace. Externally, Lebanon's stability is inextricably linked to the degree 
of legitimacy and sovereignty respected by external actors. Domestically, 
socio-political stability is conditioned by a measure of legitimacy the 
state derives from its people, i.e., the reestablishment of state authority 
subsuming the sectoral or communal loyalties. 
Following the implementation of the Ta'if Accord there has been a 
tremendous improvement in the Lebanese political situation. Lebanon 
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embarked on the series of reforms according to tiie provision of tiie 
agreement and signs of long lasting peace had begun to emerge except in 
the southern Lebanon. But the intermittent fights between IsraeH forces 
and Hizbullah in the South still cast darks shadows of civil war. The 
"South Lebanon issue" is a part of the age- old Arab Israeli Conflict and 
can not be resolved without settling the Palestinian question. Under Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri. Lebanon started improving economically; currency 
stabilized, and physical and social reconstruction was kept at the top of 
the priority. 
The Ta'if Accord, undoubtedly, contains many provisions to tackle 
long standing sources of domestic instability, namely, socio-economic 
disparities and socio-political discontents. In the socio-economic arena 
provisions for equitable regional development and administrative 
decentralization are notable. In the political side, Ta'if accord emphasizes 
the abolition of political confessional ism as a basic national goal. 
Deconfessionalisation is considered as an important step toward 
relegitimizing Lebanon's political system. The Ta'if accord calls for the 
eventual elimination of the confessional system and it refers to the 
establishment of a national committee that will devise measures to guide 
the political transition. 
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However, the process of deconfessinalization is not as simple as it 
appears from outside, it is encumbered by severe limitations. 
Deconfessionalization means dis-enfranchisement of the existing 
establishment, which derives its power from the same confessional 
constituency. It is doubtful whether the confessional establishment would 
ever take such a drastic step to disempower those benefiting from it. 
Moreover, considering Lebanon's current political and social reality, 
whether an institutional change will produce a functionally 
deconsfessionalised system or not is a question. 
With regard to this, socio-political characteristics of Lebanon 
require a special mention. As primordial ties and politics are very much 
inter-related in Lebanon, deconfessionalization of the institutions alone 
do not bring complete democracy to the country. More than five years 
after signing the Ta'if Agreement, many improvements have been 
realized. The war has ended, and most Lebanese, except for one part of 
the southern population, have enjoyed a long forgotten peace since late 
1990. State institutions have reestablished their authority, the army is 
united and gaining strength, and the deterioration in economic conditions 
has stopped, although a lot has to be done to face a serious financial 
deficit and economic stagnation. However, the Ta'if Agreement was and 
is still being implemented within a different balance of internal forces as 
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well as a different balance of regional, Arab forces, than originally 
intended. This is reflected through the increase of Syrian influence and a 
lack of balanced internal representation in Parliament because of the 
"Christian" decision to boycott the elections held in the summer of 1992. 
This imbalance has led some of those who participated in and supported 
the agreement to join the opposition and declare that what is being 
implemented is not the Ta'if Agreement. 
Syria's unquestionable influence in the Lebanese political affairs 
imposes constants on it autonomy, with regard to Syria's influence, it is 
considered as a mixed blessing. Although it protects Lebanon from the 
external penetrations there is a significant section in Lebanon, which 
perceives the Syrian domination with a "conquered" feeling. However, 
despite the negative domestic fallout that Syria's presence provokes; its 
insulating effect has a positive domestic consequence; it allows the 
Lebanese to focus better on their internal problems. 
In the event, Lebanon's future shaped by external pressures and 
influences will be largely dependent on the regional peaces process. 
Peace exercise between the major players, Syria, Israel and the 
Palestinians will have a tremendous effect on the Lebanese political 
scene. 
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Appendix - 1 
The National Pact 
Lebanon Table of Contents 
The National Pact (al Mithaq al Watani), an unwritten agreement, came 
into being in the summer of 1943 as the result of numerous meetings between 
Khuri (a Maronite), Lebanon's first president, and the first prime minister, 
Riyad as Solh (also cited as Solh), a Sunni. At the heart of the negotiations was 
the Christians' fear of being overwhelmed by the Muslim communities in 
Lebanon and the surrounding Arab countries, and the Muslims' fear of Western 
hegemony. In return for the Christian promise not to seek foreign, i.e., French, 
protection and to accept Lebanon's "Arab face," the Muslim side agreed to 
recognize the independence and legitimacy of the Lebanese state in its 1920 
boundaries and to renounce aspirations for union with Syria. The pact also 
reinforced the sectarian system of government begin under the French Mandate 
by formalizing the confessional distribution of high-level posts in the 
government based on the 1932 census' six-to-five ratio favoring Christians over 
Muslims. Although some historians dispute the point, the terms of the National 
Pact were believed to have been enunciated by the first cabinet in a statement 
to the legislature in October 1943. Among the following key points of the 
agreement are: 
1 The Maronites to not seek foreign intervention and accept Lebanon as an 
"Arab" affiliated country, instead of a "Western" one. 
2 The Muslims (Shi'a and Sunnis) to abandon their aspirations to unites with 
Syria 
3 The President of the Republic to always be Maronite. 
4 The President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) to always be 
Sunni. 
5 The President of the National Assembly to always be Shi'a. 
6 The Deputy speaker of the Parliament has to always be a Greek Orthodox. 
7 Parliament members to be in a ratio of 6:5 in favour of Christians to 
Muslims. 
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As noted, the confessional system outlined in the National Pact was a 
matter of expediency, an interim measure to overcome philosophical divisions 
between Christian and Muslim leaders at independence. It was hoped that once 
the business of governance got under way, and as national spirit grew, the 
importance of confessionalism in the political structure would diminish. Over 
the years, the frequent political disputes—the most notable of which were 
manifested in the 1958' Civil War, the Palestinian controversy of the 1960s and 
1970s, and the 1975 Civil War-bear stark testimony to the failure of the 
National Pact as a means toward societal integration. 
Moreover, some observers claim that the National Pact merely 
perpetuated the power of the privileged. The pact, combined with the system 
of zuama clientelism, guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo and the 
continuation of privilege for the sectarian elites. 
Source: U.S. Library of Congress 
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Appendix -2 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 
March 19, 1978 
Following the March 11, 1978 terrorists attack against two Israeli buses near 
Tel-Aviv, Killing 37 Israelis and injuring 76, the IDl" entered southern 
Lebanon in order to clear out PLO terrorist bases and staging areas south of the 
Litani River. When Operation Litani began, the US began seeking a suitable 
formula to send a United Nations peacekeeping force to the area held by Israel, 
in order to bring about an Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a buffer 
zone in southern Lebanon free of terrorists. As a result of these efforts, the UN 
Security Council met and decided to adopt Resolution 425 calling on Israel to 
withdraw, and establishing a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL). 
Text: 
The Security Council, 
Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon 
(S/12600 and S/12606) and the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/12607), 
Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and 
Israel, 
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, the 
its consequences to the maintenance of international peace. 
Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in 
the Middle East, 
Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese 
territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese 
territory; 
Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish 
immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern 
Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, 
restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of 
Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to 
be composed of personnel drawn from states Members of the United Nations. 
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Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four 
hours on the implementation of this resolution. 
Source: www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/peacepTOcess. 
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Appendix -3 
Security Council Resolution on the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
Resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 
The Security Council, 
Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon 
and from the Permanent Representative of Israel, 
Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon 
and Israel, 
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East 
and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace. 
Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just 
peace in the Middle East, 
/. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; 
2. Calls upon all Israel immediately to cease its military action against 
Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all 
Lebanese territory; 
3. Decides in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to 
establish immediately under its authority a United Nations Interim Force for 
Southern Lebanon Ibi- the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the 
Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in 
the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from Member States; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four 
hours on the implementation of the present resolution. 
Adopted at the 2074th meeting by 12 votes to 
none, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics). 
Resolution 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 
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The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 508 (1982), 
Gravely concerned at the situation as described by the Secretary-
General in his report to the Council, 
Reaffirming the need for strict respect for the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally 
recognized boundaries, 
1. Demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and 
unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon; 
2. Demands that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph 1 of 
resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and 
simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the 
Lebanese-Israeli border; 
3. Calls on all parties to communicate to the Secretary-General their 
acceptance of the present resolution within twenty-four hours; 
4. Decide, to remain seized of the question. 
Adopted unanimously the 2375th meeting. 
Resolution 512 (1982) of 19 June 1982 
The Security Council, 
Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian 
civilian populations. Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and to the obligations arising from the regulations 
annexed to [he Hague Convention of 1907, Reaffirming its resolutions 508 
(1982) and 509 (1982), 
/. Calls upon all the parties to the conflict to respect the rights of the civilian 
populations, to refrain from all acts of violence against those populations 
and to take all appropriate measures to alleviate the suffering caused by the 
conflict, in particular, by facilitating the dispatch and distribution of aid 
provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental 
organizations, in particular, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(JCRC); 
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2. Appeals to Member States to continue to provide the most extensive 
humanitarian aid possible; 
3. Stresses the particular humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations 
and its agencies, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), towards civilian 
populations and calls upon all the parties to the conflict not to hamper the 
exercise of those responsibilities and to assist in humanitarian efforts; 
4. Takes note of the measures taken by the Secretary-General to co-ordinate 
the activities of the international agencies in this field and requests him to 
make every effort to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this 
resolution and to report on these efforts to the Council as soon as possible. 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2380th 
meeting 
Resolution 516 (1982) of 1 August 1982 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982) and 
513(1982), 
Recalling its resolution 515 (1982) of 29 July 1982, 
Alarmed by the continuation and intensification of military activities in 
and around Beirut, 
Taking note of the latest massive violations of the cease-fire in and 
around Beirut, 
1. Confirms its previous resolutions and demands an immediate cease-fire, 
and a cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the 
Lebanese-Israeli border; 
2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to deploy immediately on the request of 
the Government of Lebanon, United Nations observers to monitor the 
situation in and around Beirut; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report back to the Council on compliance 
with this resolution as soon as possible and not later than four hours from 
now. 
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Adopted by the Security Council at its 2386th 
meeting 
Resolution 517 (1982) of 4 August 1982 
The Security Council, 
Deeply shocked and alarmed by the deplorable consequences of the 
Israeli invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982, 
1. Reconfirms its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 
515 (1982) and 516 (1982); 
2. Confirms once again its demand for an immediate cease-fire and 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon; 
3. Censures Israel for its failure to comply with the above resolutions; 
4. Calls for the prompt return of Israeli troops which have moved forward 
subsequent to 1325 hours EDT on 1 August 1982; 
5. Takes note of the decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization to move 
the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut; 
6. Expresses its appreciation for the efforts and steps taken by the Secretary-
General to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 516 
(1982), and authorizes him, as an immediate step, to increase the number of 
United Nations observers in and around Beirut; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the 
implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and not later 
than 1000 hours EDT on 5 August 1982; 
8. Decides to meet at that time if necessary in order to consider the report of 
the Secretary-General and, in case of failure to comply by any of the parties 
to the conflict, to consider adopting effective ways and means in accordance 
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2389th 
meeting 
Resolution 518 (1982) of 12 August 1982 
The Security Council, 
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Recalling its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 
(1982), 515 (1981), 516 (1982), and 517 (1982), 
Expressing its most serious concern about continued military activities in 
Lebanon and, particularly, in and around Beirut, 
1. Demands that Israel and all parties to the conflict observe strictly the terms 
of Security Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of all 
military activities within Lebanon and particularly, in and around Beirut; 
2. Demands the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the city of Beirut in 
order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the 
civilian population of Beirut; 
3. Requests United Nations observers in and in the vicinity of Beirut to report 
on the situation; 
4. Demands that Israel co-operate fully in the effort to secure the effective 
deployment of the United Nations observers, as requested by the 
Government of Lebanon, and in such a manner as to ensure their safety; 
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report soonest to the Security Council on 
the implementation of the present resolution; 
6. Decides to meet if necessary in order to consider the situation upon receipt 
of the report of the Secretary-General. 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2392nd 
meeting 
Resolution 521 (1982) of 19 September 1982 
The Security Council, 
Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut, Having heard 
the report of the Secretary-General (S/15400), 
Noting that the Government of Lebanon has agreed to the dispatch of 
United Nations Observers to the sites of greatest human suffering and losses 
in and around that city, 
1. Condemns the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut; 
2. Reaffirm once again its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982) which call 
for respect for the rights of the civilian population without any 
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discrimination and repudiates all acts of violence against that population; 
3. Authorizes the Secretary-General as an immediate step to increase the 
number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from 10 to 50 and 
insists that there shall be no interference with the deployment of the 
observers and that they shall have full freedom of movement; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of 
Lebanon, to ensure the rapid deployment of thus observers in order that 
they may contribute in every way possible within their mandate, to the 
effort to ensure full protection for the civilian population; 
5. Requests the Secretary-General as a matter of urgency to initiate 
appropriate consultations and in particular consultations with the 
Government of Lebanon on additional steps which that Council might rake, 
including the possible deployment of United Nations forces, to assist that 
Government in ensuring full protection for the civilian population in and 
aroimd Beirut and requests him to report to the Council within forty-eight 
hours; 
6. Insists that all concerned must permit United Nations observers and forces 
established by the Security Council in Lebanon to be deployed and to 
discharge their mandates and in this connection solemnly calls attention to 
the obligation of all Member Stares under Article 25 of the Charter to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in accordance with the 
Charter; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on an urgent 
and continuing basis. 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2396th 
meeting 
Resolution 523 (1982) of 18 Oct. 1982 
The Security Council, 
Having heard the statement of the President of the Lebanese Republic, 
Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 519 (1982), 
Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), as well as all 
subsequent resolutions on the situation in Lebanon, 
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Having studied the report of the Secretary-General (S/15455 and Corr.l), 
and taking note of its conclusions and recommendations, 
Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, 
1. Decides to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim 
period of three months, that is, until 19 January 1983; 
2. Insists that there shall be no interference under any pretext with the 
operations of UNIFIL and that the Force shall have full freedom of 
movement in the discharge of its mandate; 
3. Authorizes the Force during that period to carry out, with the consent of the 
Government of Lebanon, interim tasks in the humanitarian and 
administrative fields, as indicated in resolutions 511 (1982) and 519 (1982), 
and to assist the Government of Lebanon in assuring the security of all the 
inhabitants of the area without any discrimination; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General, within the three-month period, to consult 
with the Government of Lebanon and to report to the Council on ways and 
means of ensuring the full implementation of the UNIFIL mandate as 
defined in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and the relevant 
decisions of the Security Council; 
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the 
progress of his consultations. 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2400th 
meeting 
Resolution 529 (1983) of 18 January 1983 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), and all subsequent 
resolutions on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 
Recalling further its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), 
Having taken note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of 
Lebanon to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General 
of 13 January 1983 (s/15557, annex), and of the statement he made at the 
meeting of the Council, Having studied the report of the Secretary-General 
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(S/15557) and taken note of his observations. 
Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, 
/. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 July 
1983; 
2. Calls upon all parties concerned to co-operate with the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon for the full implementation of this resolution; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress 
made in this respect. 
Adopted by the Security Council at its lAWth 
meeting 
Resolution 538 (1983) of 18 October 1983 
The Security Council, 
Having heard the statement of the representative of Lebanon, 
Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and all subsequent 
resolutions on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 
Recalling further its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 520 (1982). 
as well as all its other resolutions on the situation in Lebanon, 
Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized 
boundaries, 
Having studied the report of the Secretary General on the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (S/160.36) and taking note of the conclusions and 
recommendations expressed therein, 
Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/16036, para. 20), 
Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon, 
1. Decides to extend the present mandate of the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 19 April 
1984; 
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2. Coll upon ail parties concerned to fuiiy cooperate witli tiie United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon for tlie full implementation of its mandate (as 
defined in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and the relevant decisions 
of the Security Council); 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress 
made in this respect. 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 
2480th meeting. 
Source: http://www.unitednations/securitycouncilresolutiononinlei-imlorceinlebanon(LJNll'll.) 
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Appendix -4 
Resolution 521 (1982) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2396* meeting held on 19 September 
1982 
The security Council, 
Appalled at the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut, Having heard the 
report of the Secretary-General (S/15400), Notinn that the Government of 
Lebanon has agreed to the dispatch of United Nations Observers to the sites of, 
greatest human suffering and losses in and around that city, 
1. Condemns the criminal massacre of Palestinian civilians in Beirut; 
2. Reaffirms once again its resolutions512 (1982) and 513 (1982) which 
call for respect for the right of the civilian population without any 
discrimination and repudiates all acts of violence against that 
population; 
3. Authorizes the Secretary-General as a immediate step to increase the 
number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut from 10 to 50 
and insists that there shall be no interference with the deployment of the 
observers and that they shall have full freedom of movement; 
4. requests the secretary-general, in consultation with the government of 
Lebanon, to ensure the rapid deployment of those observers in order that 
they may contribute in every way possible within their mandate, to the 
effort to ensure full protection for the civilian population; 
5. requests the secretary-General as a matter of urgency to initiate 
appropriate consultations and in particular consultations with the 
government of Lebanon on additional steps which the council might 
take, including the possible protection for the civilian population in and 
around Beirut and requests him to report to the council within forty-
eight hours; 
6. Insists that all concerned must permit United Nations observers and 
forces established by the Security Council in Lebanon to be deployed 
and to discharge their mandates and in this connexion solemnly calls 
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attention to the obligation on all Member states under Article 25 of the 
Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council in 
accordance with the Charter; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the council informed on an 
urgent and continuing basis. 
Source: http://www.lebanese-forces/lebanon/unresolutions/un521/html. 
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Appendix -5 
Israel-Lebanon: Agreement on Withdrawal of Troops from lebanon, Done 
at Kiryat Shemona and Khaldeh, May 17, 1983 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON 
The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic 
of Lebanon: 
Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening 
international peace based on freedom, equality, justice, and respect for 
fundamental human rights; 
Reaffirming their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with 
each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries; 
Having agreed to declare the termination of the state of war between them; 
Desiring to ensure lasting security for both their States and to Ivoid threats 
and the use of force between them; 
Desiring to establish their mutual relations in the manner provided for in 
this Agreement; 
Having delegated their undersigned represefltalive plenipotentiaries, 
provided with full powers, in order to sign in the presence of the representative 
o/the United States of America, this Agreement; 
Have agreed to the following provisions: 
Article 1 
1. The Parties agree and undertake to respect the sovereignty, political 
independence and territorial integrity of each other. They consider the 
existing international boundary between Israel and Lebanon inviolable. 
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2. The Parties confirm that the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been 
terminated and no longer exists. 
3. Taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, Israel undertakes to 
withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with the Annex of 
the present Agreement. 
Article 2 
The Parties being guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and of international law, undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner as to promote international peace and security and justice. 
Article 3 
In order to provide maximum security for Israel and Lebanon, the Parties agree 
to establish and implement security arrangements, including the creation of a 
Security Region, as provided for in the Annex of the present Agreement. 
Article 4 
L The territory of each Party will not be used as a base for hostile or 
terrorist activity against the other Party, its territory, or its people. 
2. Each Party will prevent the existence or organization of irregular forces, 
armed bands, organizations, bases, offices or infrastructure, the aims and 
purposes of which include incursions or any act of terrorism into the 
territory of the other Party, or any other activity aimed at threatening or 
endangering the security of the other Party and safety of its people. To 
this end all agreements and arrangements enabling the presence and 
functioning on the territory of either Party of elements hostile to the 
other Party are null and void. 
3. Without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense in accordance 
with international law, each Party will refrain: 
a. from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in threats 
or acts of belligerency, subversion, or incitement or any 
aggression directed against the other Party, its population or 
property, both within its territory and originating therefrom, or in 
the territory of the other Parry. 
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b. from using the territory of the other Party for conducting a 
military attack against the territory of a third state. 
c. from intervening in the internal or external affairs of the other 
Party. 
4. Each Parry undertakes to ensure that preventive; location and due 
proceedings will be taken against persons or organizations perpetrating acts in 
violation of this Article. 
Article 5 
Consistent with the termination of the state of war and within the framework of 
their constitutional provisions, the Parties will abstain from any form of hostile 
propaganda against each other. 
Article 6 
Each Party will prevent entry into, deployment in, or passage through its 
territory, its air space and, subject to the right of innocent passage in 
accordance with international law! its territorial sea, by military forces, 
armament, or military equipment of any state hostile to the other Party. 
Article 7 
Except as provided in the present Agreement, nothing will preclude the 
deployment on Lebanese territory of international forces requested and 
accepted by the Government of Lebanon to assist in maintaining its authority. 
New contributors to such forces shall be selected from among states having 
diplomatic relations with both Parties to the present Agreement. 
Article 8 
1. a. Upon entry into force of the present Agreement, a Joint Liaison 
Committee will be established by the Parties, in which the United 
States of America will be a participant, and will commence its 
functions. This Committee will be entrusted with the supervision of 
the implementation of all areas covered by the present Agreement. In 
matters involving security arrangements, it will deal with unresolved 
problems referred to it by the Security Arrangements Committee 
established in subparagraph c. below. Decisions of this Committee 
will be taken unanimously. 
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b. The Joint Liaison Committee will address itself on a continuing basis 
to the development of mutual relations between Israel and Lebanon, 
inter alia the regulation of the movement of goods, products and 
persons, communications, etc. 
c. Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee, there will be a 
Security Arrangements Committee whose composition and functions 
are defined in the Annex of the present Agreement. 
d. Subcommittees of the Joint Liaison Committee may be established as 
the need anses 
e. The Joint Liaison Committee will meet in Israel and Lebanon, 
alternately. 
f Each Party, // it so desires and unless there is an agreed change of 
status, may maintain a liaison office on the territory of the other 
Party in order to carry out the above-mentioned functions within the 
framework of the Joint Liaison Committee and to assist in the 
implementation of the present Agreement. 
g. The members of the Joint Liaison Committee from each of the 
Parties will he headed by a senior government official. 
h. All other matters relating to these liaison offices, their personnel, and 
the personnel of each Party present in the territory of the other Party 
in connection with the implementation of the resent Agreement will 
be the subject of a protocol to be concluded between the Parties in 
the Joint Liaison Committee. Pending the conclusion of this protocol, 
the liaison offices and the above-mentioned personnel will be treated 
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Convention on 
Special Missions of December 8, 1969, including those provisions 
concerning privileges and immunities. The foregoing is without 
prejudice to the positions of the Parties concerning that Convention. 
During the six-month period after the withdrawal of all Israeli armed 
forces from Lebanon in accordance with Article 1 of the present 
Agreement and the simultaneous restoration of Lebanese governmental 
authority along the international boundary between Israel and Lebanon, 
and in the light of the termination of the state of war, the Parties shall 
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initiate, within the Joint Liaison Committee, bona fide negotiations in 
order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and 
persons and their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis. 
Article 9 
1. Each of the two Parties will take, within a time limit of one year as of 
entry into force of the present Agreement, all measures necessary for the 
abrogation of treaties, laws and regulations deemed in conflict with the 
present Agreement, subject to and in conformity with its constitutional 
ptocedures. 
2. The Parties undertake not to apply existing obligations, enter into any 
obligations, or adopt laws or regulations in conflict with the 
present Agreement. 
Article 10 
1. The present Agreement shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with 
their respective constitutional procedures. It shall enter into force on the 
exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall supersede the previous 
agreements between Israel and Lebanon. 
2. The Annex, the Appendix and the Map attached thereto, and the Agreed 
Minutes to the present Agreement shall be considered integral parts thereof 
3. The present Agreement may be modified, amended, or superseded by mutual 
agreement of the Parties. 
Article 11 
1. Disputes between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or 
application of the present Agreement will be settled by negotiation in the 
Joint Liaison Committee. Any dispute of this character not so resolved 
shall be submitted to conciliation and, if unresolved, thereafter to an 
agreed procedure for a definitive resolution. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, disputes arising out of 
the interpretation or application of the Annex shall be resolved in the 
framework of the Security Arrangemems Committee and, if unresolved, 
shall thereafter, at the request of either Party, be referred to the Joint 
Liaison Committee for resolution through negotiation. 
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Article 12 
The present Agreement shall be communicated to the Secretariat of the United 
Nations for registration in conformity with the provision:; of Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Done at Kiryat Shemona and Khaldeh this seventeenth day of May, 1983, in 
triplicate in four authentic texts In the Hebrew, Arabic, English and French 
languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English and French 
texts will be equally authoritative. 
Source: Report of the Department of Defense (Long) commission on Beirut 
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, issued on December 20, 
1983. 
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Appendix - 6 
THE TAIF ACCORDS OCTOBER 22 1989 
Excerpts 
PART II: IMPOSING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LEBANESE 
GOVERNMENT OVER ALL LEBANESE LAND 
Given the agreement among the Lebanese parties on the existence of a strong 
and able state based on national reconciliation the national accord government 
shall outline a detailed security plan for a one-year period whose aim shall be: 
the gradual extension of the sovereignty of the Lebanese government over all 
Lebanese lands through the State's intrinsic resources. The general elements 
of the plan are as follows: 
1. Declaration of the disbanding of the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias 
and the transfer of weapons in their possession to the Lebanese government 
within six months of the rectification of the document of national 
reconciliation the election of a president the establishment of a national 
accord government and the constitutional ratification of the political 
reforms. 
2. The strengthening of the internal security forces through the following 
measures: 
a. The opening of recruitment to all people of Lebanon without exception 
the training of recruits and their dispersal among the district units. 
Concurrently they will undergo regular and organized courses. 
b. The strengthening of the security apparatus in order to control border 
entries and exits by air sea and land. 
3. The strengthening of the armed forces 
a. The major task of the armed forces is to defend the motherland and when 
necessary to maintain public order when threatened when the internal 
security forces are unable to handle the situation alone. 
b. The armed forces shall be used to help the internal security forces in 
maintaining security in circumstances to be decided by the government. 
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c. The armed forces shall be united trained and drilled to enable them to 
bear national responsibility against Israeli aggression. 
d. When the internal security forces shall be fit to carry out their security 
missions the armed forces shall be returned to their bases. 
e. The intelligence system of the armed forces shall be reorganized for sole 
military purposes. 
4. The solution of the problem of Lebanese displaced persons every Lebanese 
national who has left his home since 1975 shall have the right to return to his 
point of departure. Laws will be passed to ensure this right and means of 
rehabilitation will be provided. 
Given the aim of the Lebanese government to impose its control over all of 
Lebanese land through its own resources first and foremost by means of the 
internal security forces and on the basis of the ties of legitimate Lebanese 
forces in extending the sovereignty of the Lebanese government during a 
period of time not exceeding two years after the ratification to the national 
reconciliation document the establishment of the national accord government 
and the constitutional ratification of the political reforms. At the conclusion of 
this period the two governments - the Syrian government and the Lebanese 
national accord government - shall decide on the redeployment of the Syrian 
forces in the Bekaa area and the western Bekaa approaches in Dahr al-Baydar 
to the Khamana-al-Mudayraj-Ein Dara line. Should the need arise (for the 
forces to be deployed) in other locations this shall be decided by a joint 
Lebanese-Syrian military committee with the agreement of the two 
governments to determine the scope of the Syrian forces and the duration of 
their presence in these areas. The agreement shall also define the relationship 
between these forces and the Lebanese authorities in the places they are 
stationed. 
The Arab League "troika" committee is prepared to assist the two states in 
achieving this agreement should they so wish. 
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PART III: THE LIBERATION OF LEBANON FROM ISRAELI 
OCCUPATION 
1. Renewed state control to the internationally recognized Lebanese border 
requires the following measures: 
a. The implementation of Resolution 425 and the other Security Council 
decisions referring to the complete removal of the Israeli occupation. 
b. Adherence to the armistice agreement signed on March 23 1949. 
c. Taking all necessary measures to liberate all Lebanese lands from Israeli 
occupation the extension of government sovereignty to all these lands the 
deployment of the Lebanese army along the border with Israel and the 
strengthening of the UNIFIL presence in southern Lebanon in order to ensure 
the Israeli withdrawal and to restore security and stability to the border area. 
PART IV: LEBANESE-SYRL^N RELATIONS 
Lebanon which has Arab affinities and an Arab identity maintains loyal ties of 
brotherhood with all Arab states. It maintains preferred relations with Syria 
based on the roots of close affinity history and common interests. 
This is the bases for coordination and cooperation between the two states 
which shall sign agreements in various areas in such a manner as to realize the 
interests of both states within the framework of the sovereignty and 
independence of each. 
On this basis and given that the security principles create the necessary 
climate for the development of these preferred relations Lebanon cannot serve 
as the source of a threat against Syrian security nor can Syria serve as the 
source of a threat against Lebanese security. Hence Lebanon shall not allow 
itself to serve as the transit point or base for any force state or organization 
interested in harming its own security or the security of Syria. 
Similarly Syria which meticulously upholds the security independence and 
unity of Lebanon and the agreement between the two countries shall not allow 
any activity that threatens (Lebanese) security independence or sovereignty. 
Adopted on: 23 May 1926. } 
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{ICL Document Status: 21 Sep 1990. } 
The ICL edition is based on the raw text of an annotated translation by 
Paul E. Salem for the Lebanese Center of Political Studies (cf The 
Beirut Review No. 1/1991) consolidating all changes up to and 
including the Amendments of 21 Aug 1990 (signed into force 21 Sep 
1990). That text is itself based on 'The Lebanese Constitution: A 
Reference Edition in English Translation' by the Department of Political 
Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut 
(1960), and also seems to draw on the 1973 translation by Gabriel M. 
Bustros for the Bureau of Lebanese and Arab Documentation in 
London. We have added minor corrections, changed the British-style 
'shall' predominance to more definite wording, worked in the ICL 
formatting, and included article headings and paragraph numbers. ICL 
keys are yet to be done. } 
Preamble 
a. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country. It is a final homeland 
for all its citizens. It is unified in its territory, people, and institutions within the 
boundaries defined in this constitution and recognized internationally. 
b. Lebanon is Arab in its identity and in its association. It is a founding and 
active member of the League of Arab States and abides by its pacts and 
covenants. Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United 
Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these principles 
in all fields and areas without exception. 
c. Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public 
liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social 
justice and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without 
discrimination. 
d. The people are the source of authority and sovereignty; they shall exercise 
these powers through the constitutional institutions. 
e. The political system is established on the principle of separation, balance, 
and cooperation amongst the various branches of Government. 
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f. The economic system is free and ensures private initiative and the right to 
private property. 
g. The even development among regions on the educational, social, and 
economic levels shall be a basic pillar of the unity of the state and the stability 
of the system. 
h. The abolition of political confessional ism is a basic national goal and shall 
be achieved according to a gradual plan. 
i, Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese has the right to 
live in any part of it and to enjoy the sovereignty of law wherever he resides. 
There is no 
segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no 
fragmentation, partition, or colonization, j . There is no constitutional 
legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the 'pact of communal 
coexistence'. This Constitutional Law shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
[Part] A. Fundamental Provisions 
[Chapter] I. On the State and its Territories 
Article 1 [Territory] 
Lebanon is an independent, indivisible, and sovereign state. Its frontiers are 
those which now bound it: 
On the North: From the mouth of al-Kabir River, along a line following the 
course of this river to its point of junction with Khalid Valley opposite al-
Qamar Bridge. 
On the East: The summit line separating the Khalid Valley and al-Asi River 
(Orontes) and passing by the villages of Mu'aysarah, Harbanah, Hayt, Ibish, 
Faysan to the height of the two villages of Brina and Matraba. This line follows 
the northern boundary of the Ba'albak District at the northeastern and south 
eastern directions, thence the eastern boundaries of the districts of Ba'albak, 
Biqa', Hasbayya, and Rashayya. 
On the South: The present southern boundaries of the districts of Sur (Tyre) 
and Marji'yun. 
On the West: The Mediterranean. 
Article 2 [Territorial Integrity] 
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No part of the Lebanese territory may be alienated or ceded. 
Article 3 [Administrative Areas] 
The boundaries of the administrative areas may not be modified except by 
law. 
Article 4 [Republic, Capital] 
Greater Lebanon is a Republic the capital of which is Beirut. 
Article 5 [Flag] 
The Lebanese flag is composed of three horizontal stripes, a white stripe 
between two red ones. The width of the white stripe is equal to that of both red 
stripes. In the center of and occupying one third of the white stripe is a green 
Cedar tree with its top touching the upper red stripe and its base touching the 
lower red stripe. 
[Chapter] II. The Rights and Duties of the Citizen 
Article 6 [Nationality] 
Lebanese nationality and the manner in which it is acquired, retained, and 
lost is to be determined in accordance with the law. 
Article 7 [Equality] 
All Lebanese are equal before the law. They equally enjoy civil and 
political rights and equally are bound by public obligations and duties without 
any distinction. 
Article 8 [Personal Liberty, nulla poena sine lege] 
Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected by law. No one may be 
arrested, imprisoned, or kept in custody except according to the provisions of 
the law. No offense may be established or penalty imposed except by law. 
Article 9 [Conscience, Belief] 
There shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state in rendering 
homage to the Most High shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, 
under its protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public 
order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the personal status and religious 
interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected. 
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Article 10 [Education, Confessional Schools] 
Education is free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and morals and 
does not interfere with the dignity of any of the religions or creeds. There shall 
be no violation of the right of eligious communities to have their own schools 
provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public 
instruction. 
Article 11 [Official National Language] 
Arabic is the official national language. A law determines the cases in 
which the French language may be used. 
Article 12 [Public Office] 
Every Lebanese has the right to hold public office, no preference being 
made except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions 
established by law. A special statute guarantees the rights of state officials in 
the departments to which they belong. 
Article 13 [Expression, Press, Assembly, Association] 
The freedom to express one's opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of 
the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association are 
guaranteed within the limits established by law. 
Article 14 [Home] 
The citizen's place of residence is inviolable. No one may enter it except in 
the circumstances and manners prescribed by law. 
Article 15 [Property] 
Rights of ownership are protected by law. No one's property may be 
expropriated except for reasons of public utility in cases established by law and 
after fair compensation has been paid beforehand. 
[Part] B. Powers 
[Chapter] I. General Provisions 
Article 16 [Legislative Power, One Chamber] 
Legislative power is vested in a single body, the Chamber of Deputies. 
Article 17 [Executive Power, Council of Ministers] 
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Executive power is entrusted to the Council of Ministers to be exercised it 
in accordance with the conditions laid down in this constitution. 
Article 18 [Bills] 
The Parliament and the Council of Ministers have the right to propose laws. 
No law shall be promulgated until it has been adopted by the Chamber. 
Article 19 [Constitutional Council] 
A Constitutional Council is established to supervise the constitutionality of 
laws and to arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential 
elections. The President, the President of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, 
along with any 
ten Members of Parliament, have the right to consult this Council on matters 
that relate to the constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of 
religious communities have the right to consult this Council only on laws 
relating to personal status, the freedom of belief and religious practice, and the 
freedom of religious education. The rules governing the organization, 
operation, composition, and modes of appeal of the Council are decided by a 
special law. 
Article 20 [Judicial Power] 
Judicial power is to be exercised by the tribunals of various levels and 
jurisdictions. It fimctions within the limits of an order established by the law 
and offering the necessary guarantees to judges and litigants. The limits and 
conditions for the protection of the judges are determined by law. The judges 
are independent in the exercise of their duties. The decisions and judgments of 
all courts are rendered and executed in the name of the Lebanese People. 
Article 21 [Electoral Rights] 
Every Lebanese citizen who has completed his twenty-first year is an 
elector provided he ftilfiUs the conditions laid down in the electoral law. 
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[Chapter] II. The Legislative Power 
Article 22 [Senate] 
With the election of the first Parhament on a national, non-confessional 
basis, a Senate is established in which ;ill Ihc religious coininunilics ;irc 
represented. Its authority is limited to major national issues. 
Article 23 [Eligibility to the Senate] 
{abolished 1927} 
Article 24 [Electoral Laws] 
(1) The Chamber of Deputies is composed of elected members; their 
number and the method of their election is determined by the electoral laws in 
effect. Until such time as the Chamber enacts new electoral laws on a non-
confessional basis, the distribution of seats is according to the following 
principles: 
a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims. 
b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each 
religious community. 
c. Proportional representation among geographic regions. 
(2) Exceptionally, and for one time only, the seats that are currently vacant, 
as well as the new seats that have been established by law, are to be filled by 
appointment, all at once, and by a majority of two thirds of the Government of 
National Unity. This is to establish equality between Christians and Muslims as 
stipulated in the Document of National Accord [The Taif Agreement]. The 
electoral laws will specify the details regarding the implementation of this 
clause. 
Article 25 [Dissolution] 
Should the Chamber of Deputies be dissolved, the Decision of dissolution 
must provide for the holding of new elections in accordance with Article 24 
and within a period not exceeding three months. 
Article 26 [Location of Government and Parliament] 
The Goverrmient and the Chamber of Deputies shall be located in Beirut. 
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Article 27 [Representation] 
A member of the Chamber represents the whole nation. No restriction or 
stipulation may be imposed upon his mandate by his electors. 
Article 28 [No Incompatibility] 
A Deputy may also occupy a ministerial position. Ministers, all or in part, 
may be selected from among the members of the Chamber or from persons 
outside the Chamber. 
Article 29 [Incompatibility by Law] 
Cases in which persons are disqualified from becoming Deputies are 
determined by law. 
Article 30 [Validating Elections] 
The Deputies alone have competence to judge the validity of their mandate. 
No Deputy's mandate may be invalidated except by a majority of two thirds of 
the votes of the entire membership. This clause is automatically cancelled as 
soon as the Constitutional Council is established and as soon as the laws 
relating to it are implemented. 
Article 31 [Illegal Sessions] 
Meetings of the Chamber outside those set for legal sessions are unlawful 
and ipso facto null and void. 
Article 32 [Ordinary Sessions] 
The Chamber meets each year in two ordinary sessions. The first session 
opens on the first Tuesday following 15 March and continues until the end of 
May. The second session begins on the first Tuesday following 15 Oct; its 
meetings is reserved for the discussion of and voting on the budget before any 
other work. This session lasts until the end of the year. 
Article 33 [Extraordinary Sessions] 
The ordinary sessions begin and end automatically on the dates fixed in 
Article 32. The President of the Republic in consultation with the Prime 
Minister may summon the Chamber to extraordinary sessions by a Decree 
specifying the dates of the opening and closing of the extraordinary sessions as 
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well as the agenda. The President of the Republic is required to convoke the 
Chamber if an absolute majority of the total membership so requests. 
Article 34 [Quorum] 
The Chamber is not validly constituted unless the majority of the total 
membership is present. Decisions are to be taken by a majority vote. Should the 
votes be equal, the question under consideration is deemed rejected. 
Article 35 [Publicity] 
The meetings of the Chamber are public. However, at the request of the 
Government or of five Deputies, the Chamber may sit in secret sessions. It may 
then decide whether to resume the discussion of the same question in public. 
Article 36 [Voting Process] 
Votes are to be cast verbally or by the members standing, except for 
elections when the ballot is secret. With respect to laws in general and on 
questions of confidence, the vote is always taken by roll call and the responses 
are made in an audible voice. 
Article 37 [Vote of No-Confidence] 
Every Deputy has the absolute right to raise the question of no-confidence 
in the government during ordinary or extraordinary sessions. Discussion of and 
voting on such a proposal may not take place until at least five days after 
submission to the secretariat of the Chamber and its communication to the 
ministers concerned. 
Article 38 [Reintroduction of Bills] 
No Bill that has been rejected by the Chamber may be re- introduced during 
the same session. 
Article 39 [Indemnity] 
No member of the Chamber may be prosecuted because of ideas and 
opinions expressed during the period of his mandate. 
Article 40 [Immunity] 
No member of the Chamber may, during the sessions, be prosecuted or 
arrested for a criminal offense without the permission of the Chamber, except 
when he is caught in the act. 
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Article 41 [Re-election] 
Should a seat in the Chamber become vacant, the election of a successor 
begins within two months. The mandate of the new member does not exceed 
that of the old member whose place he is taking; however, should the seat in 
the Chamber become vacant during the last six months of its mandate, no 
successor may be elected. 
Article 42 [General Elections] 
General elections for the renewal of the Chamber shall take place within a 
sixty day period proceeding the expiration of its mandate. 
Article 43 [Rules of Procedure] 
The Chamber draws up its own internal rules and procedures. 
Article 44 [First Session] 
(1) Each time a new Chamber is elected, the Chamber meets under the 
presidency of the oldest member and the secretariat or the two youngest. It will 
then elect separately, by a secret ballot and by an absolute majority of the votes 
cast, the President and the Vice President of the Chamber to hold office for the 
length or the Chamber's term. At the third ballot, a relative majority is 
sufficient. Should the votes be equal, the oldest candidate is considered elected. 
(2) Every time a new Chamber or Deputies is elected, as well as in the October 
session or each year, the Chamber elects two Secretaries by secret ballot 
according to the majority stipulated in the first part or this article. 
(3) The Chamber may, once only, two years after the election or its President 
and his Deputy, and in the first session it holds, withdraw its confidence from 
the President of the Chamber or his Deputy by a Decision of two thirds of the 
Chamber, based on a petition signed by at least ten Deputies. The Chamber, at 
such point, must hold an immediate session to fill the vacant post. 
Article 45 [Presence] 
Members of the Chamber may only vote when they are present at the 
meeting. Voting by proxy shall not be permitted. 
Article 46 [Parliamentary Order] 
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The Chamber has the exclusive right to maintain order in its meetings 
through its President. 
Article 47 [Petitionsl 
Petitions to the Chamber may not be presented except in writing. They may 
not be presented verbally or at the bar of the Chamber. 
Article 48 [Remuneration] 
The remuneration of members of the Chamber is determined by law. 
[Chapter] HI. The Executive Power 
[Section] 1. The President of the Republic 
Article 49 [Presidential Powers] 
(1) The President of the Republic is the bead of the state and the symbol of 
the nation's unity. He shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon's 
independence, unity, and territorial integrity. The President shall preside over 
the Supreme Defense Council and be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces which fall under the authority of the Council of Ministers. 
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by a 
twothirds majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute 
majority shall be sufficient. The President's term is for six years. He may not be 
re-elected until six years after the expiration of his last mandate. No one may 
be elected to the Presidency of the Republic unless he ftilfills the conditions of 
eligibility for the Chamber of Deputies. 
(3) It is also not possible to elect judges. Grade One civil servants, or their 
equivalents in all public institutions to the Presidency during their term or 
office or within two years following the date of their resignation or their 
leaving office for whatever reason. 
Article 50 [Oath] 
Upon assuming office, the President of the Republic shall take an oath of 
fidelity before the Parliament to the Lebanese Nation and the constitution in the 
following terms: 
"/ swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and the laws of the 
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Lebanese Nation and to maintain the independence of Lebanon and its 
territorial integrity." 
Article 51 [Promulgation of Laws] 
The President of the Republic promulgates the laws after they have been 
approved by the Chamber in accordance with the time limits specified by the 
constitution. He asks for the publication or these laws, and he may not modify 
these laws or exempt anyone from complying with their provisions. 
Article §2 [Negotiation of International Treaties] 
The President of the Republic negotiates international treaties in 
coordination with the Prime Minister. These treaties are not considered ratified 
except after agreement of the Council of Ministers. They are to be made known 
to the Chamber whenever the national interest and security of the state permit. 
However, treaties involving the finances of the state, commercial treaties, and 
in general treaties that cannot be renounced every year are not considered 
ratified until they have been approved by the Chamber. 
Article 53 [List of Additional Presidential Powers] 
1. The President presides over the Council of Ministers when he wishes 
without participating in voting. 
2. The President designates the Prime Minister in consultation with the 
President of the Chamber of Deputies based on parliamentary consultations 
which are binding and the content of which the President formally discloses to 
the Prime Minister. 
3. The President alone issues the Decree which designates the Prime Minister. 
4. He issues, in agreement with the Prime Minister, the decree appointing the 
Cabinet and the decrees accepting the resignation of Ministers. 
5. He issues, on his own authority, the decrees accepting the resignation of the 
Cabinet or considering it resigned. 
6. He forwards to the Chamber of Deputies Bills that are delivered to him by 
the Council of Ministers. 
7. He accredits ambassadors and accept the credentials of ambassadors. 
8. He presides over official fiinctions and grants official decorations by Decree. 
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9. He grants particular pardons by Decree, but a general amnesty cannot be 
granted except by a law. 
10. He addresses, when necessary, letters to the Chamber of Deputies. 
11. He may introduce, from outside the agenda, any urgent matter to the 
council of Ministers. 
12. He may, in agreement with the Prime Minister, call the Council of 
Ministers to an extraordinary session, whenever he deems this necessary. 
Article 54 [Countersignature] 
The decisions of the President must be countersigned by the Prime Minister 
and the Minister or Ministers concerned except the Decree designating a new 
Prime Minister and the Decree accepting the resignation of the Cabinet or 
considering it resigned. Decrees issuing laws must be countersigned by the 
Prime Minister. 
Article 55 [Dissolution of Parliament by Decree] 
(1) The President of the Republic may, in accordance with the conditions 
stipulated in Articles 65 and 77 of this constitution, ask the Council of 
Ministers to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its 
mandate. If the Coimcil, based on this request, decides to dissolve the Chamber 
of Deputies, the President issues the Decree dissolving it, and in this case, the 
electoral bodies meets as provided for in Article 25, and the new Chamber is to 
be called to convene within fifteen days after the proclamation of the election. 
(2) The administrative staff of the Chamber of Deputies continues to function 
until the election or a new Chamber. 
(3) If elections are not held within the time limit specified in Article 25 of the 
constitution, the Decree dissolving the Chamber is considered null and void, 
and the Chamber of Deputies continues to exercise its powers according to the 
stipulations of the constitution. 
Article 56 [Promulgation Time Limits] 
(1) The President of the Republic promulgates the laws which have been 
adopted within one month of their transmission to the Government. He must 
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promulgate laws that were declared urgent by a special Decision of the 
Chamber within five days. 
(2) The President issues decrees and requests their promulgation; he has the 
right to ask the Council of Ministers to review any Decision that the Chamber 
has taken within fifteen days of the decision's transmission to the Presidency. If 
the Council of Ministers insists on the Decision or if the time limit passes 
without the Decree being issued or returned, the Decision or Decree is 
considered legally operative and must be promulgated. 
Article 57 [Presidential Veto] 
The President of the Republic, after consultation with the Council of 
Ministers, has the right to request the reconsideration of a law once during the 
period prescribed for its promulgation. This request may not be refused. When 
the President exercises this right, he is not required to promulgate this law until 
it has been reconsidered and approved by an absolute majority of all the 
members legally composing the Chamber. If the time limits pass without the 
law being issued or returned, the law is considered legally operative and must 
be promulgated. 
Article 58 [Urgent Bills] 
Every Bill the Council of Ministers deems urgent and in which this urgency 
is indicated in the decree of transmission to the Chamber of Deputies may be 
issued by the President within forty days following its communication to the 
Chamber, after including it on the agenda of a general meeting, reading it aloud 
before the Chamber, and after the expiration of the time limit without the 
Chamber acting on it. 
Article 59 [Adjourning the Chamber] 
The President of the Republic may adjourn the Chamber for a period not 
exceeding one month, but he may not do so twice during the same session. 
Article 60 [Responsibility] 
(1) While performing his functions, the President of the Republic may not be 
held responsible except when he violates the constitution or in the case of high 
treason. 
(2) However, his responsibility in respect of ordinary crimes is subject to the 
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ordinary laws. For such crimes, as well as for violation of the constitution and 
for high treason, he may not be impeached except by a majority of two thirds of 
the total membership of the Chamber of Deputies. He is to be tried by the 
Supreme Council provided for in Article 80. The functions of Public Prosecutor 
of the Supreme Council are performed by a judge appointed by the Supreme 
Coimcil in plenary session. 
Article 61 [Suspension after Impeachement] 
Should the President of the Republic be impeached, he is suspended from 
his functions. The presidency remains vacant until the Supreme Council has 
settled the matter. 
Article 62 [Vacancy] 
Should the Presidency become vacant for any reason whatsoever, the 
Council of Ministers exercises the powers of the President by delegation. 
Article 63 [Remuneration] 
The remuneration of the President of the Republic is determined by a law. It 
may not be increased or reduced during his term of office. 
[Section] 2. The Prime Minister 
Article 64 [Responsibility and Powers] 
The Prime Minister is the Head of Government and its representative. He 
speaks in its name and is responsible for executing the general policy that is set 
by the Council of Ministers. He exercises the following powers: 
1. He heads the Council of Ministers and is ex officio Deputy Head of the 
Supreme Defense Council. 
2. He conducts the parliamentary consultations involved in forming a Cabinet. 
He signs, with the President, the Decree forming the Cabinet. The Cabinet must 
present its general statement or policy to the Chamber and gain its confidence 
within thirty days of the date of issuance of the Decree in which the Cabinet 
was formed. The Cabinet does not exercise its powers before it gains the 
Chamber's confidence nor after it has resigned or is considered resigned, except 
in the narrow sense of managing affairs. 
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3. He presents the Government's general policy statements before the Chamber 
of Deputies. 
4. He signs, along with the President, all decrees, except the Decree which 
designates him the head of the Government, and the Decree accepting the 
Cabinet's resignation or considering it resigned. 
5. He signs the Decree calling for an extraordinary parliamentary session, 
decrees issuing laws, and requests for reviewing laws. 
6. He calls the Council of Ministers into session and sets its agenda, and he 
informs the President and the Ministers beforehand of the subjects included on 
the agenda and of the urgent subjects that will be discussed. 
7. He supervises the activities of the public administrations and institutions, 
coordinates among the Ministers and provides general guidance to ensure the 
proper progress of affairs. 
8. He holds working meetings with the competent authorities in the 
Government in the presence of the concerned Minister. 
[Section] 3. The Council of Ministers 
Article 65 (Powers] 
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers. It is the authority 
to which the armed forces are subject. Among the powers that it exercises are 
the following: 
1. It sets the general policy of the Government in all fields, prepares Bills and 
organizational Decrees and makes the decisions necessary for implementing 
them. 
2. It watches over the execution of laws and regulations and supervises the 
activities of all the Government's branches including the civil, military, and 
security administrations and institutions without exception. 
3. It appoints Government employees and dismisses them and accepts their 
resignations according to the law. 
4. It dissolves the Chamber of Deputies upon the request of the President of 
the Republic if the Chamber of Deputies, for no compelling reasons, fails to 
meet during one of its regular periods and fails to meet throughout two 
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successive extraordinary periods, each longer than one month, or if the 
Chamber returns an annual budget plan with the aim or paralyzing the 
Government. This right cannot be exercised a second time if it is for the 
same reasons which led to the dissolution of the Chamber the first time. 
5. The Council of Ministers meets in a locale specifically set aside for it, and 
the President chairs its meetings when he attends. The legal quorum for a 
Council meeting is a majority of two thirds of its members. It makes its 
decisions by consensus. If that is not possible, it makes its decisions by vote 
of the majority of attending members. Basic national issues require the 
approval of two thirds of the members of the Council named in the Decree 
forming the Cabinet. Basic national issues are considered the following: 
The amendment of the constitution, the declaration of a state of emergency and 
its termination, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements 
and treaties, the annual government budget, comprehensive and longterm 
development projects, the appointment of Grade One government employees 
and their equivalents, the review of the administrative map, the dissolution of 
the Chamber of Deputies, electoral laws, nationality laws, personal status laws, 
and the dismissal of Ministers. 
Article 66 [Ministries, Responsibility] 
Only Lebanese who satisfy the conditions for deputization may assume 
ministerial posts. The Ministers administer the Government's services and 
assume the responsibility of applying the laws and regulations, each one 
according to the affairs of his administration and what is specific to them. 
Ministers are collectively responsible before the Chamber for the general 
policy of the Government and individually responsible for their personal 
actions. 
Article 67 [Ministers in Parliament] 
Ministers may attend the Chamber if they so desire, and they have the right 
to be heard whenever they request to speak. They may be assisted by 
whomever they select from among the officials of their Departments. 
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Article 68 [Vote of No-Confidence] 
When the Chamber, in accordance with Article 37, passes a vote of 
noconfidence in a Minister, that Minister is required to resign. 
Article 69 [Government Resignation] 
(1) The Government is considered resigned in the following circumstances: 
a. if the Prime Minister resigns; 
b. if it loses more than a third of the members specified in the Decree forming 
it; 
c. if the Prime Minister dies; 
d. at the beginning of the term of the President of the Republic; 
e. at the beginning of the term of the Chamber of Deputies; 
f. when it loses the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies based on the 
Chamber's initiative or based on the Council's initiative to gain the Chamber's 
confidence. 
(2) Ministers are to be dismissed by a Decree signed by the President and the 
Prime Minister in accordance with Article 65 of the constitution. 
(3) When the Council resigns or is considered resigned, the Chamber of 
Deputies is automatically considered in extraordinary session until a new 
Council has been formed and has gained the Chamber's confidence. 
Article 70 [Impeachment] 
(1) The Chamber of Deputies has the right to impeach the Prime Minister and 
Ministers for high treason or for serious neglect of their duties. The Decision to 
impeach may not be taken except by a majority of two thirds of the total 
membership of the Chamber. 
(2) A special law is to be issued to determine the conditions of the civil 
responsibility of the Prime Minister and individual Ministers. 
Article 71 [Judicial Impeachment Proceedings] 
The impeached Prime Minister or Minister are tried by the Supreme 
Council. 
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Article 72 [Consequences of Impeachment] 
A Prime Minister or Minister leaves office as soon as the Decision of 
impeachment concerning him is issued. If he resigns, his resignation does not 
prevent judicial proceedings from being instituted or continued against him. 
[Part] C. Procedural Provisions 
[Chapter] I. Election of the President of the Republic 
Article 73 [Election of the President] 
One month at least and two months at most before the expiration of the 
term of office of the President of the Republic, the Chamber is summoned by 
its President to elect the new President of the Republic. However, should it not 
be summoned for this purpose, the Chamber meets of its own accord on the 
tenth day preceding the expiration of the President's term of office. 
Article 74 [Vacancy of Presidency] 
Should the Presidency become vacant through the death or resignation of 
the President or for any other cause, the Chamber meets immediately and by 
virtue of the law to elect a successor. If the Chamber happens to be dissolved at 
the time the vacancy occurs, the electoral bodies are convened without delay 
and, as soon as the elections have taken place, the Chamber meets by virtue of 
the law. 
Article 75 
The Chamber meeting to elect the President of the Republic is considered 
an electoral body and not a legislative assembly. It must proceed immediately, 
without discussion or any other act, to elect the Head of the State. 
[Chapter] II. Amending the Constitution 
Article 76 [Proposal] 
The constitution may be revised upon the proposal of the President of the 
Republic. In such a case the Government submits a draft law to the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Article 77 [Request] 
The constitution may also be revised upon the request of the Chamber of 
Deputies. In this case the following procedures are to be observed: During an 
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ordinary session and at the request of at least ten of its members, tiie Chamber 
of Deputies may recommend, by a majority of two thirds of the total members 
lawfully composing the Chamber, the revision of the constitution. However, 
the articles and the questions referred to in the recommendation must be clearly 
defined and specified. The President of the Chamber then transmits the 
recommendation to the Government requesting it to prepare a draft law relating 
thereto. If the Government approves the recommendation of the Chamber by a 
majority of two thirds, it must prepare the draft amendment and submit it to the 
Chamber within four months; it does not agree, it shall return the Decision to 
the Chamber for reconsideration. If the Chamber insists upon the necessity of 
the amendment by a majority of three fourths of the total members lawfully 
composing the Chamber, the President of the Republic has then either to 
accede to the Chamber's recommendation or to ask the Council of Ministers to 
dissolve the Chamber and to hold new elections within three months. If the new 
Chamber insists on the necessity of amending the constitution, the Government 
must yield and submit the draft amendment within four months. 
Article 78 [Priority] 
When a draft law dealing with a constitutional amendment is submitted to 
the Chamber, it must confine itself to its discussion before any other work until 
a final vote is taken. It may discuss and vote only on articles and questions 
clearly enumerated and defined in the draft submitted to it. 
Article 79 (Majority, Promulgation] 
(1) When a draft law dealing with a constitutional amendment is submitted to 
the Chamber, it cannot discuss it or vote upon it except when a majority of two 
thirds of the members lawfully composing the Chamber are present. Voting is 
by the same majority. 
(2) The President of the Republic is required to promulgate the law of the 
constitutional amendment under the same conditions and in the same form as 
ordinary laws. He has the right, within the period established for the 
promulgation, to ask the Chamber to reconsider the draft, after consultation 
with the council of Ministers, in which case the vote is by a majority of two 
thirds. 
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[Part] D. Miscellaneous Provisions 
[Chapter] I. The Supreme Council 
Article 80 [Function, Composition, Organizational Law] 
The Supreme Council, whose function is to try Presidents and Ministers, 
consists of seven deputies elected by the Chamber of Deputies and of eight of 
the highest Lebanese judges, according to their rank in the judicial hierarchy, 
or, in case of equal ranks, in the order of seniority. They meet under the 
presidency of the judge of the highest rank. The Decisions of condemnation by 
the Supreme Council is rendered by a majority often votes. A special law is to 
be issued to determine the procedure to be followed by this Council. 
[Chapter] IL Finances 
Article 81 [Integral Tax Law] 
No public taxes may be imposed and no new taxes established or collected 
in the Lebanese Republic except by a comprehensive law which applies to the 
entire Lebanese territory without exception. 
Article 82 [Rule of Law I 
No tax may be modified or abolished except by virtue of law. 
Article 83 [Yearly Budget] 
Each year at the beginning of the October session, the Government has to 
submit to the Chamber of Deputies the general budget estimates of state 
expenditures and revenues for the following year. The budget is voted upon 
article by article. 
Article 84 [Budget Discussion] 
During the discussion of the budget and draft laws involving the opening of 
supplementary or extraordinary credits, the Chamber may not increase the 
credits proposed in the budget or in the draft laws mentioned above either by 
way of amendment Or by means of a proposal. The Chamber may, however, 
adopt, by way of proposal, laws involving ftirther expenditures after the close 
of this discussion. 
Article 85 [Extraordinary Credit] 
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No extraordinary credit may be opened except by a special law. 
Nevertheless, should unforseen circumstances render urgent expenditures 
necessary, the President of the Republic may issue a Decree, based on a 
Decision of the Council or Ministers, to open extraordinary or supplementary 
credits or transfer appropriations in the budget as long as these credits do not 
exceed a maximum limit specified in the budget law. These measures are to be 
submitted to the Chamber for approval at the first ensuing session. 
Article 86 [Provisional Budget] 
If the Chamber of Deputies has not given a final decision on the budget 
estimates before the expiration of the session devoted to the examination of the 
budget, the President of the Republic, in coordination with the Prime Minister, 
inmiediately convenes the Chamber for an extraordinary session which lasts 
until the end of January in order to continue the discussion of the budget; if, at 
the end of this extraordinary session, the budget estimates have not been finally 
settled, the Council of Ministers may take a decision on the basis of which a 
decree is issued by the President giving effect to the above estimates in the 
form in which they were submitted to the Chamber. However, the Council of 
Ministers may not exercise this right unless the budget estimates were 
submitted to the Chamber at least fifteen days before the commencement of its 
session. Nevertheless, during the said extraordinary session, taxes, charges, 
duties, imposts, and other kinds of revenues continue to be collected as before. 
The budget of the previous year is adopted as a basis. To this must be added the 
permanent credits which have been dropped, and the Government fixes the 
expenditures for the month of January on the basis of the 'provisional twelfth.' 
Article 87 [Final Financial Accounts, Auditing Bureau] 
The final financial accounts of the administration for each year must be 
submitted to the Chamber for approval before the promulgation of the budget 
of the year following. A special law is to be issued for the setting up of an 
Auditing Bureau. 
Article 88 [Public Loan] 
No public loan or undertaking involving an expenditure from the treasury 
fiinds may be contracted except by virtue of a law. 
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Article 89 [Contracts, Concessions, Resources, MonpoliesJ 
No contract or concession for the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
country, or a public utility service, or a monopoly may be granted except bj* 
virtue of a law and for a limited period. 
[Part] E. Provisions Relating to the Mandatory Power and the Leage ol 
Nations 
Article 90 [...1 
{Abolished in 1943} 
Article 91 [...] 
{Abolished in 1943} 
Article 92 [...] 
{Abolished in 1943} 
Article 93 (..-l 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 94 [...] 
{Abolished in 1943} 
[Part] F. On the Abolition of Political Confessionalism 
Article 95 [National Committee] 
(1) The first Chamber or Deputies which is elected on the basis of equalit) 
between Muslims and Christians takes the appropriate measures to realize the 
abolition of political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A 
National Committee is to be formed, headed by the President of the Republic, 
including, in addition to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Prime Minister, leading political, intellectual, and social figures. 
(2) The tasks of this Committee are to study and propose the means to ensure 
the abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies anc 
the Ministers, and supervise the execution of the transitional plan. 
(3) During the transitional phase: 
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a. The confessional groups are to be represented in a just and equitable 
fashion in the formation of the Cabinet. 
b. The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the 
judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed 
agencies are to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national 
reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and 
competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents are exempt from 
this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally bclwccn Christians and 
Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but 
rather applying the principles of expertise and competence. 
[Part] G. Provisions Relating to the Election and Functions of the Senate 
Article 96 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 97 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 98 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 99 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
Article 100 [...] 
{Abolished in 1947} 
[Part] H. Additional Provisions 
Article 101 [Greater Lebanon, The Lebanese Republic] 
Beginning 1 Sep 1929, the state of'Greater Lebanon' is to be known as 'The 
Lebanese Republic' without any other change or modification. 
Article 102 [Abrogation of Old Laws] 
All legislative provisions contrary to the present constitution are abrogated 
United Nations Security Council 
2 September 2004 
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Resolution 1559 (2004) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 5028th meeting, on 2 September 2004 
The Security Council, 
Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 
425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, resolution 520 (1982) of 17 
September 1982, and resolution 1553 (2004) of 29 July 2004 as well as the 
statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the 
statement of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), 
Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and 
political independence of Lebanon within its internationally territorially 
recognized borders, 
Noting the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-
Lebanese forces from Lebanon, 
Gravely concerned at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, 
which prevent the Lebanese government from exercising its full sovereignty 
over all Lebanese territory. 
Reaffirming the importance of the extension of the control of the Government 
of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory, 
Mindful of the upcoming Lebanese presidential elections and underlining the 
importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese 
1. Reaffirms its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive 
authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; 
2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon; 
3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
militias; 
4. Supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all 
Lebanese territory; 
5. Declares its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon's 
upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese 
constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence; 
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6. Calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the 
Security Council for the full implementation of this and all relevant 
resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full 
sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon; 
7. Requests that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council within 
thirty days on the implementation by the parties of this resolution and 
decides to remain actively seized of this matter. 
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